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Author's Note 
This thesis began shortly after the European Community (EC) (formerly the 
European Economic Community (EEC)) was renamed the European Union (EU) 
under the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Maastricht, 1992. However, 
consistent labelling of the law with the name of the political entity has lagged. The 
EEC Treaty was officially renamed the EC Treaty (hence the term 'EC law') in the 
TEU. 
In an effort to maintain some consistency and avoid confusing distractions, liberty 
has been taken in this thesis in using the term EC (European Community/ies) in place 
of EU, since the central focus is on EC law. In regard to citations or bibliographical 
reference the terms EEC, EC and EU are used depending upon the author and date 
the item was published. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an examination of competition law in the context of the changing 
telecommunications industry. It is undertaken with the aim of facilitating a re- 
assessment of contemporary competition law and policy by raising questions about 
its interpretation. This is principally achieved through questioning the underlying 
philosophy that informs the law and policy of competition in the particular context of 
developments occurring within the industry. The competition law of the European 
Community is selected for particular study, but there are common problems faced by 
other systems of competition regulation to which reference is also made. 
A re-assessment of this area of law and policy is timely and the telecommunications 
industry offers an appropriate focus for study and analysis. Competition ('antitrust') 
law and policy recently passed its centennial. Although it may be argued that 
competition law and policy have existed longer in a number of countries, examples 
and analogies may be seen in a variety of royal decrees and grants of historic 
monopolies, the system that protects the right to compete really only developed 
within the past century. The interpretation of competition law has not, of course, 
been static in the context of any single legal system. In the United States for 
example, the argument for economic-dominance in antitrust decisions was popular in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, because of its predictability. This method was not always 
the case. After a century of experience, the present is an appropriate time for 
reflection, particularly as a number of significant competition problems remain 
unresolved. 
A re-consideration is also rendered timely by the contemporary expectation that the 
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commercial world is undergoing a period of revolutionary change. This revolution 
involves the change of the Industrial Society into an Information Society. Whereas 
previous generations have witnessed the emergence of nation-states as building 
blocks in the system of public international law and, later, the birth of the industrial 
society, it is today widely held that the latter years of the twentieth century are 
developing not only a new age of information technology but, with it, potentially 
new political, social and economic structures. The telecommunications industry is 
the infrastructure for this new order. The questions of its legal structure and 
regulation are thus matters of profound potential significance for the 21st century 
world order. Competition law and policy are by no means the only area in which 
important questions arise in this regard, but do represent a vitally significant aspect 
of the future shaping of an Information Society which may be distinctly different 
from what has gone before. 
In this context, the present thesis is neither intended as a review of competition law 
and its development over the past century nor a case-by-case assessment of its 
progress. It is, rather, intended to initiate a discourse upon the optimum approach of 
competition policy to the new `Information Society'. In regard to competition law, 
while its history may be of interest and the different interpretations worthy of 
comparison, the value of its historical development is really only pertinent in this 
thesis so far as it has had a direct effect upon contemporary problems and changes. 
The `Information Society' will be, and to a degree already is, focused upon 
information-exchange in contrast to industrial manufacturing. This development is 
founded upon technological advances which have occurred in the previous separate 
(albeit distantly related) telecommunications, computer and media industries. In the 
case of the latter, these developments have effectively re-created it as the multimedia 
industry, incorporating news-information services and entertainment. Developments 
3 
in these industries and through related technology such as digitalisation have brought 
about the circumstances in which inter-sectional convergence can occur. The 
convergence of telecommunications, computer technology and multimedia, in brief, 
creates the industry and marketplace for the provision of services upon which society 
is becoming increasingly dependent. The dependence is through further technological 
development and through the maximisation of information-service provision. Much 
has been written in the popular press and by politicians suggesting that the majority 
of employment will be dependent on information-service markets by the early part of 
the 21st century. Whether this will indeed be so or to what extent can not be 
presently known without significant changes and the benefit of hindsight. Only then 
can comparisons be confidently made in order to determine how much the 
information society developed to supersede the industrial society. It is not the 
purpose of this study to state a position either in support or in contradiction of the 
proposition that an economic, social and political revolution is occurring. It is for the 
present purpose simply assumed that important change is occurring, whether these 
are ultimately evolutionary or revolutionary in character may be a matter of general 
interest, but is of slight importance to the analysis sought to be advanced. 
The principal endeavour of this thesis is to begin the re-assessment of competition 
law and policy by pointing to the problem area of market-dominance and its threat to 
the continuance of a competitive market. The premise throughout the study is that a 
competitive marketplace in telecommunications has yet to be achieved and while it is 
being developed, competition problem areas which continue to be unresolved need 
to be addressed. For example, adherents of the neo-classical theory which recently 
influenced American thinking argue that market dominance is inherently not a long- 
term commercial phenomenon. This is said to be the case because in a competitive 
market the existence of a dominant-player would be an incentive for rivals to defeat 
it, for example through innovation and pricing. This argument is not accepted at 
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face-value in this thesis. While there may be some supporting evidence for the 
proposition, it may also be doubted whether the fully competitive market is 
necessarily a workable paradigm for all markets and industries. It may, rather, be the 
ideal which should be the goal for markets and industries but must be seen as an 
aspiration rather than a universally valid description of the real functioning of the 
commercial world. A more realistic position would be not the presumption of a fully- 
competitive market, but the acceptance of an imperfect market with the goal through 
law and policy of achieving this ideal. The telecommunications market and 
particularly the conflicts within it demonstrates the difficulty in achieving the 
perfectly competitive market. 
The discourse which is here sought to be advanced in re-assessing competitive law 
and policy is founded upon a combination of practice and theory. The practice is 
what is actually occurring within the telecommunications industry and market, while 
the theory is the fundamental thinking behind the policy and the law guiding and 
governing competition. 
The thesis is then structured on a step-by-step approach. Chapter One, by necessity 
of a changing industry, establishes the context in which this study was prepared and 
undertaken. It sets out what is occurring within and to the telecommunications 
market. This places the thesis within the practical situation. The second chapter 
continues this contextualisation, but through the policy and legal changes in the 
European Community in developing a competitive (telecommunications) market. 
Chapter Three addresses the root of the argument underlining the thesis, which is the 
philosophical approach of competition law. By necessity the chapter discusses more 
of the fundamental problems behind competition management through law and 
policy and does not refer much directly to telecommunications. However the 
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argument supports the concerns and criticisms about various types of markets and 
obstacles to competition in Chapters Four and Five. 
Chapter Four focuses on the problem of concentrations in markets, particularly in 
telecommunications. Among the problems include the need and attraction at times 
for alliances between rivals, as well as the challenge of oligopolies. Chapter Five 
addresses the EC's approach to protecting competition in telecommunications and 
further contradictions the industry presents to a competitive market. 
Chapter Six seeks to extend the encouragement for a re-assessment beyond the 
confines of the domestic (EC) market. It advances another view in this thesis of the 
new telecommunications industry, which is that the industry and market is of a type 
that is an international one. In encouraging a new debate over competition policy and 
enforcement, this chapter opens more questions and raises challenging issues which 
require addressing and answering. 
The intended ultimate result of the thesis is to encourage a thought-provoking re- 
evaluation of competition law and policy in keeping with the needs of a changing 
industrial society. Although, as remarked above, the principal focus of this study is 
on EC law, the basis of the argument may also be applicable to other systems. It is 
contended that the essential problem lies with the philosophy supporting the general 
policy and laws. The discourse is more than an academic debate, for the extreme 
approaches which have been fashionable, especially but not solely in the United 
States, have not provided answers to common competition problems. These 
problems may cause short-term disruptions and structural distortions in much of the 
telecommunications market if not addressed and properly managed. The market in 
domestic jurisdictions may even suffer if international competition problems are not 
addressed. The thesis brings to the forefront important matters requiring attention 
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and these early years of telecommunications liberalisation present an opportunity to 
address the problems and implement new solutions. 
The thesis neither aims nor pretends to have achieved a global analysis of 
competition law. It is a wide area of law, and not all its aspects are or need to be 
covered within the scope of this study. The main focus is upon the maintenance of a 
competitive telecommunications market, but the concern is that a weak or misguided 
application of competition law will allow for an over-concentrated and ultimately 
uncompetitive industry. The areas chosen for emphasis have been selected in light of 
these concerns. 
In a few instances topics have been omitted not only because space would not permit 
a justified analysis of them, but also because they would require extensive and 
separate study in their own right to do justice to them. In particular, enforcement and 
investigation procedures, intellectual property, pricing and tariff matters have either 
been omitted or given little reference. The reasons are that their importance and 
topical relevance, especially with regard to modern telecommunications are of such 
an order that proper examination would be impossible within the confines of the 
present discussion. Each should be accorded a thesis-study. In light of this, any 
attempt for analysis of these subjects would distract from the intent of this thesis. 
The emphasis is not on the reasoning of particular judgements, but rather the use of 
cases and legislation is to understand the wider philosophy behind the competition 
law. 
This thesis was written during an exciting period in the transition to the "Information 
Society". The research began with some foresight and inspiration of change through 
the guidance of policy publications, but more accurately resulted from concern about 
the actual success of competition governance. By some coincidence, the research 
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began just prior to the strategic alliance era. This commenced through the formal 
announcement by Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom about their intention to 
form an alliance (Atlas) in December 1993. 
The changes and developments both through legislation and corporate activity have 
been continuous, at times seemingly furious, but nevertheless making the period of 
the construction of this thesis exciting. The law and policy cited in this thesis, and 
the industry and market information pertinent to the examples of the problems are 
accurate as of 30th October 1997. 
S 
CHAPTER ONE 
The New Telecommunications Industry: 
An Industry and Market Being Reshaped and Redefined 
1.1 Introduction 
To begin the discourse on competition law in the changing commercial society, this 
chapter is to necessarily establish an understanding about the 'new' 
telecommunications industry. It provides a basis for some of the problems and their 
sources raised throughout the thesis. It is in essence about a telecommunications 
industry in transition which, because of significant developments, also highlights the 
difficulty in anticipating the new structural form of the industry. 
There is a popular opinion which holds that a new telecommunications industry is 
emerging; one whose transition is not so much a continuous evolution, but rather a 
revolution. ' An example of this opinion is found in a publication by Britain's Office 
of Telecommunications (Otte! ): 
"A new era, possibly as significant as the industrial revolution of the 
nineteenth century, is about to begin. " Z 
The belief that there is a significant change occurring originates from a combination 
of activities in the industry. These changes are based on both technology and 
politics, ' some of which are simultaneously occurring. There is uncertainty about the 
shape of the new telecommunications structure. 4 There is, however, also a need for 
adequate regulation which meets current and future requirements. ' In this chapter it 
is necessary to discuss some of the factors that are shaping the new industry and the 
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regulation of competition within it. These factors are titled technological, structural 
and political. 
1.2 Technological 
The technological changes are of interest in this analysis only in so far as they 
potentially create new types of products, and therefore could form new markets. As 
will be shown in a subsequent chapter, there can be problems of definition. Some of 
the effects of new technological developments include improved efficiency of 
communication and additional types of communication exchange (such as voice, 
data, and video). Restrictions on the location of communications are beginning to be 
removed and the costs of communication are also being reduced. New technology 
also reduces the cost of entry and may therefore encourage competition. 
6 However, 
technology further affects the telecommunications industry by allowing for over- 
capacity and there is the risk of forming new barriers to market-entry. 
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Some significant technological advances in the industry include digitalisation, fibre 
optics and the microchip. These developments establish not only new markets, but 
create new relationships between companies. One new market produced by 
technological advances could be the convergence of the television, telephone and 
computer. Although it is technically possible to merge into one unit, its appeal to the 
consumer is another matter. What is important is the commercial relationship that 
emerges from this technical advance. The services from three previously separate 
service providers could now come from one provider! 
"It is clear.. . that telecommunications systems will 
be a vital component in the 
distribution of any future digital or broadcast services. It is also clear that as 
technological developments such as digitalisation emerge and the traditional 
telecommunications systems begin to offer video-based services, broadcast 
services will become increasingly difficult to distinguish from other services 
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with a telecommunications component. " 9 
From a legal perspective, as observed by Oftel, "these developments will mean that 
the traditional regulatory distinctions between broadcasting and telecommunications 
will be difficult to sustain". 10 
The microchip has assisted telecommunications by improving capacity and 
decreasing costs. " Furthermore microchips in modem computers, according to 
Cane, "provide the processing power to handle everything from speed to full motion 
colour video coupled with high-fidelity sound". 12 Another example of the modem 
sophistication and advantage of the microchip and computer is the benefits in 
maintaining communications equipment. The digitalisation of the industry also allows 
for greater 'speed in transmission and reception of information. The consequences 
between the computer industry and telecommunications are however at odds. 
Whereas the computer industry is able to offer customers faster, smaller and more 
powerful devices at the same price, the telecommunications industry is forced to 
offer the same product at a falling price. Telecommunications providers are 
presented with the problem of finding value added services for basic telephony more 
quickly than prices fall. 
Fibre optics is a source of this profit-loss problem encountered by telecom firms. It 
allows for a greater volume of telecommunications traffic. This technology permits 
long distance communications to be transmitted at a high capacity and at a lower 
cost than the traditional copper wire system. The new system costs about half as 
much as the old system. 13 A single optic fibre is thinner than a human hair and 
currently has the ability to simultaneously carry 30,000 telephone conversations. 
According to the International Telecommunications Union, less than a third of the 
capacity of the trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific fibre optic cables is used. 14 Fibre 
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optics has the ability to transmit video and image based services as well as voice, 
data, switching, highly reliable transmission and economical service delivery. " This 
is now more efficient, effective and economical than the copper wire system. It also 
increases the types of services that can be provided. 
The consequence of new transmission and receiving methods is the possibility of 
increased competition for traditional telecommunications providers from others, such 
as cable companies. 16 In addition, there is a greater potential for many different types 
of services to be provided through telecommunications. A few examples include 
entertainment, home shopping and on-line business information. " This provides 
telecommunication firms with the opportunity for new markets which will be a 
source of revenue to substitute falling prices in the original voice and basic data (e. g. 
fax) markets. 
Fibre optics and satellite technology advance the types and capacities of 
communications exchange. 18 Transmission and reception are also furthered through 
the use of mobile communication. 19 The result, in theory, is the potential for 
competition between service (i. e. transmitter and reception) operators. In addition, 
there is potential competition through types of communication exchanged. 
1.3- Structure 
The carrier of telecommunications has in the past usually been state-owned and 
operated. This was the situation in the European Community until deregulation 
began with the privatisation of British Telecom, the Netherlands opened its markets 
in 1989 and Sweden's more recent membership to the Community. The United States 
has been an exception to the rule. AT&T held a privately owned monopoly that was 
accepted for most of the twentieth century2° until the 1984 divestiture. The political 
changes in the EC telecommunications industry's structure resulted from the 1987 
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Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications 
Service and Equipment. This began the process of opening up the EC's 
telecommunications market. 21 The basis of liberalisation can be found in the Green 
Paper. 
"The strength of European telecommunications is one of the major 
requirements for improving the competitiveness of the European Economy, 
strengthening Community cohesion and achieving the completion of the 
i2 Community wide market... 2 
The Commission has successfully overcome resistance by some Member States to 
accept, as Pombo called it, "the Internal Market philosophy, particularly where an 
economic area as sensitive as telecommunications was implicated". 23 Following the 
use of Article 90,24 (see Chapter Two) progress nevertheless depends on the 
implementation and enforcement of the Directives. A further problem extending 
beyond political philosophy is the practical difficulty between Member States 
regarding varying degrees of technical structure, ability and development . 
2' A 
method of understanding the apparent direction of the industry and the situation 
within the EC, is to divide the history of the telecommunications industry into 
distinct eras. These could be described in terms of three ages of 
telecommunications. 26 
The first age is the natural monopoly. It was defined as one where: 
"... a product or group of products can be produced most cheaply by one 
large firm.... Natural monopoly raises the issue of organising an industry so 
as to gain the potential efficiency advantage of production by a single firm 
without creating the conditions for monopolistic conduct or losing incentives 
for management of cost. "Z' 
Chalmers defined a natural monopoly as "[t]he principle that a certain activity is 
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logically suited to being carried out by a single organisation without competition". 28 
He further explained its connection to the telecommunications industry. 
"For many years it was widely assumed that telecoms operating was a natural 
monopoly on account of the size of investment required as well as some of 
the public- service functions associated with a utility. 29 
Valiance characterised this first age of natural monopoly as one in which operators 
control fixed networks. These networks he explained are "... tied to, or even 
vertically integrated with, national suppliers. i3o 
"These operators provide basic services nationally by themselves and 
international service on a correspondent basis (that is - combining with one 
another to provide end to end services). Their ethos at its best is a strong 
public service one, achieved by politically controlled regulation, or indeed 
public ownership. They provide universal service at affordable price, often 
heavily averaged. And they do so, in all countries, by cross subsidies from 
business and high users for the benefit of low users. ... 
That stable public 
service world is indeed a utility world. "" 
The purpose of the state telecommunications monopolies (in Europe) in providing 
universal service may not have been an accurate perception. Stehmann and 
Borthwick offered the view that "the correlation between network monopoly and 
achieving the universal service goal may be weaker than is often assumed" 32 
However, they also stated "universal service [has] been virtually achieved in the 
more advanced industrialised countries". 33 This may not necessarily be from a direct 
policy action. Instead some writers have suggested "the modern definition of 
universal service arose when.. . cross-subsidy practices were threatened 
by 
competition". 34 Stehmann and Borthwick reported: 
"According to an OECD study, European TOs historically give rather low 
priority to universal service... One may therefore argue that the universal 
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service objective was redefined by vested interests as a useful tool to slow 
liberalisation. " 3s 
Universal service and its future (for example, as a means to building 'the information 
superhighway') is further examined later in this dissertation, but it is a stage which 
some industry experts believe some countries have moved beyond in their 
development. Valiance believes in a second stage in the progress of 
telecommunications 
The second stage is the age of technology and deregulation. The liberalisation is 
extended to all sectors of the industry; "local, long-distance and international, 
covering voice and the public and private services, switched and unswitched, wire 
line and radio, terrestrial and satellite, mobile and fixed, and not only services but 
also infrastructure provision. r36 Liberalisation (in theory), is protected by regulation 
that manages the market to guarantee competition and "protects, stimulate and 
sustain market entrants". 37 He suggests competition develops and the utility market 
disappears in this stage. 
The third stage is one of convergence. 
"To some observers, it is the merging of technologies, to others it is the 
blurring of industry boundaries and the proliferation of overlapping services 
from both traditional and non-traditional suppliers. In the strictest sense, 
convergence is the inclination of different market segments towards each 
other. X38 
The stage of convergence as described by Valiance occurs where digital technology 
replaces the electronic switching. This technology (as previously described) enables 
an expansion of capabilities in the types of services which can be delivered. This new 
potential brings together telecom firms with other industries, namely computing, 
entertainment and other sources of information dissemination. An intelligent network 
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is capable of being created with the aid of complex software. This offers greater 
capacity to communicate larger quantities and volumes of information. 39 
Valiance believes that the United States and Britain are at the beginning of the 
convergence stage. 40 He also believes many countries including some in the EC have 
only begun the second stage. Consequently, there is a potential for conflict from 
these distortions and a lack of harmonised progress in the EC. 
The 1998 deadline for telecommunications liberalisation in the EC also highlights the 
difference between the telecommunications developments within the Community. It 
also emphasises the common uncertainty about what shape the new 
telecommunications industry will form Convergence is one important reason why, as 
Chalmers claimed "... traditional telephone companies are falling over themselves in 
attempting to buy or get into partnership with companies active in these sectors. "" 
Liberalisation is another reason. It is not only a business opportunity, but the threat 
of competitors which is spurring alliance formations. Alliances are dealt with in a 
later chapter. However, two points of interest emerge from the issue of convergence. 
The first is that there is a potential for new markets and new services in which firms 
can compete to obtain more customers and potentially a greater share of the 
communications business. Secondly there is the issue about the way firms participate 
in convergence. 
A convergence might mean a complete merger or full assimilation of firms. For 
example, an entertainment firm and a telecommunications firm could form a loose 
alliance where there is an agreement that one delivers the other's product. In the 
meantime the independence of each firm is retained. Or they could unite to form a 
new company. 
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However, Overbury and Ravaioli believe telecommunications and information 
technology are not yet truly converged. This they claim, is: 
"... because the basic function of the communication of information is still 
different from that of processing information. X42 
They believe the two have instead become interdependent. The improvements in 
communication through the medium of data processing and through the medium of 
telecommunications have occurred separately. 43 They argued the implication was 
expansion and not convergence. 4 From an historical perspective this may be 
interesting. It is an interesting argument in discussing the meeting of different aspects 
of communication. It has been claimed the data processing industry and 
telecommunications have developed along different lines 45 The former had origins in 
a more competitive environment. Telecommunications developed more slowly over a 
longer period of time due to its state control and organisation. ab 
One industry observer stated: 
"[P]eople believe that customers will be more inclined to buy 
communications from people who can also offer them entertainment, video 
links, home shopping and the rest of it ... [A]s a result, people are frightened 
that someone else - in a now hugely competitive and an ever more 
competitive sector - will have access to a superior product or transmission 
system. "47 
In relation to the debate about convergence, this observation could be used to 
suggest that data processing and telecommunications will not simply be 
interdependent as Overbury and Ravaioli stated 48 Although interdependence may 
currently exist, the vision of Oftel stated above about the future of the 
communications industry as well as the perceived demand for 'one stop shopping', 49 
suggests that the third stage is an acceptable prediction of the industry's evolution. 
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Measures can then be taken to ensure any foreseeable or potential anti-competitive 
formations do not occur. 
1.4 Political Influences 
Political changes have encouraged the promotion of the notion that the industry will 
be best managed by market forces and should be based on competition. 5° This is a 
distinct change from the traditional attitude which regarded telecommunications as a 
public utility. " Mansell described the new attitude: 
"For some observers, the evolution of public telecommunications networks 
raises issues that do not differ from those that need to be considered in other 
manufacturers of shoes or automobiles. "$2 
An example of this view can be seen in the writings of Gasman who stated "[a]fl 
public policy should aim ... to maximise economic efficiency, and to 
leave individuals 
as free as possible to do as they wish as long as they do not impose undue costs on 
others. 03 However the current nature of the industry may not necessarily allow for 
the ideal of open competition. This could be due in part to the transitional period 
telecommunications is going through from a monopolistic to a competitive state. 54 
One feature which obstructs the creation of an ideal competitive industry is the threat 
of established dominant firms (PTTs, TAs or TOs) being tempted to use their 
position and economic strength to thwart the entry of competitors into the national 
markets. " This position of dominance is influential and directly affects the 
competitiveness of the market. It is a basic yet significant difference between the 
telecommunications industry and any other goods and service provider in the private 
sector. Access to infrastructure owned and operated by the PTT or TO, connection 
and service tariffs, cross-subsidisation and separation of PTTs' commercial 
operations from influences on national regulations are important competition 
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concerns. 
Traditionally the PTTs, according to Overbury and Ravaioli had: "... exclusive and 
total control for the establishment and operation of the network infrastructure; for 
the supply of a few, but well standardised services; for the supply of terminal 
equipment to customers; for all standardisation and type approvals; for regulation 
and frequency management; for research and development and policy making. 06 
Telecommunications has been one area in particular where not all EC members have 
been enthusiastic to relinquish control. 57 
Opening the telecommunications industry to competition is seen by the European 
Commission as important for the benefit of consumers and the EC as a whole. For. 
consumers, the Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert claimed the advantages 
of competition in telecommunications concerned price, service quality and choice. 58 
Liberalisation has demonstrated such consumer benefits where the market has 
opened. According to the OECD, the benefits of liberalisation will be markets 
expanding, consumer choices improved and prices reduced. 59 These are important 
to the economy of the modern society. More than six out of ten jobs in Europe 
depend directly or indirectly on information technology. 60 The modern industrial 
setting is being based on the provision and use of information through advanced 
means 61 
Liberalisation also brings commercial efficiency to the traditional protected 
monopolies. The PTTs who had little incentive to develop new services, be efficient 
or reduce charges find they must do so. They can now be undercut through price, 
service and quality by new rivals. 62 The situation in Europe has been described in the 
following manner; 
"The backwardness of Europe's telecom monopolies ... 
is more than just an 
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irritation to users: It is hampering Europe's ability to compete.... [T]he 
disparity in prices and services is sapping Europe's economic vitality. , 63 
These disparities range from variations in charges to length of time it takes to be 
connected. One observer wrote: 
"In most countries long distance calls are priced disproportionately high in 
relation to the cost of providing the service. International calls are overpriced 
to an even greater extent, a condition which is particularly evident across the 
European continent where the close proximity of so many countries means 
that many international calls cover no greater distance than the average 
domestic call. " 64 
The problem of such costs is partly due to the inefficiency of state - monopolies and 
their overcharging. The problem also concerns national borders. A call placed 
between states "stops" at the border. The signals are often converted to the 
standards and technology of the destination-state's system. The tariffs charged by the 
destination state to the sender state is often very much higher than the cost. 65 The 
tariffs are, according to the consultant firm Touche Ross, "curiously asymmetrical in 
the sense that the price of a call from country A to county B is in some cases up to 
double the price of the call in the reverse direction. " 66 
An additional obstacle for the consumer has been used by some PTTs to their 
advantage. 
"Countries with high international tariffs which limit the number of outgoing 
calls win; a positive difference between call minutes aimed into the country 
and those going out earns them hard currency payments. " 67 
This problem with monopolies should end with the opening of most states' 
telecommunications market by 1998. 
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In 1987, the Commission published its Green Paper on the Development of the 
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment (COM(87) 290) 
-hereafter the Green Paper (1987)- on the opening of the European Community's 
telecommunications market. Three influences can be attributed to the Commission's 
creation of the Green Paper (1987). The influences include, pressure on the 
Commission by the commercial sector to open and regulate a competitive 
telecommunications industry, the 1985 British Telecommunications case (41/83 
[1985]) and the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market (COM (85) 
310). 68 The objectives of the Green Paper (1987), (an analysis of which will be 
further developed in the following chapter), include: separating the regulating and 
operational activities of the PTTs, prohibiting cross-subsidisation of services, 
allowing access by other telecom operators to other PTTs' networks, and 
establishing common markets in services, equipment (both terminal and network) 
and ending PTTs' monopolies over customer equipment such as private telephone 
exchanges and telephones. Karel Van Miert re-enforced the Commission's 
determination in opening the telecommunications market when he said: 
"It is clear telecommunications can not continue to be a sector treated 
differently from other sectors, sheltered from the logic of the single 
market. x, 69 
For the purpose of this thesis what happens after liberalisation is of particular interest 
in regards to competition law. For example, the establishment of telecom alliances to 
create a network to gain access to markets, to block new. competitors or to maintain 
a dominant position is important for the law to manage. A market dominance is 
therefore a private domination over an important infrastructure to the new industrial 
society.. It is also a concern because telecommunications has become what could be 
called a social institution and the continuation of a universal service could be 
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challenged. "The ability of everyone to make and receive telephone calls at 
reasonable price is taken for granted... [it is].. at least as necessary for full 
participation in a modem society. it 70 It is not just an institution in the late twentieth 
century but an important medium for the commercial well-being of modern service- 
based societies. " 
Although universal service is dealt with later in greater detail (see Chapter Five), the 
effects of its objectives resulting from the sector - changes are worth noting. 
Traditionally in Europe as well as other parts of the world, telecommunications has 
been seen as a public utility. 72 The provision of a universal service is closely 
associated with the concept of public utility. Due to costs and the nature of 
telecommunications, universal service has traditionally been seen in European states 
as being best provided to the population through public service via the monopolies73 
referred to above. In essence, telecommunications has become to be regarded in 
general as a 'right' of humankind. 74 The recent and continuing upheaval in the 
industry has changed both the 'public' and the 'utility principles which in turn has 
caused some alarm over provision of this modern 'right'. Both the European 
Community and the United States have sought in their own ways to maintain a form 
of universal service. Government policy in the United States has been described to 
pursue the goals: 
"... to enable telecommunications to make a maximum contribution [1] to 
efficiencies because productivity is the key factor in the global competition 
that is now the norm, and [2] to the quality of life in the information society 
in such areas as education, health care, telecommuting, and democratic 
processes. "75 
However, it is actually becoming more difficult to implement these goals because the 
telecommunications, cable television, broadcasting, computing, newspaper and other 
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media-related industries were undergoing a process of convergence. 76 Universal 
service remains an important concept in the United States, " but Geller suggested 
this concept should be revised in order to benefit those truly in need, and in such a 
way that competition is not hampered. 78 
The importance of universal service in the European Community was recognised by 
Cawley who said "[s]afeguarding and developing universal service in 
telecommunications and financing uneconomic aspects of universal service 
obligations in the context of services and infrastructure liberalisation has become a 
central policy issue .... ". 
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The reasoning for universal service as a central policy issue can be found in the 
Commission's Publication Meeting Universal Service Obligations In a Competitive 
Telecommunications Sector. 8° Within the publication, it is stated: 
"The rationale for imposing universal service obligations is political, social 
and economic. It is desirable on political ground that citizens in a democracy 
have access to communication facilities which they require to exercise their 
political rights, and it is desirable on social grounds that all individuals should 
have access to communication facilities, to avoid a gulf emerging between 
'information-rich' and 'information-poor' groups. In addition, there are 
persuasive economic arguments for encouraging households and firms to 
attach themselves to the telecommunications network. " 81 
Four reasons have been given from a pure policy position. They are: to achieve 
universal geographical coverage, geographical averaging of residential prices, low 
cost access through an access deficit, and targeted telephone subsidies such as to the 
poor, elderly, disabled, rural dwellers and low users. 82 In essence, universal service 
occurs because competition would be socially harmful. Evidence to the contrary has 
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emerged and suggests competition does not necessarily harm universal service. 83 
One fear which arises from allowing competition to replace a public supported 
universal service (i. e. traditional monopolies) is about new entrants 'cherry-picking' 
the more profitable customers of the market. For example, business customers could 
be targeted more than the residential market by new entrants. 84 This leaves the 
question, why should one firm be forced to carry the less profitable residential or 
universal service obligation? Or to alter the question slightly, will some residential 
customers, such as those in cities benefit more than the less-profitable such as the 
rural customer? These are some points which regulators are faced with and these are 
elaborated upon in a later chapter. However, it does bring to the forefront the issue 
of the incumbent operators and their new relationship with their competitors. 
Competition it has been suggested, is "an odd sort" in telecommunications. " New 
entrants will require access to infrastructure networks as more European markets 
open up. The oddity is the fact that the network is owned by the entrants' rival, the 
PTT (or former PTT). It is in a sense, as one source described, like a supermarket 
using a competitor's in-house distribution system. 86 One question that is important, 
is whether one new entrant competitor be denied access to the network while 
another is accepted? Should the owner of the network be permitted discretion as to 
who is allowed access? Furthermore, how is the charge for access determined? This 
is a potential area for anti-competitive behaviour on the part of those with the power 
to accept or deny access. Government intervention in restraining the incumbent 
network operator is in principle counter to the argument that pure competition can 
exist in telecommunications. This problem raises an interesting and seemingly 
contradictory issue of duty to supply. An EC Commissioner stated: 
"The cases on Telecommunications show that, in general, a company in a 
dominant position in one market may not use its power to extend its 
dominance or monopoly into other markets. This principle is relevant to, but 
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not to be confused with, the principle that dominant companies must make 
facilities available when this is essential to enable competitors to 
compete. 07 
To avoid the need to access the incumbent's network, two alternatives may be found. 
One is that the network is'unbundled', voluntarily as some American companies have 
done 88, or by legislation. Another is to form alliances with other telecom firms, 
creating private networks. 
1.5 Summary 
The changes occurring within and to the telecommunications industry from both 
technological advances and alternative political perspectives raise many thought- 
provoking questions about the resulting structure of the sector. These questions are 
not only about the shape of the industry to come, but the consequences in relation to 
competition law. The industry will increasingly come under the auspices of 
competition law, but by how much is the next question. As the industry's market 
opens questions need answering whether it should and can be treated as other 
general competitive markets, or do particular characteristics (interconnection) and 
social-expectations deter "pure" competitive-market approaches. While the nature of 
the industry in its newer guise allows for (new) opportunities and a competitive 
market, it also presents a contradictory picture. The need for interconnection and at 
times co-operation can also test policies on competition. 
In some instances co-operation is desirable such as for market access, infrastructure 
access and technological development. Yet it is an industry which is supposed to 
become a competitive one. While on the one hand firms do compete and may strive 
to block new entrants, they also seek close co-operation through strategic alliances, 
as will be shown later. Within this new environment, legislators have a unique 
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opportunity to shape an industry from the outset. 
Although there are unique and ambiguous features of telecommunications which 
require special attention, these helpfully emphasise weaknesses in competition 
policies. The period of liberalisation is an opportunity to correct any continuing 
failings of the system overseeing competition. For those reasons the 
telecommunications industry affords, for the present purpose, not only an important 
study in its own right but a potentially significant model for the regulation of 
competition in a dynamic economic system. 
ýý"; 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Telecommunications Policy and Antitrust Measures 
2.1 Introduction 
The contextual analysis advanced in chapter one continues in this chapter, but with a 
focus upon the policy and legal changes which have occurred within the European 
Community in developing a competitive (telecommunications) market. The 
discussion of the basic policies and principles of EC telecommunications policy is 
conducted through the use of policy documents, legislation and case law. Whereas 
the first chapter established an understanding of the changing telecommunications 
sector, this chapter is focused on the practical change in the political-legal approach 
to telecommunications. The issue that becomes evident in the progression of this 
chapter and the thesis is that there is some conflict and contradiction between policy 
and law. This is in addition to the challenge of harmonising Member States' 
approaches to telecommunications. 
The chapter is organised to show the development of policy into law. During the 
transition in telecommunications to liberalisation, measures to overcome national 
resistance to change are taken such as through Article 90 and the 
Telecommunications (Antitrust) Guidelines. These measures are taken to ensure that 
Member States do act to liberalise their telecommunications markets and that the 
rules of EC competition law are understood and applied to this sector. The inclusion 
of Article 90 is important as it was a mechanism in facilitating the liberalisation 
process within sovereign countries. Article 90's application to telecommunications in 
particular, as it was previously little used, resulted in academic interest about its role. 
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In the instance of this thesis, its importance as a legal device and some of its 
controversy are cited. However, in this instance it is a part of the wider context of 
the EC's liberalisation process. 
Inherent in this thesis is an element of the unknown, which is the sense of social 
change based on communications. The liberalisation process does to a great degree 
encourage such progresses of change but, as previously shown, there is also the 
somewhat distinct issue of technological change. From a regulatory position, what 
will evolve from this change and how the resulting developments can be influenced 
are questions which have developed since the first Green Paper in 1987 firmly 
initiating political changes to telecommunications. 
The origins of EC's telecommunications policy can be traced back to 1984 with the 
Council Recommendation for the implementation of harmonisation in the field of 
telecommunications. ' The most significant basic source of general EC 
telecommunications policy, as previously noted, was the 1987 Green Paper entitled 
Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the 
Common Market for Telecommunications Service and Equipment (hereafter the 
Green Paper (1987)). 2 This gives important guidance about the Community's 
telecommunications policy. It is not the only Green Paper which is concerned with 
telecommunications per se. Others have since been published in related sectors of the 
(wider) communications industry. For example, there is the Green Paper on the 
Liberalisation of Telecommunications and Cable Television Networks. 3 It is the 
former though which provides direction as to the original intentions and objectives of 
the European Commission. Yet the Green Paper (1987) is a document of policy and 
not law. The law later stems from policy in the traditional EC form of Regulations 
and Directives. Policy may act as a guide to the interpretation of law, as seen below 
in the Terminal Equipment Directive case (202/88). 
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It is logical to first examine the policy before the law, and then the industry where 
the ideals of regulators and ambitions of industry players meet and often conflict. 
Strengths or weaknesses then emerge as to the law's ability to govern the demands of 
modern competition. 
2.2 Liberalisation towards Competition 
Liberalising and deregulating the telecommunications industry are not only adherent 
to recent political and economic philosophy. These steps can be seen as the natural 
progression towards achieving the ideal on which the EC was founded 4 In theory 
any closed industry is essentially in breach of the ideal of a common market. 
Telecommunications is also important to both the modern social and commercial 
infrastructure of the EC. 5 The opening of the telecommunications industry to 
competition is the result of socio-economic change from an industry-wide opinion 
about telecommunications. 6 Telecommunications is the industry which will be, if it is 
not already, the essential medium or infrastructure for the economic prosperity of 
companies and hence nation-states. 7 The goal of the EC is based around such 
opinions and thus an EC-wide telecommunications industry is favoured. 8 
The EC Commission's Green Paper (1987)9 was the influential blue-print for 
liberalisation. It continues to be relevant (although diminishing because of the 
increasing numbers of legislation fulfilling the objectives) for directing the 
telecommunications sector towards an open market and subsequent supervision 
under competition law. It has six main objectives towards competition: the 
liberalisation of the supply and provision of both terminal and network equipment, 
the liberalisation of services with the exception of public voice and the -operator of 
the basic network - at least temporarily, separating regulatory and operational 
functions, ensuring there is open access to networks and interconnection, 
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standardisation within the EC, and full application of competition law. 10 These 
objectives seek to open up almost every level of the telecommunications industry. 
(Mobile telecoms, satellite and cable television are later introduced into the equation 
through Directives. ) 
The six objectives stem from the EC's principles of competition throughout the 
Community, (i. e. competition within the EC, and between the Community and non- 
EC entities). In other words not only is competition regarded as positive and 
necessary for a common market, but it in turn strengthens the EC as a whole in 
competition with non-EC states such as Japan and the United States - two strong 
industrial competitors. It is also a strength against competition from other alliances 
of nation-states including Asia and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area). 
Governing the industry, whether it is by strict regulation or a looser framework is 
visible in debates about the future of telecommunications. The reasons for 
liberalisation may be divided into two categories: political and economic. 
The political reason continues the goal of achieving a common market in Europe. 
The objective of a common market was reinforced by the Single European Act 
which furthered the EEC Treaty by the addition of Article 8A. This Article was for 
the establishment of an internal market by the end of 1992. " Economic integration 
of EC members means eliminating barriers of trade between the Member States and 
not necessarily the states becoming the same. 12 This is an interesting point 
(independent of any subsequent Treaties promoting further integration), because of 
the nature of telecommunications. Access to infrastructure and networks, and 
universal service are a couple of significant characteristics of the industry which 
effectively extend EC interests into the national markets - at least initially. Achieving 
a common market in the EC also contains economic purposes. The breaking down of 
market barriers between Member States defined on national barriers are political acts 
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for the purpose of achieving economic benefits. National barriers in 
telecommunications has been a last outpost of national protectionism. 13 
Protectionism in the telecommunications industry rested primarily on national 
regulations and differing technical standards. Both hinder cross-border delivery of 
communication services and in developing an open market. 14 These are often very 
profitable to the state and among the largest enterprises and employers in the 
Member States. 15 These state and (frequently) monopolistic companies have held 
the role of both the regulator and the regulated. 
The economic reason is the changing philosophy of the purpose of the industry. A 
widely accepted opinion about the significance of telecommunications in 
contemporary economic society is found in the Commission's 1993 White Paper 
focusing on growth, competitiveness and employment. " The Commission notes 
access to information and its transmission is a key to prosperity and growth. '7 
Information is now more recognisable as a commodity as state economies shift from 
industrial (manufacturing) based to service based. 18 The change from the traditional 
acceptance of the industry as a public-utility was also influenced by technical 
changes. This makes it possible for the public telecom utilities "... to move beyond 
basic services to provide more diversified and sophisticated services". " Another 
expression of the economic reasoning is found in the report Europe and the Global 
Information Society. 
"Information has a multiplier effect which will energise every economic 
sector. With market driven tariffs, there will be a vast array of novel 
information services and applications. " 20 
This follows the argument that the new information based industry is not only a new 
market in its own right, but one which will generate other secondary markets. The 
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consequence will be a society dependent on the exchange of information-based 
services, hence the term the Information Society. The EC (and other states) have 
proposed policies towards the creation of the information society, largely because 
there is the opinion that this is the direction society is naturally taking, and 
government initiatives assist in ensuring their constituents will not be at a 
disadvantage. Additionally, there is the opinion that this is a source of economic and 
employment exploitation for the benefit of their states or trade areas. " Such opinion 
of social-economic development in policy and political rhetoric is visible, particularly 
since the 1987 Green Paper. 22 For example: 
"The convergence of information and telecommunications technologies is 
giving birth to a new industrial revolution, accompanied by economic, social 
and cultural upheaval.... The new technologies are spreading throughout our 
economic and social environments, gradually transforming our approach to 
work and leisure and touching a growing number of very different areas: 
learning, health care, transport, communication, etc. In doing so they are 
heralding a new form of social organisation: the information society. " 23 
The White Paper Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways 
Forward into the 21st Century is a beneficial source which further demonstrates 
government recognition of change. It states: 
- "To... stimulate the creation of new markets, the Commission proposes to 
identify strategic trans-European projects.... The strategic projects would be 
carried out at each of three interdependent 'levels' that makeup the 
telecommunications networks: the carrier networks for transmission of 
information, generic services and telematics applications. 
With regard to the networks which serve to carry the information (voice, 
data, images) the objective would be to consolidate the integrated service 
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digital network and to install the high speed communications network using 
advanced transmission and switching techniques (asynchronous transfer 
mode: ATM), which help digitised multimedia services to make a 
breakthrough" Z4 
These statements imply an interventionist approach to the social and economic 
changes, and this is indeed the policy adopted by the Commission. In the said White 
Paper the approach was reasoned as: 
"This major challenge confronts us all. That is why we are arguing, first and 
foremost, the need to press on with building a unified Europe which will 
increase our strength through co-operation and through the benefits of a 
large area without frontiers of any kind. That is why we are calling on 
everyone - not only political decision-makers and business leaders - to 
contribute to the combined effort by seeking to understand the new world 
and by participating in the joint endeavour. 
Nothing would be more dangerous than for Europe to maintain structures 
and customs which foster resignation, refusal of commitment and passivity. 
Revival requires a society driven by citizens who are aware of their own 
responsibilities and imbued with a spirit of solidarity towards those with 
whom they form local and national communities - communities which are so 
rich in history and their common feeling of belonging. " 25 
This call of solidarity towards change underlines the populist approach to the 
political policy of the EC in seeking to establish a common EC information society. 
The White Paper's stress on the importance the information society will have on 
economic and employment growth, quality of life and an increase in competitiveness 
is developed further in 1994 in subsequent documents, Europe's Way to the 
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Information Society: an Action Plan 26 and Europe and the Global Information 
Society 27. 
The policy approach adopted by the EC Commission in developing a trans-European 
telecommunications network(s) is based on promoting access, interconnection and 
interoperability. These are planned to achieve the four following objectives, which 
are best understood through the language of the Commission: 
"facilitating the evolution towards the information society by promoting the 
increased use of and improved access to advanced technologies, notably 
through adapted education and training facilities, to encourage new working 
arrangements... and develop new information applications and services, 
particularly in areas of collective interest such as healthcare, education and 
training, and cultural activities which contribute to improving the quality of 
life and the environment, 
-improving the competitiveness of European industry and strengthening the 
internal market by encouraging the development of pan-European networks, 
applications and generic services which will support the growth of trans- 
European electronic commerce and new commercial applications, and enable 
citizens of the union to access and transfer information freely within an area 
without internal frontiers, 
-reinforcing economic and social cohesion by reducing disparities between 
the regions concerning both the general availability of and access to 
telecommunications infrastructure, services, and applications 
-accelerating the development of new growth area activities (e. g. multimedia 
and electronic information services) leading to job creation, by creating a 
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favourable environment to obtain critical mass of demand and investment. " 28 
To create the said pan-European information infrastructure for the new information 
society and to achieve the social and economic benefits, an EC report invited the 
private sector to create initiatives and use its entrepreneurial skills to bring about the 
information society. 29 Among the four proposed plans of approach by the 
Commission to creating the information society, is the adoption of a regulatory and 
legal framework for the liberalisation of services and infrastructure in 
telecommunications. A second is to encourage trans-European networks, services 
and applications. " 
In addition and in elaboration to the four EC proposed plans of approach, eight 
common principles were stated at an international level. At the 1995 G7 Ministerial 
conference on the information society the following were proposed: 1) promoting 
dynamic competition, 2) encouraging private investment, 3) defining an adaptable 
regulatory framework, 4) providing open access to networks, -while- 5) ensuring 
universal service provision of and access to service, 6) promoting equality of 
opportunity to the citizen, 7) promoting diversity of content; including cultural and 
linguistic diversity, 8) recognising the necessity of world-wide co-operation with 
particular attention to less developed countries. 3' Also common to the Members 
States, including the EC, involved in the summit were the following principles 
towards the Global Information Infrastructure: 1) promotion of interconnectivity and 
interoperability, 2) developing global markets for networks, services and 
applications, 3) ensuring privacy and data security, 4) protecting intellectual property 
rights, 5) co-operating in R&D and in the development of new applications, 6) 
monitoring of the social and societal implications of the information society. 32 
The difference between these objectives and the pre-Information Society system was 
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beneficially explained in the EC White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and 
Employment. 
"If a common information area really is to be established, the digital national 
networks must, like the telephone network, be interconnected and managed 
in a coherent fashion in order to form trans-European networks which will 
provide access to a wide range of interactive services..... At present, this 
transition to interactive trans-European networks and services is being held 
up by the fragmentation of markets, by insufficient interconnection and 
interoperability and by the absence of mechanisms to ensure coherent 
management. Although these are obvious shortcomings, the problems 
concerning the telecommunications networks and services differ considerably 
from those of the other trans-European networks for the following reason: 
supply of services is inadequate and where it does exist, too costly, with the 
result that the demand is also too low as in this case it is supply which 
determines demand. " 33 
This, the EC White Paper acknowledges, is a vicious circle and is not helped by the 
strong tendency of private sector only to invest in areas of limited or acceptable 
risk. 34 In over-coming this shortfall and to create new markets, the Commission in 
addition to encouraging R&D and removing problems of security, intellectual 
property, and financial obstacles, encourages competition and the liberalisation of the 
telecommunication industry. 35 According to the document, Europe's Way to the 
Information Society - an Action Plan: 
"Competition law plays an important role in maintaining open markets, as 
well as in ensuring that co-operation between TOs does not result in new 
barriers being set up. The Commission takes an active role in the application 
of competition rules to the telecom sector..... The competition rules support a 
positive contribution to the achievement of the information society, and the 
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Commission will apply these rules taking into account the reality of the newly 
emerging global markets and the rapid speed of change. " 36 
On the one hand, with the demise of the belief that telecommunications is a natural 
monopoly and the philosophy of development associated with this model, there is the 
opinion that the industry may or should essentially be regarded like any other 
competitive commercial entity. One only needs for example, to turn to the writings 
of some American sources such as Gasman's Telecompetition for arguments of a 
more libertarian nature. 7A similar message initially appears to be supported by the 
Directive produced to bring competition to the six principle markets addressed 
above. It is at least the ideal for which to aim. On the other hand, there is the 
possible contradiction of a necessity for direct intervention such as in the provision 
of universal service. 38 The Commission first encourages competition, but then 
intervenes in order to retain elements of the old telecommunications environment. 39 
Achieving the balance is controversial as it conflicts with the Idealist model (i. e. the 
belief in perfect competition: elaborated in Chapter 3) in which the market achieves 
the demands of the consumer. There are significant implications with efforts to 
achieve these policy objectives and the restructuring of the industry across the EC. 
Prior to establishing the commercial situation of a competitive market, there was the 
political issue of government control. 
Historically most telecommunications firms have been government owned. This has 
two fundamental implications. The Public Telecommunications Authorities have had, 
according to Overbury and Ravaioli, "... the ability to formulate and enforce policies 
... of ... 
its telecommunications activities. " 40 
"As an often powerful and influential arm of the government ... [they]... can 
also implement other policies and goals that may not be consistent with the 
provision of economical and efficient telecommunications services. " 41 
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In other words the Green Paper (1987) was an important initiating step towards 
breaking down an institution politically regarded with some esteem by many states. 
The ownership of a telecommunications firm by the state is initially less important 
than the powers the company politically holds over the industry (i. e. as a regulator), 
and its economic control and benefit (i. e. state support, purchasing power, supply 
power and recipient of great wealth for government coffers). Similarly it can 
establish its own technical standards, thus creating an additional entry barrier to a 
potentially competitive market. 42 The Public Telecommunications Authorities also 
had power not only to determine national tariffs and policies, but could according to 
Overbury and Ravaioli, "... negotiate with foreign carriers and international 
communications organisations.... ", and "... implement... policies and regulations that 
may be inconsistent with the free flow of information across national 
boundaries... " 43 They were both the regulator and communications provider. The 
consequence of the Commission's goals as outlined in the Green Paper (1987) and 
the subsequent Directives enforcing the aims set out, are an intrusion into an 
important source of wealth and power of states. Whether this source is justified is a 
separate subject. It is nevertheless essential to 'intrude' in order to achieve the ideals 
of both a common market and a competitive market. This necessity has been visible 
in the behaviour of member states toward a common telecommunications market. 
The support among EC states in creating a competitive telecommunications market 
has been mixed. In this regard Britain has been one of the more positive of EC 
states. 44 It began the process in the EC as part of the more general market-oriented 
and privatisation process by the government in the 1980s. The national telecom 
company was privatised and separated from the traditional connection with the Post 
Office in 1981. In 1984 the first licence was granted, creating a duopoly and began 
the course towards a competitive industry. Other states, while voicing support, 45 
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have been taken to court by the European Commission for failing to implement 
telecom Directives. 46 
2.3 Policy to Law 
Despite the Green Paper (1987) being published a decade ago, at the time of writing 
much has yet to be successfully implemented and it therefore remains a significant 
policy guide for the foreseeable future. Three basic messages which permeate the 
Green Paper (1987) continue to be of relevance. The first states: 
"Failure to adopt the system of regulation of the telecommunications sector 
in Europe to the new technology and market conditions would risk immense 
damage to the long-term economic strength of the Community as a whole - 
and to the fulfilment of the requirements of the European citizen who is 
entitled to freedom of choice in his or her way of life: communications will be 
an increasingly important aspect for the user. " 47 
The second message states: 
"Existing structures have grown up over a long period and have been 
successful in bringing telephone services within reach of everybody in 
Europe. The objective of general public service must be reconciled with the 
objective of broader choice for the user. " 48 
The philosophy here supports the concern that less-economic services and traditional 
public access may be sacrificed in order to pursue more profitable communication 
service areas. However, having achieved its objective the message assumes it is also 
necessary that traditional service is enhanced through (if not replaced by) choice. 
The means of choice is most-likely achievable by a competitive market. 
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The final message states: 
"Regulatory changes in telecommunications must therefore take account of 
the views of all parties concerned. " 49 
This may be interpreted to state both traditional expectations of a universal service 
and contemporary needs provided through alternative market approaches should be 
met. Similarly alternative providers, it might be argued, should be accepted. There 
may emerge a problem or dispute that needs consideration. If company X is obliged 
to provide universal service including in profit-losing areas, they may have some 
grievance about their obligation which other companies are not required to fulfil. 
Thus the rivals may be able to pursue the profit-making areas only. This imbalance 
may require consideration. Alternatively, potential competitors may be kept out of 
the market because the infrastructure is owned and operated by the incumbent firm. 
This too may fall within the meaning of the third message. Regulatory changes 
require level-playing field approaches rather than creating unfair advantages for 
some firms. 
The task created in the Green Paper (1987) may be regarded by some observers as a 
difficult and complex one. No doubt this would be due to the apparent ambiguity of 
the Commission's ambitions: 1) to remove trade barriers in the telecommunications 
industry while, 2) attempting to balance both liberalisation and harmonisation, public 
services and competition. From a purist position, this is not only ambiguous but 
completely contradictory ideals. If one were to take the 'libertarian' position, 
harmonisation and public service are two objectives that meddle and hinder the 
process of competition on the basis that competition should be left to the 'natural 
laws' of economics. Competition on its own would provide the needs demanded by 
the consumer. If there is scepticism over faith in competition, it may stem from the 
EC's concern about trade barriers in other guises replacing the national (economic) 
borders the EEC Treaty is designed to remove for a common market. Thus to open 
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the closed telecommunications industry, and to clarify the markets to which 
competition will apply and change policy into legislation the EC Commission began 
forming Directives. This took the approach of focusing on industry and market 
sectors individually. 
The initial Directives created for liberalising the European telecommunications 
market focused on what may be called the 'traditional' telecommunications industry. 
These Directives concerned terminal equipment (88/301/EEC), services 
(90/388/EEC) and open network provision (90/387/EEC). Directives regarding 
'modern' aspects of the industry such as satellites, cellular telephone and cable 
television to name a few have since been developed. What is particularly interesting 
is the recognition of the telecommunications industry as something 'special' in 
comparison with other industries. A document was formed especially for the 
telecommunications industry concerning antitrust. The Telecommunications 
(Antitrust) Guidelines 199150 is a Commission Notice "clarifying the application of 
Community competition rules to the market participants in the telecommunications 
sector" . 
51 A factor of interest in this is the apparent need to create a notice to 
"clarify" the laws of competition. However, the. previously mentioned Directives 
were created with a view towards competition. 
The 'delicate balance' referred to earlier is, in telecommunications, between the 
economic model of competitive market and state planning or interference in the free 
market under Article 222(EEC). 52 The Directives which followed the Green Paper 
(1987) began to establish a new EC-wide regulatory framework for 
telecommunications, based on the three principles of liberalisation, harmonisation 
and competition. 53 
In the British Telecommunications case54 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
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confirmed that EC competition law did apply to the telecommunications sector, yet 
its significance has more to do with Article 90 (see below) and its interpretation. 
British Telecommunications (BT) was found to have abused its dominant position, 
and its actions in preventing some message forwarding agencies from offering given 
types of services was ruled illegal. This case was based primarily on Article 86. BT's 
argument was based on the claim that the application of EC competition law would 
obstruct its performance of duties. The Commission accepted the argument in its 
decision that BT had duties of general economic interest within the meaning of 
Article 90(2), namely the provision of telecommunication services throughout the 
United Kingdom. However, it was ruled that Article 90(2) is not at the Member 
State's discretion with regard to its application, whereby the State "... has entrusted 
an undertaking with the operation of a service of general economic 
interest. "...... "Article 90(3) assigns the Commission the task of monitoring such 
matters, under the supervision of the Court. " ss 
In dismissing the argument of BT's duties under Article 90(2) and State application 
of those rules, the Court stated the plaintiff: 
"... totally failed to -demonstrate that the results of the activities of those 
agencies in the United Kingdom were, taken as a whole, unfavourable to BT, 
or that the Commission's censure of the schemes at issue put the performance 
- of the particular tasks entrusted to BT in jeopardy from the economic point 
of view. 06 
This case had three important and lasting results. First, the ECJ confirmed that 
competition law applied to the telecommunications industry and operators. The 
second and third results concern Article 90. The ECJ ruled it was for the 
Commission to decide any derogations from competition law under Article 90(2). 
This however, was subject to judicial review. The third result was the ECJ stating it 
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would favour a narrow form of interpretation of the scope of derogation in 
telecommunications. Since this ruling, the Commission has used Article 90 as an 
important tool in liberalising the telecommunications industry and enforcing 
Directives. However, the use of derogation from competition laws under Article 
90(2) became restricted. For example in Terminal Equipment Directive (88/301 
EC), the Commission ruled only the provision of the public telecommunications 
network could be considered a service of general economic interest. It seems, with 
time this should become redundant once competition is evident. This is supported 
simply with the argument that once there are alternative networks for the provision 
of the same basic service, there would be no need for such derogation. 
2.4 Terminal Equipment Directive (88/301/EEC): An Example of Initial 
Commission and Member State Confrontation Over Re-structuring 
Telecommunications 
As with the other Directives and areas under consideration listed earlier, terminal 
equipment may be deemed a market in its own right. Beyond it being considered as 
one however, it is an important feature in the infrastructure of telecommunications. 
This Directive is both of intent and of particular importance because it acted as a 
signal to the end of the state monopoly of telecommunications. It formally brought 
to light the general question concerning whether or not telecommunications could be 
justifiably considered a natural monopoly. 
Recognising that the monopoly rights over telecommunications "... often go beyond 
the provision of network utilisation services and extended to the supply of user 
terminal equipment for connection to the network ... ", 
57 the Commission by way of 
this Directive is of the opinion that through technical and economic development, 
there has been a "... proliferation of types of terminal equipment". 58 The Commission 
has also been encouraged by some states such as Britain in reviewing the "... gravity 
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of special or exclusive rights". 59 The conclusion drawn by the Commission was: 
"[U]sers must be allowed a free choice between the various types of 
equipment available if they are to benefit fully from the technological 
advances made in the sector. t160 
Thus the Commission, according to one observer: 
"... delineates its goals as technical progress, consumer choice... " and "... the 
elimination of restrictions on imports from other Member States, fair 
competition, and mutual acceptance of goods legally manufactured and 
marketed in other Member States ... 
i6l 
As observed by others62, Member States were generally (at least publicly) not against 
the Green Paper's (1987) recommendations. 63 An example previously presented was 
the notion of separating the traditional unitary authority of Post and 
Telecommunications where it acts as both regulator and service provider. ' Some 
Member States established new and separate regulatory bodies. Others as late as 
1990 had failed to do so. 65 Most of the Member States by 1997 had formed new 
regulatory bodies but many were too under-developed to adequately function. 
The 1988 Directive began the formal process of removing special privileges and 
exclusive rights in the telecommunications industry. In the preamble of the Directive, 
it was written: 
"The special or exclusive rights relating to terminal equipment enjoyed by 
national telecommunications monopolies are exercised in such a way as, in 
practice, to disadvantage equipment from other Member-States, notably by 
preventing users from freely choosing the equipment-regardless of 
origins. , 66 
Furthermore: 
"The provision of installation and maintenance of services is a key factor in 
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the purchasing or rental of terminal equipment. The retention of exclusive 
rights in this field would be tantamount to retention of exclusive marketing 
rights. "" 
These two important points address both the before and after markets of purchase or 
rental of equipment. Liberalisation of control over the market would not be effective 
if one existed without the other. In particular, refusal or other means of obstruction 
to aftersales servicing would hinder the market process. It could also act as a barrier 
that the EC seeks to abolish. 
"Such rights [of exclusivity] must therefore... be abolished if the abolition of 
exclusive importing and marketing rights is to any practical effect. "" 
To avoid further market distortion, 88/301/EEC states: 
"[T]he terminal equipment market requires the introduction of transparent 
technical specifications and type-approval procedures... " [in order to] "allow 
the free movement of terminal equipment. it69 
Although Member States generally supported the Green Paper (1987), the legislation 
introduced to implement the aims in the Green Paper were received less 
enthusiastically by some. The 88/301/EEC Directive was challenged before the 
European Court of Justice by France, Italy, Belgium, Germany and Greece. 70 
"The challenging Member States focused on the power of the Commission to 
issue the Directive under Article 90(3) rather than on the substance of the 
Directive itself. "" 
The States objected to 88/301/EEC on the grounds of. "... the distortions of 
procedure, the incompetence of the Commission, violation of the principles of 
proportionality, and violation of procedure. 02 The ECJ ruled in the Commission's 
favour except for annulling Article 2 (of the said Directive), "... in so far as it related 
to special rights", all of Article 7 and Article 9 "... in so far as it related to those 
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annulled provisions. 03 The issue the ECJ objected to was that of special rights and 
the Commission's authority to oblige States to remove them. 
2.4.1 Article 2 of Directive 88/301/EEC 
Article 2 of the Directive "... requires Member-States which have granted 
undertakings special or exclusive rights regarding the importation, marketing, 
connection, bringing into service of telecommunications terminal equipment and/or 
maintenance of such, equipment to withdraw those rights and to inform the 
Commission of the measures taken or draft legislation introduced to that end. "74 
The intention of this Article can be found in the preamble as noted earlier. It is to 
eliminate a principle and powerful obstacle to the freedom to provide goods and 
services, 75 competition, and all measures having an equivalent effect to barriers of 
trade. 76 The Commission's authority regarding Article 2 of the Directive was 
questioned as to its justification in obliging the withdrawal of special rights and 
secondly, its use of Article 90(3) in imposing such obligations. The ECJ found 
Article 2 contained two concerns by the Commission; that of exclusive rights and 
those considered to be special rights. " 
Referring to Article 30 EEC and to case law, the ECJ stated exclusive importation 
and marketing rights were already regarded to be a breach of Community law. 
"[T]he prohibition of measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions... applies to all trading rules enacted by Member-States which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra- 
Community trade. "78 
The ECJ did state: "exclusive importation and marketing rights in the 
telecommunications terminal sector are capable of restricting intra-Community 
trade. 09 Such restrictions are contrary to Articles 2 and 3 EEC and Article 30 EEC, 
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and "must... be interpreted in the light of that principle... "80 for preventing the 
distortion of competition. So while the Commission "... was justified in requiring the 
withdrawal of exclusive rights regarding importation, marketing, connection, 
bringing into service of telecommunications terminal equipment and/or maintenance 
of such equipment... ", 8" it was not justified in seeking to have special rights removed. 
This was due to its failure to "specify the types of rights that are actually involved 
and in what respect the existence of such rights is contrary to the various provisions 
of the Treaty. , 82 
Although aspects of Article 2 were annulled along with all of Article 7 and relevant 
aspects of Article 9, it was said "... [t)he told effect of the.... udgement is an 
endorsement of the Commission's philosophy as expressed in the Green Paper. "" 
The Directive is a direct attack against State monopolies but demonstrated through 
the resulting case of 202/88 the sensitivity many states still have about the industry. 
Less than eight months after the case was the deadline for the implementation of the 
Directive. Ireland, Luxembourg and two of the Case 202/88's plaintiffs (Greece and 
Belgium) were in breach of "... the requirement that conforming national legislation 
be adopted. 04 Germany had created practical measures which complied with the 
Directive's principles, but its national laws had not been adapted to meet these 
objectives. 85 
2.5 Article 90 
The use of Article 90 EEC with regard to the telecommunications industry has 
proven to be a positive device for the Commission. It has been a legislative tool to 
assist in opening the closed, state-monopolised telecommunications markets. The use 
of Article 90 has, however, attracted some attention from industry and legal analysts. 
Article 90 in effect bridges EC and Member States' conflicting interests in 
competition policy. In particular, the conflict between competition and state (public) 
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undertakings. One lawyer stated: 
"EC competition law is often seen as a nexus between Brussels bureaucracy 
and industry. Article 85 and 86, the principle instruments of competition 
policy enforcement, apply to undertakings. They are not concerned with 
measures imposed by national governments. 06 
Article 90 on the other hand is concerned with measures contrary to the EEC Treaty 
giving public undertakings (and other undertakings) special privileges, such as grants 
of special or exclusive rights from a Member State. 87 Another description of the 
purpose of the Article comes from Taylor. He wrote: 
"Article 90 of the EC Treaty seeks to reconcile the pursuit of free trade and 
fair competition with the protection of public services performed by state 
monopolies. 08 
However the scope of the Article has attracted some legal debate. 89 In regard to 
telecommunications, Article 90 has been instrumental in opening the market to 
competition and in countering the Member States which have been reluctant 
(practically as opposed to verbally) to accept competition in the industry. The Article 
has also been described as: 
"... a delicate balance between what may be considered to be a presumption 
that public monopolies and privileged undertaking are legal, on the one hand, 
and the recognition that they may be illegal if they fall foul of the rules 
enshrined in the Treaty, particularly those on competition. "90 
It is this 'delicate balance' which has begun a debate. Although Article 90 had been 
used before, it appears historically to have been one of the lesser used Articles. Until 
the mid-1970s the European Court of Justice and the Commission accepted 
exclusive rights in the name of public interest, particularly of a non-economic nature, 
could be granted by Member States. Such rights were therefore not in violation of 
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Article 90(l). However since the mid-1970s the ECJ and the Commission began to 
use Article 90(1) (along with Article 86) to remove monopolistic barriers to trade. 9' 
Article 90 became an issue with the legislating of the first telecommunications 
Directive. According to Bright: 
"A breach of Article 90 only occurs where there is a breach of another 
relevant provision of Treaty rules and there is a casual link to a Member 
State. For the purposes of competition rules there needs to be established all 
the incidents of a breach of Article 85 and 86 including an effect on trade 
between Member States and, for Article 86, the existence of a dominant 
position within the Common market or a substantial part of it. " 92 
However, the question has been raised; to what extent is it in fact possible for a state 
to give a public monopoly or private undertaking exclusive privileges? " In Bodson v 
Pompes Funebres, the ECJ held where there was market dominance, prices that 
were artificially high could be found to be incompatible with EC competition law. In 
the instance where a public authority fixes the prices, it could be in violation of EC 
law under Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86.94 If the state did not infringe 
Article 90 and the undertaking does not abuse any exclusive rights that would 
effectively be an abuse of a dominant position under Article 86, then neither would 
be found to be at fault. However, as found in Hofner v Macrotron, if the state has 
created conditions of exclusivity where a fine is able to violate EC competition law 
(namely Article 86) then under Article 90(1) an illegal abuse has occurred. 95 
In Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli96 exclusive rights were given to 
recognised companies for the loading and unloading of ships at Genoa. The Court 
stated the creation of exclusive rights was not in itself abusive, but under Articles 90 
and 86 can become abusive if they create a situation in which the undertaking in 
question "... cannot avoid abusing its dominant position ... or 
is induced to commit 
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such an abuse. 07 
From these cases, each with their own individual importance, it may be recognised 
that the firm or undertaking which is given exclusive privileges does not necessarily 
have to be publicly owned or controlled. Yet as in the Sacchi case, 98 the undertaking 
could be in both the private and the public sector. In this instance the Italian 
Broadcasting Authority (RAI) was controlled by a state holding company. The state 
had interests within the firm's organisation and could therefore intervene in decisions, 
operations and management. This is one example of where regulatory and 
commercial operations unjustly conflict should a competitive market exist. 
"[A]n exclusive right granted to a limited company in relation to radio and 
television broadcasts and cable transmission means that such an undertaking 
falls within the ambit of Article. 90(1). " 99 
Article 90(1), it may be found, establishes the identity of those to whom the Article 
is applicable. Article 90(2) extends defining the identity by stating: 
"Undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be 
subject to the rules... on competition... " loo 
The difficulty the Court or Commission may find in 'intervening' in Member States 
for the good of the European Community, as well as the defence which the state has 
against EC involvement, is made in the second half of Article 90(2): Undertakings 
are subject "... in sofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. " There is an 
important provision to this 'exception-to-the-rule'. Article 90(2) dictates that the 
development of trade must not be affected so as to be contrary to the interests of the 
Community. 
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Article 90(2) was the result of compromises between the interests of the Member 
States and the Community's, and the result is therefore fraught with interpretation 
difficulties. Paragraph 2 of the Article is designed to be a form of equilibrium 
between the two conflicts of interests, should one arise. One interpretation of Article 
90(2) claims EEC Treaty rules and especially those concerned with competition have 
been limited in their application. This limitation applies to public service performance 
by either public or private undertakings. 1°' In the case of telecommunications, the 
provision of 'universal service' is an example of a public service which has 
traditionally been fulfilled by state owned and operated telecoms firms. This service, 
in theory, ensures all people within the state have access ('reasonable access') to a 
telephone. 102 In Regie des Postes v Paul Corbeau1 °3 the ECJ ruled Member States 
were permitted through Article 90(2) to grant exclusive rights for the provision of 
universal service. This was accepted in sofar as the restrictions on competition 
benefited in the achievement of the public service. The Court also ruled an 
undertaking fulfilling such an obligation could restrict or eliminate competition only 
as far as it was necessary to ensure the continuation of providing - in this case - 
universal service. '" 
The anti-competitive behaviour had to be justified on the grounds of maintaining 
economically acceptable terms. 105 This case concerned universal service in the postal 
sector. In telecommunications a more active approach has been taken since the late 
1980s. This 'active' approach refers to the Commission's efforts in opening up the 
telecommunications market. At the time of writing, the liberalisation of 
telecommunications has been at a more advanced stage than the proposed 
liberalisation of the postal sector. Advancing the liberalisation of telecommunications 
has been achieved through the use of Article 90(3), the British Telecommunications 
case106 and the introduction of Directives concerning specific sectors in the 
telecommunication industry. 
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2.6 Telecommunications (Antitrust) Guidelines 1991 107 
The Guidelines are defined to: "clarify the application of Community competition 
rules to the market participants in the telecommunications sector. ""' They are also 
of interest because the telecommunications industry has been singled out for special 
treatment in the application of competition law. The preface to the Guidelines points 
out the industry's uniqueness in such application. On the one hand the Guidelines 
"must be viewed in the context of the special conditions of the telecommunications 
sector", while "the overall Community telecommunications policy will be taken into 
account. i109 One of the special features of the industry in regard to its treatment is 
that "the telecommunications operators should be allowed, and encouraged, to 
establish the necessary co-operation mechanisms.... "' 10 Initially this seems to 
counter the intentions of a competitive market. The policy envisaged is one of a co- 
operative competitive market, terms that contradict one another. The preface states 
this is possible provided the rules are complied with "in order to avoid the 
diseconomies that could result. ""' The initial ambiguity of this approach, and yet 
one that is a dichotomy, is understood by reflecting back to the general policies 
towards the Information Society. On the one hand, co-operation in general is needed 
for research and development, for interconnection and interoperability. 112 On the 
other a competitive market is often seen to be best for innovation and efficiency. 
Ungerer said of the principles aimed towards the Information Society and their 
relation with competition law: 
"These principles present the essential features of the future framework, 
which include on the one hand, a growing role for the competition rules and, 
on the other, the establishment and maintenance of public interest 
legislation..... Competition law is, therefore, likely to become increasingly 
important for the telecommunications sector, due primarily to deregulation 
and the dynamics of convergence and globalisation. i113 
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Meddling (as advocates of non-intervention in the marketplace would see it) in the 
industry can cause economic distortions and imbalance thus affecting the ability of 
the market to function in a proper, 'fair', competitive spirit. Social policies are often 
the origins or cause of such interference and their merits are debatable. For a sensible 
examination of the telecommunications industry as one which is becoming 
competitive or at least capable of becoming one, it must be understood in terms of 
its infrastructure. 
The industry's infrastructure could symbolically be understood as a patchwork quilt. 
Each square represents the traditional structure. The individual states have (had) 
their own connections, standards, and comparative levels of technical ability and 
quality. It is also important to reiterate the previous norm of a (usually state owned) 
monopoly. In order to form the quilt, the patches must be sown together. For a 
common (telecoms) market as the European Community sees it, the quality of the 
patches - the service and technical infrastructure, must be improved to a common 
standard: 
"... to enable European users to benefit from a wide range of better and 
cheaper telecommunications services. " 114 
Again, to achieve this the competitive market is regarded as the appropriate vehicle. 
There is seen to be the need though for forms of co-operation in order to maintain 
competition (i. e. prevent barriers to entry) and also for a result of common benefits 
and standards - regardless of where one is in the EC. This would, in theory, achieve 
the principles in the EEC Treaty (see above) - that of better living standards and also 
so that the EC as an economic entity is able to compete with non-EC entities. '" 
Co-operation is deemed undesirable when collusion goes against the principles of the 
EC and competition law (i. e. abuse of a dominant position). It is stated the 
Guidelines "... should be seen as one aspect of an overall Community policy towards 
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telecommunications, notably of policies and actions to encourage and stimulate those 
forms of co-operation which promote the development and availability of advanced 
communications for Europe. i16 One cited example is "to create - or ensure - 
Community-wide full interconnectivity between public works. "' 7 The Guidelines 
state: 
"The telecommunications sector in many cases requires co-operation 
agreements, inter alia, between telecommunications organisations (TOs) in 
order to ensure network and services inter-connectivity, one-stop-shopping 
and one-stop-billing which are necessary to provide for Europe-wide services 
and to offer optimum service to users. " 118 
Thus the significance of having the Guidelines is to assist carrying out the 
application of competition law and guiding firms in avoiding breaching these laws. 
They apply the "principles governing... competition rules.. . only 
[where they] are of 
specific relevance to telecommunication issues. i19 The purpose of the Guidelines is 
to assist the two challenges of EC competition law and policy; the creation of a 
competitive framework and market structure, and to ensure the behaviour of market 
players is competitive in telecommunications sectors. 120 
The question that continues to be predominant, asks how will the EC pursue its 
goals beyond the rhetoric towards a modern, liberalised telecommunications industry 
and the purported Information Society? What is the interpretation behind the policy, 
which in turn is behind the law? Mansell wrote: 
"The texts issued by the European Commission concerning 
telecommunication liberalisation refer to extra-Community threats created by 
inter-national rivalry in service and equipment markets. When it looks to 
external markets, the Commission and policy-makers within the member 
states seem to recognise the reality of the Strategic model. They recognise 
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that full reciprocity in the liberalisation of markets within the Triad of the 
European Community, the United States and Japan, is far from a reality and 
that there are multiple indications of market-distorting practices. However, 
within the context of intra-Community policy, the Commission's rhetoric and 
actions often suggest that the Idealist model is rather more influential. Within 
the Community, the conflicts between harmonisation and competition, and 
between success in global markets and the promotion of universal services, 
are rarely problematised explicitly. " 12' 
The conflict for the EC lies in the choice between the Idealist model and the 
Strategic model, (which are considered in following chapters). The Idealist position 
may be a suitable goal for the long-term, but it may be questioned whether it is 
appropriate to use it as the more influential philosophy in achieving a liberalised, 
open-market telecommunications industry, as opposed to something to strive 
towards? Mansell stated: 
"[R]ivalry in national, regional and global markets is not to be permitted to 
jeopardise the availability of a universal set of services' and the current public 
telecommunication network and telephone service are prime examples. This 
is the rhetoric of evolving telecommunication policy and regulation in the 
European Community context..... carries with it the assumptions that are 
reminiscent of both the Idealist and Strategic models. For instance, on the 
one hand, the harmonisation of a minimum set of standards and regulations is 
expected to secure the widest public interest in telecommunication 
development. On the other hand, there is awareness of the disadvantageous 
impact of rivalry and monopolisation and the need to secure the provision of 
a set of universal services. " 122 
This effectively summarises the problems facing governments and regulators in 
achieving a balanced system. 
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2.7 Summary 
The EC has developed a policy and legal framework within which to carry out 
liberalisation reforms. The changes range from stating the policy-aims to enforcing 
the changes on EC-member countries. The liberalisation process is largely technical 
but the most important factor emerging is the requirement for competition law 
(assisted by the Telecommunications Antitrust Guidelines) to manage the liberalised 
market. 
The process of liberalisation in the EC required the removal of exclusive rights and 
privileges of incumbent operators. Although originally in equipment and non-public 
services, the process towards full liberalisation (as of 1, January 1998) benefited 
from the existence of Article 90 in EC law. Nevertheless, out of the combined 
process of liberalisation and the technical changes occurring within the industry 
continue to emerge questions about the best policy to be adopted and goals to be 
achieved. These are in particular related to the anticipated Information Society. This 
is seen through the collection of policy documents including the EC's 1987 Green 
Paper, the 1994 White Paper about the Information Society and the 1995 G7 
Conference. 
Movement towards the `Information Society' has brought about debate upon how 
this would best be achieved. A traditional interventionist policy is one option more 
widely supported in some countries than others. Alternatively, there is the argument 
which favours the marketplace be allowed to naturally develop this new society. At 
the centre of this debate between countries is the European Commission, which 
ultimately determines the shape of the European Information Society. In this context 
it will be interesting to observe how often the Commission will have to intervene in 
order to push reluctant Member States to accept the current wave of change in 
political and economic thinking for the market-type of telecommunications sector. 
1 
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Of central significance for this thesis is the conflict between an interventionist and a 
non-interventionist approach to the market. The point here being that even a "free 
market" is an economic and political construct which may, paradoxically, require 
policy-driven intervention to sustain it. The conflict is evident through the political 
rhetoric of government policy documents and speeches. The conflict, as discussed in 
subsequent chapters, is at the heart of competition law management and enforcement 
in the marketplace. 
It is clear that a market-based telecommunications industry is the favoured direction 
of EC telecommunications industry development. Yet, it is not clear where the line is 
to be established between non-intervention (except for anti-competitive behaviour) 
and intervention by necessity. The problem is not unique to the EC, for other and 
more traditionally market-favoured economies such as the US have similar debates. 
The division between competition and political intervention is not restricted to 
developing the information society. It is also a matter of concern within the subject 
of competition policy and enforcement. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theory of Competition Law: Supervising the New 
Telecommunications Market 
3.1 Introduction 
The underlying purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the challenges and conflicts 
competition law will face in a liberalised, market-based telecommunications industry. 
It is also sought to set out a framework within which constructive discourse between 
competition law and policy can be developed. In opening this discourse, it is 
suggested that competition law and policy have some problems which remain 
unresolved, even a century after the formalisation of antitrust law. It is suggested 
that with this market-liberalisation, telecommunications serves as an ideal example 
for consideration of these weaknesses and their possible redress. Having discussed 
the changing industry and some of the laws and policies being used to open the 
telecommunications market, it is important to address the thinking which supports 
policies and judicial approach to competition law. 
This chapter is the third necessary step in presenting the tensions that are developing 
in the modem telecommunications market, and shows weaknesses, contradictions 
and flaws in competition laws and policies. Behind every policy, legislation and 
judgement there is a philosophical-basis, so it is naturally appropriate at this point to 
address this foundation supporting competition law. This step moves the discourse 
from understanding the situation in the changing industry and the policy and legal 
developments undertaken in Europe to the fundamental problems facing regulators 
as detailed in the following chapters. This chapter encourages this progression 
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through challenging some recent perceptions about how the law can be predictably 
applied, as well as the belief that the market can in most instances determine 
appropriate outcomes. It is argued that these beliefs can be misleading, despite their 
appeal. 
Although this chapter seemingly departs from references to telecommunications and 
focuses on theory, the matters addressed are nevertheless of paramount importance. 
The argument in this chapter underlines the analysis in the remainder of this thesis, 
and calls for a new and more appropriate approach to be developed for interpreting 
competition policies and laws. This is particularly important for the encouragement 
and maintenance of competition within the telecommunications industry. 
Liberalising the telecommunications market into a competitive environment and the 
application in that process of competition law based upon theoretical appreciations in 
some cases originating a century ago has the potential to create an interesting 
situation. The nature of the modern telecommunications industry, the nature of its 
development under competitive conditions and the nature of competition legal theory 
all contain ambiguities. These ambiguities are created by conflicting interpretations 
and exceptions-to-the-rules of traditional thinking about the philosophy of 
competition, and telecommunications affords an interesting and productive model of 
the-issues arising. 
Although this thesis is concerned with law rather than economics, ' the inclusion of 
economics in the analysis of the competition law is unavoidable. This is because it is 
an influential element in competition policy. The extent of how influential it should 
be in both policy and legal reasoning is debatable. ' The American school of thought 
known as the 'Chicago School' has been associated with the popularisation of the 
dominant use of economics in antitrust cases during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
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Although the domination of economics - or rather the Chicago School's application 
of economics to law - has come under question lately in the United States, lessons 
for the EC may be learned from the experience overseas. 3 However, the EC may 
have lessons for overseas. Competition theory, economic influences and recent 
lessons in antitrust law are particularly interesting in application to the modern 
telecommunications industry. 
The behaviour permitted by the law and what some theories of the law argue it 
should permit can be two different things. The result of this debate influences or 
determines what type of industrial structure is permissible. Yet, what is permissible 
by law may not have beneficial consequences for competition or for society. This is 
where some conflict may exist in relation to some potential formations of 
telecommunication networks. 
3.2 The Rise of Economic Influence in Contemporary Competition Legal 
Theory 
The influence of economics in legal theory is relatively recent. Originally, it had little 
or no importance in antitrust law, but since the mid-1960s and particularly from the 
1970s onwards its contribution has increased 4 The occurrence of a new "industrial 
revolution" around the centenary of the creation of contemporary competition 
(antitrust) law is an interesting, timely event. It is timely in that the contemporary 
promotion of the aim of competition policy in telecommunications comes around the 
centenary of the expiry of the first Bell patents in 1890.5 A century ago there was a 
period of great competition in the American telephone market which initiated the 
debate about the role of competition and competition laws in the telecommunications 
industry. ' The history of legal theory is however, of less importance than the 
apparent parallels that have been achieved within a century of the first formal 
antitrust legislation. 
\ 
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Although notions of competition law were evolving prior to the Sherman Act (1890) 
in other countries, ' the Act is significant. It was the first legislation to respond to 
problems in competition resulting from the industrial change in the nineteenth 
century. (The Sherman Act was followed by the Clayton Act which was later 
amended in 1936 by the Robinson-Patman Act. ) In contrast, competition in Britain is 
reported not to have changed much during the nineteenth century. 8 Although 
Germany experienced similar rises in big-business they did not create the same 
competition problems. ' Despite the English common law's history in forming rules 
for competition, its development has been described as "haphazard". 10 Efforts to 
create a more formal system with the aid of statutes did not begin until 1949. The 
English rules have been described in the following manner: 
"Part of the law is judge-made in the form of common law doctrine of 
restraint of trade, the roots of which extend back to the Middle Ages. The 
remainder is contained in statutes. " 11 & 12 
The United Kingdom's membership in the European Community is of contemporary 
significance, despite Whish's noteworthy comment: 
"There is no single, coherent policy that binds UK or EEC law together: 
there is no single premise from which decisions flow which binds UK or EEC 
law together: there is no single premise from which decisions flow through 
the application of logic alone. " 13 
The UK is bound to the EC law through its membership to the Community, similar 
observations about competition law and related problems to competition legal theory 
may be made. Yet, it is possible Whish's statement may soon become more relevant 
to history and less so to contemporary law, as talk continues about revising the UK 
competition law. '4 
US and EC competition law have had different aims. 15 Their differences may be 
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attributed to the American "common market" being of a more established nature 
than the EC's common market at the time of its (EEC as it was in 1958) 
formation. " The United States has also been an influential economic power during 
the twentieth century, and it has been a source of economic and legal development 
and debate 17 from which lessons may be learned by other states or 'Communities' 
such as the EC. Hawk observed: 
"Given the parentage of the EEC's competition law and the fact that both 
regimes concern anti-competitive business practices, the EEC and the US 
face many of the same legal and economic questions, such as the definition of 
abusive competition. In many instances the EEC and the US have arrived at 
much the same answers, for example, with respect to horizontal exchanges of 
price and cost information and criteria for membership in a group of 
competitors or access to a competitively necessary facility. " 18 
There are many instances where the answers to the shared legal and economic 
questions have differed. 19 The differences are due to policy or aims of the laws. For 
example, the goal of integration is fundamental to EC law. Different conclusions are 
also found to be more philosophically acceptable. Furthermore, the history of the US 
and the EC have differed. For example, Waller stated: 
"Unlike the US economy, which was largely integrated and continental in 
scope at the time the EC was created in 1957 in order to establish a new 
European common market and to 'promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability an accelerated raising of standard of living 
and closer relations between the States belonging to it. ' In part, EC 
competition law must play the role that the commerce clause and the 
supremacy clause played in the United States in creating a true Community- 
wide market in which to have competition at all. " 20 
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Both EC and American competition legal philosophies stem from nineteenth century 
thinking. " There also seems to be some strong parallels between contemporary 
industrial events and the late nineteenth century. 
The future of both the American and European Community competition legal 
systems will be interesting to follow in so far as the strengths each have to offer and 
their relation to the establishment of a global economy. Waller was of a similar view 
about the important contributions each have to make to a global marketplace. He 
stated: "[t]he differences between the EC competition law and its United States 
counterpart ..... 
have important implications for the development of competition law 
on a global basis. " 22 The EC offers a system of integrating markets previously 
separated by political boundaries. The American system offers greater economic 
depth to the analysis of competition issues and problems. 3 However some reflection 
about the parallels in the experiences with competition and telecommunications may 
contribute to some beneficial lessons. 
The period 1870-1914 has been identified as significant especially in the United 
States24 Others have been less specific in defining the period as between the end of 
the American Civil War up to around 1900.25 The First World War is also a date 
used to determine the end of this particular and important era, especially in American 
economic history. It was important in so far as the changing industrial nature of the 
country, the introduction of antitrust laws and the development of an American 
interpretation of economic philosophy. This is also an important period specifically 
for the telecommunications industry. 
3.2.1 Competition in Telecommunications during the Early 20th Century 
In Europe perhaps competition seems new because the telecommunications market 
has mostly been composed of state monopolies, often connected with the state run 
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post office. The situation in the United States has been a little different. For much of 
the century AT&T dominated the American market, although it was privately 
owned. This has not always been the case as there was a period of competition 
which one observer described as "intense competition". 26 The original Bell patents 
expired in 1894. Independent companies (non-Bell companies) were then able to 
open and operate telephone exchanges, in both cities and towns the Bell company 
had not previously served, and in places (normally the larger urban cities) which Bell 
had operated as the incumbent. By 1902 the independent companies provided nearly 
60 per cent of the telephone service along the North Central and South regions of 
the Atlantic side of the United States. They were also quickly succeeding in the 
South Central states? ' Bell companies dominated the Northeast, with some 
exceptions such as urban and rural markets outside of large metropolitan areas (e. g. 
New York). By 1907 independent operators accounted for nearly half of the 
telephone business. By 1912 however, the market control of the independent 
operators fell. Bell companies directly controlled 55 per cent of the market in the 
United States, and another 30 per cent through sublicence agreements 2 
Weiman and Levin stated: 
"The sudden rise and fall of the independent movement have raised doubts 
about the viability of competition in the early telephone industry. The 
- traditional view holds that telephone service was a natural monopoly and so 
regards the competitive period as a disequilibrium episode ............. 
Advocates of the alternative view deny the existence of natural monopoly in 
the early telephone industry and accuse Bell of predation to recapture its 
monopoly position. They assert that American Telephone and Telegraph and 
its operating companies, through a combination of predatory pricing and 
investment, forced the independents to exit or to consolidate on terms that 
blocked future entry. By wielding access as a strategic weapon, it also 
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argued, AT&T leveraged its initial advantage in long-distance service to gain 
greater control over local exchange and toll markets. " 29 
The extent to which either is true is debatable. 30 By 1913, "AT&T had effectively 
subdued competition" in the United States. 3' The significance of this date is the 
Kingston Commitment' which was to guarantee access for independent operators to 
Bell (AT&T) networks. It however, came too late for competition to effectively 
survive in the United States. The consequence was effectively a private monopoly 
under Federal regulation. 
It seems ironic on reflection that after introducing the Sherman Act to counter the 
perceived threat of big business and monopolies, the telephone industry that had seen 
competition became a monopoly. 
Nevertheless, the turn of the century and its significance for the United States as a 
whole was described by Morgan when she stated: 
"In a period of rapid growth throughout all sector, the economy was 
transformed from a predominantly agricultural economy to a state of highly 
developed industrial capitalism within a period of 30-40 years. The 
diminished role for agriculture and concomitant growth in industry had been 
accompanied by a marked change within the industry. The growth in the size 
of firms and their concentrations into 'trusts', 'combinations', and oligopolies 
were associated in the contemporary mind with greater efficiency and lower 
prices. By the late 1890s, these large firms and combinations (acting as 
cartels or as corporate entities) had come to dominate large sectors of the 
supply of raw materials ... through their 
final manufactured products. The 
development of the combinations and the competitive behaviour of large 
firms were believed to be peculiarly American phenomena, moreover, ones 
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that had arisen with startling rapidity. " 32 
Morgan's observation contains three important points of interest. First, there is the 
economic change from an agricultural based economy to an industrial based one. 
Secondly, there is the economic theory of the time that these large firms would be 
more efficient and cheaper than a number of smaller firms. The third point is the 
sudden existence of monopolies, cartels and oligopolies. During this period there 
also appears a divide between public reaction to these cartels and the birth of 
American economics. The American public generally grew hostile to trusts, 
combinations and cartels. 33 Simultaneously American economic thinking developed 
and became identifiably separate from European philosophies. 34 While the American 
economists as Morgan described "... were impressed by these rapid and severe 
changes in the economy, which challenged their perceptions of the nature of 
competition and shaped their ideas" 35, popular opinion looked at the changes from a 
more political perspective. 
Neale and Goyder described the situation in the following manner: 
"The impetus behind the movement for the earliest legislation gathered 
strength during the 1870s and 1880s. Already half a century before this a 
deep-rooted political tradition against concentrations of private power had 
forced the break-up of the central bank of the United States. After the Civil 
War, the railways with their privileges, charters and subsidies became the 
main object of suspicion and hostility. " 36 
Presently, American thinking provides both an influential and a reflective debate 
concerning antitrust for the twenty-first century. Certain parallels spring to mind a 
century later, most notably the telecommunications industry with the break-up of 
AT&T in 1984 in the United States, and the privatisation of British Telecom (BT) in 
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the UK with other countries following suit. Without trying to stretch a European 
example of the AT&T break-up too far, the European Commission's insistence that 
Deutsche Telekom be privatised and more of the German market be opened could be 
regarded as an EC parallel. Yet certain fears arise for the future of long-term 
competition after some of the experiences of the brief spell of competition the United 
States. Although one must be cautious with drawing on the past, the experience may 
be of value. 
3.2.2 Economic and Antitrust Thinking in the Early 20th Century's 
Competitive Telecommunications Period 
Although the Sherman Act was created in response to the public concern about the 
concentration of economic power in such trusts, economists of the time were 
generally against the formation of antitrust laws. 37 They believed the cause of 
monopolies was due to tariffs. 38 Later, as one observer pointed out, many who 
disagreed with antitrust legislation such as Schumpeter, von Mises and von 
Beckerath, "did not go out of their way to attack" the Act when American 
economists' opinions changed. 39 Between 1900-1920, their opinion supported the 
antitrust legislation. 40 Nevertheless, economists had little or nothing to do with the 
passage of the Act. 1 
In the early years of antitrust there was little economic evidence to support legal 
theories and arguments 42 Decisions were decided on the wisdom of the judiciary. 
Some concepts of industrial organisation used later on in the twentieth century are 
allegedly to have originated in antitrust cases in the early years of the existence of the 
Sherman Act. 43 Sullivan observed: 
"In time all this changed. For the last several decades many economists 
have been addressing the theoretical and empirical study of competition, the 
antitrust law's basic concern, in substantial ways. Increasingly and with 
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varying-degrees of frustration and satisfaction courts have turned toward 
theoretical economics for insight and the aid in the development of antitrust 
doctrine. " 44 
As was once written about "the life of law", it " 'has not been logic: it has been 
experience' ". 45 Recent trends in American antitrust thinking have sought to inject 
more logic into the system through the application of economics. This is in 
significant contrast to the practice of early antitrust cases. This 'logic' is founded on 
nineteenth (and to a degree eighteenth century) philosophies, including, but not 
exclusively, the writings of Englishmen John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart 
Mill. Their writings and also those of Jeremy Bentham and David Hume continue to 
be influential with contemporary American liberalism, based on faith in political, 
personal and economic liberty. 46 
Correia observed: 
"There was a natural fink between capitalism and liberalism because 
capitalism represented the embodiment in the marketplace of an ideology 
based on individualism and rationality. " 
47 & 48 
The American economists of the late 1800s were in (what has been described as) a 
period of transition. That is to say, the economic and industrial climate around them 
was in transition as was the generation of economic thinkers. They are said to be the 
last generation to rely on European (namely English and German) 49 economic 
sources and the first to develop distinctly American methods. " They sat on the 
saddle point between the earlier classical school and the later neo-classical school", 
claimed Morgans' 
Morgan described the new generation as follows: 
"[T]hese economists were not theorising in ivory towers (not even ivory 
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towers shared by others): they were living in a vibrant and increasingly 
commercialised economy. They made use of their own observations and 
perceptions of the new phenomena in their economy, and they intertwined 
their theories with their interpretation of the evidence in their economic 
writings. " 52 
They were in a manner fulfilling a virtue which Schumpeter later wished economists 
as a whole would follow. He wrote: 
"If we economists were given less to wishful thinking and more to the 
observation of facts, doubts would immediately arise as to the realistic 
virtues of a theory that would have led us to expect a very different result. " 53 
Instead, contemporary writers are critical of the apparent lack of economic theory s4 
which could have been used to create an entirely different Sherman Act - or no 
antitrust legislation. This nevertheless is historical reflection. Dewey concluded 
".... an economist is in no position to chide Congressmen and judges for failing to 
accept immediately truths that it took his trade the better part of a hundred years to 
learn. " ss 
Now that (according to the neo-classicists) the 'truths' and 'logic' of economic theory 
have arrived, the antitrust debate is for all intent and purposes dead. " Schumpeter 
would probably have disapproved of this trend, as the ideal of perfect competition 
which is a founding point of classical (and neo-classical) economic thinking, was the 
focal point of his criticism. 57 
3.3 Two Schools of Thought in Competition Law and Policy 
In competition law the two schools of opposing thought can, on reflection, be 
generally termed 'the interventionist' and 'the non-interventionist'. 58 These have also 
been called 'the structuralist' and 'the neo-classical'. 59 In the United States where 
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these opposing views have each been popular at some point in the last one hundred 
years of American anti-trust law, the structuralist philosophy has also been called 'the 
Harvard School' while the neo-classical philosophy has also been called 'the Chicago 
School'. 6° The latter has also been called 'the Permissive School'. 6' The neo- 
classical philosophy bases its views on economics. 62 Such schools of thought not 
only affect general antitrust decisions, but can strongly influence the development of 
a competitive telecommunications industry and consequently affect the endurance of 
competition in its market. 
Tye described this philosophy as follows: 
"The permissive model of antitrust enforcement (often ascribed to the 
Chicago school) promises to provide determinate results to difficult antitrust 
questions by choosing efficiency goals over equity goals, perfect markets 
over imperfect markets and (in more cases than not) private contractual 
solutions over enforcement of antitrust laws by public authorities. 
Specifically with regard to vertical restraints (resale price maintenance, 
exclusive territories, mergers, etc. ), the permissive model faults antitrust 
prohibitions of such activities. The logic is that firms with monopoly power 
at one stage of a vertical market relationship can exploit whatever market 
power they have through high prices. If such firms engage in vertical 
restraints of competition, these restraints can only be explained as motivated 
to achieve efficiency gains, according to the theory. If one accepts the notion 
that economic efficiency is the chief objective of antitrust policy, the result is 
a permissive view toward vertical restraints. " 63 
In the United States where enthusiasm for the permissive (or the Chicago School) 
influence on antitrust theory has been particularly noticeable, its future has been 
under question. The term 'counterrevolution' has been used to describe the change. 64 
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Some, including Rule and Meyers, regard this as "unfortunate". 65 Some interesting 
questions have arisen in light of the American experience. For example, Liesner and 
Glynn asked; ".... does economic theory provide good grounds for supporting that a 
positive non-neutral stance on the part of the state is desirable.... "? 66 
As states grow economically closer, whether it is through the process of commercial 
globalisation or through the creation or joining established regional entities such as 
the EC, the debate about competition law extends beyond the boundaries of 
individual states. This increasingly international debate is evident as world trade 
organisations begin forming to govern global trade in services such as 
telecommunications. 67 It also is evident in Eastern European states who prepare to 
join the EC. 
Waller suggested that "[t]he broader principles embodied in EC competition law 
appear very attractive to the rest of the world, potentially even more so than the pure 
competition approach of the Sherman Act" 68 The possible deterioration of the state 
as one traditionally seen as being capable of functioning in isolation, 69 and the ability 
of the state (or federation of states) to regulate competition-interests beyond its 
borders, are called into question. 7° EC law may be more appealing because it allows 
to some degree, provided the integration of the markets of the member states is not 
obstructed, differing systems of competition rules to operate. Whish stated: 
"[C]ompetition policy does not exist in a vacuum: it is an expression of the 
current values and aims of society and is as susceptible to change as political 
thinking..... Furthermore different systems of competition law reflect 
different concerns". 71 
EC competition law (or the United States or any other country with international 
economic interests or relations) also "does not exist in a vacuum". Goyder also 
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claimed, it was "separate from all the pressures of international trade, but on the 
contrary is substantially affected and influenced by them". 72 With the establishment 
of greater global economic interdependence and the important supporting role which 
telecommunications has in the globalisation process73, the effectiveness of 
competition law may be called into question. 
One problem or perhaps criticism (as demonstrated later) of antitrust law is its 
weakness in predictability. The EC adjudication of competition law has been subject 
to such criticism in recent years. 74 The concerns arise from the new issues raised by 
globalisation, in particular for the purposes of this study in the telecommunications 
industry, may involve shared concerns about competition legal thinking for both the 
EC and the United States. Furthermore the philosophy behind competition law 
shared generally, should perhaps be due for reappraisal. However, Hawk stated: 
"[T]he revolution in US anti-trust law in the last ten years brought about by 
changes in accepted economic thinking ... has magnified the differences 
between EEC and US antitrust. it 75 
Through the process of globalisation and the creation of international trade 
organisations, will these two entities (in the long term) grow closer in legal 
philosophies concerning competition? Consider again the thoughts (cited earlier) 
from Waller. The influence of both the Sherman Act and EC competition law could 
be important in the shaping of a global competition law; or rather the harmonisation 
of competition law among states. 76 There are important implications for future 
competition laws, and both the American and the European Community approaches 
have something different to offer. This is becoming the case with regard to 
telecommunications as it establishes a more global nature to its industrial 
infrastructure. The debate could centre around relative influence of the permissive 
(Chicago) approach and the interventionist (EC or Harvard) approach to 
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competition law. 
Without dismissing the contributory role economics has in competition law, relying 
on economic models as legal solutions may be misleading. The point is illustrated by 
attempts to apply such a philosophy to a strategy for governing the entire 
telecommunications industry. 
3.4 Economics and its Influence on Competition Law: An Alchemy of Legal 
Science 
Two terms associated with neo-classicism are 'consumer-welfare' and 'efficiency. 
Bork determined the existence of two types of efficiency; 'allocative' and 
'productive'. Bork wrote in his book The Antitrust Paradox: 
"Allocative efficiency ... refers to the placement of resources in the economy, 
the question of whether resources are employed in tasks where consumers 
value their output most. Productive efficiency refers to the effective use of 
resources by a particular firm. The idea of effective use, ..... encompasses 
much more than mere technical or plant - led efficiency. " " 
Another leading 'Chicago' advocate, Posner, defined 'efficiency' as a "technical term", 
meaning; "exploiting economic resources in such a way that human satisfaction as 
measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and resources is 
maximised. " He further explained, "When resources are being used where their value 
is greatest, we may say that they are being employed efficiently. i78 
The 'Chicago School' in its endorsement of economic analysis essentially regards 
economic efficiency, according to Landes, as "the only value that counts in antitrust 
analysis". 79 This philosophy does not favour reactions against large firms simply 
because their size could be a potential threat to smaller firms. Economic efficiency it 
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has been suggested, provides a clear and predictable method for both the judiciary 
and the business world. 80 This thinking relies on the 'natural laws of economics' to 
determine the strong from the weak and therefore prevent resources from being 
wasted. The endorsement of this school of thought by authorities may, if one needs a 
point in time, have been in 1981 when the Attorney General William Smith 
"announced that the policy of the Department of Justice would continue to be the 
'promotion of competition'. But he cautioned that big in business does not 
necessarily mean bad and emphasised 'efficient firms should not be hobbled under the 
guise of antitrust enforcement. ' " 81 Later, the Assistant Attorney General William 
Baxter stated "the 'sole goal of antitrust is economic efficiency". Baxter's successor 
claimed that currently "the sole basis of antitrust enforcement' should be based 'on 
economic efficiency notions"'. 82 
The appeal of economics is the provision of perceived clarity and certainty to such 
circumstances. It is seductive because it provides all the solutions, and is very 
attractive when an industry such as telecommunications is undergoing drastic change 
and its future shape is uncertain. In regards to the ordinary application of 
competition rules, some observers (such as Korah) have argued that the European 
Court of Justice and indeed the Commission should in fact be more open to the use 
of economics. Korah wrote: 
"With a few notable exceptions, the Commission's practice is to recite many 
primary facts in its formal decisions, and then to give its legal appraisal. 
Unfortunately, the analysis in the latter is seldom connected to specific facts. 
This gives the Commission a very wide discretion in reaching its conclusions, 
and makes them unpredictable. " 83 
The "assertions of principle" has been a greater basis for decision-making than 
economic analysis. 84 A few people including Whish, have suggested the possibility 
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of some growing influence of'Chicago School'( or neo-classical) thinking within the 
European Commission. This may particularly be the case with some of the younger 
members of the Commission. 85 The basis for this influence is on the belief that 
through government intervention the system has been too restrictive. 86 
Consequently the use of economic analysis brings to the decision-makers a method 
by which problems may be resolved. As Korah wrote: 
"By not spelling out the economic and legal arguments more precisely, the 
Commission loses a wonderful chance to educate not only businesses and its 
advisers, but also its own officials, national courts and the Community 
Court. " 87 
This argument leads to other concerns such as the need for more openness in the 
Commission. 
Questions then may be raised about what kind of an active model would be suitable. 
How precise is the model to be. followed? Perhaps the English system has a useful 
method. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission according to Korah; 
"... spells out why particular practice are pro- or anti-competitive or 
otherwise in or against the public interest. It does not always write as tightly 
as would an economist, but it does usually provide reasons to connect 
particular facts to particular conclusions. " 88 
Again, the notion of'greater openness' arises as a beneficial aid. 
The view of Korah brings to light what some writers think should ideally exist, and 
what seems to make the 'Chicago School' so appealing. This ideal is simply a want 
for predictability and a method that provides all the answers. In Liesner and Glynn's 
description of the Chicago School philosophy some of its appealing nature may be 
found. They wrote: 
"This school of thought uses an approach to economic analysis similar to that 
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of the natural sciences in that the hypothesis succeed or fail on the basis of 
empirical performance. An atomistic approach is adopted to consumers and 
firms (who maximise utility and profits respectively) and the relevant 
analytical arena within which results are obtained and policy implications 
derived is that of 'equilibrium', a configuration at which the system has no 
inherent tendency to move without the impetus of an externally created 
disturbance. " 89 
The ideals can be further seen in the description of the 'Chicago School' (or 'neo- 
classicism') philosophy defined by Muller. The Chicago School, he wrote, "... is a 
classical system of theoretical 'predictions' that eliminates the need for proof in the 
particular case: The model tells the judge what forms the behaviour will be profit- 
maximising (and thus 'rational') for all firms in any set of circumstances and that, in 
turn, tells him what practices are in 'fact' being used in the case before him...... 90 
Note from the quotations the term 'predictions', and the comparison to 'natural 
science'. These, among other things, are cause for concern. They have begun to be 
addressed in the aftermath to the 'Chicago'. years. 
Recent opinion has moved away from the constraints of 'Chicago School' theory. 
However, one which parallels it in an organised and structured manner has not 
emerged. " Instead the latest thinking has allowed for more independent thought. 92 
Criticism of the theory may be defined into two general categories; questioning the 
conclusions, and questioning its claim to being scientific. 
The questioning of economics and its dominating influence - Chicago style - is 
important for three reasons. The first and most important is the question of 
economics providing 'real' solutions, as opposed to theoretical ones disguised as 'real' 
answers. 93 The second question is affected by the first. This is about oligopolies and 
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how economics permits the existence of such a situation in a system based on perfect 
competition in the marketplace. Thirdly, one may question the exclusion of other 
sources of influence. 94 The third question appears to be dependent on the issues 
arising out of the first question. 
One might argue; either economics is used as the primary if not the sole influence on 
antitrust and competition decisions or not at all. Can selections of economic 
principles and models be taken and applied at will, while excluding other elements? 
This is not likely because the model would be distorted. The distortions may have 
undesirable consequences because all of the criteria needed to produce the model are 
not employed. One should however, be concerned about having faith in the 
domination of economics as the principle source from-which decisions are made in 
competition law. An even greater concern is the promotion of economics as a 
science -a natural science. 
95 A danger of holding this belief is the risk of being led 
away from the 'real' problems due to the perception that the answers are best left to 
nature. This is the case with competition. 
3.5 Economics: A Natural Science versus Ideology 
A principal question that emerges from promoting the use of economics as the main 
influence in competition law, asks if economics is `to predict' or `to explain' 
events? 96 The question attacks the application of economics. 
The difference between the `to predict' and `to explain' focuses on time; the future 
or the past. 'Explaining' often answers 'why - questions' or how a phenomenon 
occurs or occurred. Predicting' is less a provision of an answer than anticipating 
optimism or apocalyptic results to an action. In a quite simplistic way 'predicting' 
may be called 'speculating' as in the example of the stockmarket. 97 These terms 
affect the understanding and use of analysis. 
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The words 'science' and 'scientific results' have been applied to economics and in 
economic analysis by supporters of the 'Chicago School' 98 Again, the appeal of 
these perceptions is the impression of achieving 'predictability. As in natural science, 
each event can be anticipated with certainty. 99 This then provides for a structured 
system. The belief in applying natural law to economics 10° and thus to law is 
founded in part on the Spencer-Darwinian notion of survival of the species and 
evolution. These ideas has been extended to the marketplace. Therefore, the laws of 
nature are the best means to govern the natural system of competition. Antitrust 
intervention in the 'Chicago School' belief may only be appropriate in extreme 
instances. 
This philosophical model is therefore deemed to be 'scientific' under the nineteenth 
century meaning of the term, which Flynn explains is, "a science producing 
unyielding and eternal truths and fixed assumptions for measuring reality". lol 
Economists or those seeking to use economics for their own purposes are not the 
only ones to have erred, but other social sciences have succumbed to this illusion. 
All, according to Flynn, seek to establish "fixed rules capable of mechanical and 
repetitious application divorced from the deeper moral values that ... reflects ... the 
evolution in reality and our understanding of it". 102 
It is the 'scientific' element which has been both popularly influential and a reason 
why significant areas of competition policy (e. g. mergers) have in many instances 
failed. Its failure is in the self-denial or misleading belief in the laws of nature 
governing a perfectly competitive marketplace. Schumpeter wrote: 
"'[E]conomic laws' are much less stable than are the 'laws' of any physical 
science, that they work out differently in different institutional conditions, 
and that neglect of this fact has been responsible for many an 
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aberration. " 
103 
The question which then may be asked is; is the use of 'law' either confusing or 
distorted? Magee suggests it is a word which is ambiguous. Laws of societies state 
or "prescribe" 104 what the citizens of the societies are permitted - or forbidden - to 
do. These laws may be breached. In contrast, laws of nature "are not prescriptive but 
descriptive. It tells us what happens", and may be proved to be false. 'os It can not 
however, be breached. The difference is whether or not the statement is a command. 
Magee further explained the ambiguity. 
"The pre-scientific belief that it was (by some god) is the reason for the 
unfortunate ambiguity: the laws of nature were thought to be commands of 
the gods. But nowadays no one would dispute that they are not prescriptions 
of any kind, to be 'kept' or 'obeyed' or 'broken', but explanatory statements of 
a general character which purports to be factual and must therefore be 
modified or abandoned if found to be inaccurate. '06 
A problem is when'natural laws' are made or at least attempted to be converted into 
social laws or commands. There can also be the problem of introducing commands 
to distort the laws of nature. A greater problem is the belief that something is a 
natural law with at least some primitive interpretation of it being the equivalent to a 
command from the gods; then believing efforts to correct any'injustice' of the natural 
law is harmful. 
"The search for natural laws has been seen as the central task of science, at least 
since Newton. " 107 This search is not confined to what are traditionally classified as 
'the sciences'. The search for natural laws is equally active in the 'social sciences'. 
Popper wrote: 
"Scientific interest in social and political questions is hardly less old than 
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scientific interest in cosmology and physics: and there were periods in 
antiquity ...... when the science of society might have seemed to have 
advanced further than the science of nature ..... But the social sciences have 
not yet seemed to have found their Galileo. " 108 
The value given to the term 'science', as earlier described by Flynn, is a problem in its 
application. The glorification of science as being eternal truth causes difficulties 
when doubts about the validity of a scientific law are raised, or the 'law' is proven 
incorrect. The problem with science being questioned is not the pursuit of 'truths', 
but the promoters and worshipers of the revelations. Magee wrote: 
"The popular notion that the sciences are bodies of established fact is entirely 
mistaken. Nothing in science is permanently established, nothing unalterable, 
and indeed science is quite clearly changing all the time, and not through the 
acceleration of new certainties. " 109 
The problem is not necessarily with science itself, but the purpose and expectations 
given to it and those in pursuit of the answers. Secondly, but in conjunction with the 
problem of expectations and value is the problem of confusing non-science with 
science; often with the purpose to achieve the afore reference to validity and eternal 
truth. With this in mind, the words of Popper are worth remembering. In his book 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he wrote: 
"The wrong view of science betrays itself in the craving to be right. " 10 
Soros provides an interesting perception of social sciences, a category in which both 
economics and law are placed. Social science is more an alchemy than a science he 
claims, and hence the name is a misnomer. "' Soros wrote: 
"Social scientists are just as interested in the pursuit of truth as natural 
scientists, but they have an opportunity to conjure that is largely denied to 
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the natural scientists. The best way to guard against abuse is recognising the 
possibility. " 12 
Social Science may be described as an alchemy because theories may be altered in 
order to form a 'truth': The actual problem may rest in some form of vanity. 
"Science", according to Soros, "has a great reputation and it is therefore appealing to 
say you are doing science. " 113 The term has a sense of authority and natural order 
to it. Therefore applying it gives respectable legitimacy to the subject or theory. 
There is an appealing similarity between science and law which may create some 
illusions of supreme, authoritative perfection. Wise finds there are three perspectives 
through which law and science may be linked: "technical, evaluative, and 
rhetorical. "' 14 
"Both law and science present a technical or 'engineering' aspect that analyses 
and seeks to control events and behaviours and solve practical problems. " '" 
Antitrust law was originally intended to understand and control the behaviour of 
large businesses. ' 16 Science on the other hand has sought to discover explanations 
to be used for predictions, in this case, economic behaviour. The mixture of the two 
is therefore appealing through their purpose of overall control and reasoning. 
Science fills a void in antitrust law or doubt as to its supremacy by providing 
answers above and beyond those determined by social-political will. 
Having stated Popper's claim above that the social sciences have not found their 
Galileo, it is important to note he did believe economics was an exception. Physics, 
Popper claimed has been successful beyond all other sciences. Even efforts by the 
social sciences to copy the methods of physics have been disappointing, with the 
exception of economics. "' One would expect therefore, that economics can claim to 
be as pure a science as can be. The imitation of neo-classical economics' application 
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to antitrust law has produced, claims Wise, "... an antitrust law that is coexistence 
with neo-classical price theory. ""8 Should this not vindicate the Chicago School and 
all others believing in the science of economics. To explain the fault or at least 
disagreement with this position and even with the views held by Popper, the focal 
point of economic theory requires further emphasis. 
Classical economic theory which is often attributed to Adam Smith's The Wealth of 
Nations 119, assumes the function of the marketplace is based on perfect 
information. 120 Consumers and other market-players have perfect knowledge about 
the market and are therefore able to make rational choices. 
"Economics", wrote Posner, "is the science of human choice in a world in which 
resources are limited in relation to. human wants. It explores and tests the 
implications of the assumptions that man is a rational maximier of his ends in life, 
his satisfaction - what we shall call his 'self-interest'. " 121 'Self-interest' and the 
'rational human being' according to theory efficiently control the use of resources and 
the distribution of wealth. 
This leads to three economic concepts. These claim Posner include; "the inverse 
relation between price charged and quality demanded"; secondly "the economist's 
definition of cost, 'the price that the resources consumed in making (and selling) the 
seller's product would command in their next best use - the alternative price'. " 122 
"The third basic concept", states Posner, "... is also derived from reflection on how 
self-interested people react to changes in their surroundings. " He adds there "is the 
tendency of resources to gravitate toward their highest value uses if exchange is 
permitted. " 123 The value is measured by the consumer's willingness to pay and 
according to Posner, "[w]hen resources are being used where their value is greatest 
... they are being employed efficiently. " 
124 In a sense, claim others, competition 
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places "each productive resource in the precise position where it can make the 
greatest possible addition to the total social dividend". 125 
In theory, this may be appealing for the management of resources, the distribution of 
wealth, and efficiency or the protection against wasting resources. The problem lies 
in the lack of such a mechanical process and the actual uncertainty created by the 
thinking participants. At the very least 'the rational human being' means 'the thinking 
human being'. There is a problem with the implied assumption that the thinking 
participant is 'reasonable' in their thinking. While there is doubt about the plausibility 
that perfect information is available to all and is held by all concerned, there may also 
be doubt about the aspect of 'self-interest'. 
With regard to the participant, Soros wrote: 
"The participants' perceptions influence the market in which they participate, 
but the market action also influences the participants' perception. They can 
not obtain perfect knowledge of the market because their thinking is always 
affecting the market and the market is affecting their thinking. This makes 
analysis of the market behaviour much harder than it would be if the 
assumptions of perfect knowledge were valid. " 126 
The involvement of thinking participants claims Soros, distorts the laws of neo- 
classical economics. This can be seen in his claim: 
"[T]he events studied by the social sciences have thinking participants" while 
"natural phenomena do not. The participants' thinking creates problems that 
have no counterpart in natural science. " 
127 
Soros believed quantum physics was the closest analogy in which scientific 
observation gives rise to the `uncertainty principle'. However, in social events the 
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human participants' thinking is responsible and cause for the element of uncertainty, 
rather than the outside observer. ' 29 Unlike the perfect world of natural science 
where events are mechanical in their progress, market-economics fails to fulfil such a 
definition as a natural law because of the significant element of uncertainty. This 
makes the assumption of perfect knowledge an ideal. This ideal is an important 
component in this alchemy of economics. Instead the marketplace and the rest of the 
world involving thinking participants is inherently imperfect. 129 
Soros stated: 
"The situations we need to understand in order to reach our decisions are 
naturally affected by these decisions. There is an innate divergence between 
the expectations of the people taking part in events and the actual outcome 
of these events. Sometimes this divergence is so small that it can be 
disregarded but at other times it is so large that it becomes an important 
factor in determining the course of events. " 130 
This idea was further explained by Soros. He observed a quite interesting issue 
which appears to be a paradox of 'reality'. Soros stated: 
"On the one hand, reality is reflected in people's thinking - this is the 
cognitive function. On the other hand, people make decisions that affect 
reality and these decisions are based not on reality, but on people's 
interpretation of reality ... the participating 
function. The two functions work 
in opposite directions and in certain circumstances they can interfere with 
each other. " 
131 
In other words, this cognitive function disrupts the basis of classical economic 
theory, which is the belief in positions of equilibrium. "Equilibrium is the product of 
an axiomatic system", according to Soros and "the crowning achievement of the 
axiomatic approach is the theory of perfect competition". 13' The importance of this 
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'scientific' event is the allowance of the assumption of the 'rational human being'. This 
is to strengthen the weakness of the `cognitive function' or to replace it altogether. 
This rational behaviour assumed the 'self-interest' view of Adam Smith whereby 
consumers will choose the best alternatives available. "' This rational behaviour 
argument is, importantly, supported by the added quality of 'perfect information'. 
Producers are recognised as rational maximisers of profit and consumers as rational 
maximisers of Utility. 134 
The agenda of each rational participant may clash. This does not create an 
equilibrium, but instead returns the argument back to a divergence between 
expectations of the market participants. It is not only the consumer, but the seller 
who is affected by this theory. The seller seeks profit maximisation, but is controlled 
by the industry as a whole. In perfect competition, stated Sloman, "... [e]ach firm is 
so small relative to the whole of the industry that it has no power to influence price. 
It is a price taker". 135 This would suggest that the market is cyclical in form. 
There is the cycle involving consumer and the seller in relation to price. Similarly 
price is controlled in the relation between competitive sellers. Yet is it not rational to 
assume that the influential 'self-interest' of a seller is to break the cycle and seek to 
turn market events to the seller's own advantage. Neo-classical economic theory 
would suggest this would not be possible. 
Whish demonstrated the problem of the rational participant and sole objective of the 
seller was to maximise profits. He suggested: 
"Directors of a company may not think that earning vast profits for the 
shareholders is the most important consideration they face: they may be more 
interested to see the size of their business empire grow or to indulge 
themselves in the quiet life that monopolists may enjoy, although the threat of 
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take-overs may mean that a quiet life is a less realistic option than might be 
imagined. " 136 
Obtaining market power and domination is denied by the neo-classical theory. 137 
Acknowledgement at a moderate level in the theory only quickly dismisses power as 
short term. 138 Nevertheless, the agenda for power does not fit neatly into the model, 
it is a plausible 'self-interest' and requires recognition. Furthermore, Whish explained 
a fundamental constraint of the absolute application to the marketplace in the neo- 
classical argument. 
"[T]here is the difficulty with the theory of perfect competition that is based 
on a static model of economic behaviour which may fail to account for the 
dynamic nature of markets and the way in which they operate over a period 
of time. " 139 
The model does not allow for firms to hold agendas other than profit-maximisation 
nor behavioural patterns within and varying between industries. 
Rather than achieving a status of reality, the theory is more of an ideal world. Reality 
is instead a world in which rational behaviour is questionable and the information 
available is imperfect. The fallacy is in believing that the 'ought' exists as the 'is'. 
Problems arise when the alleged 'scientists' alter their models sufficiently, for 
example in antitrust, to conform to a defined supposition of what 'is'. Flynn stated: 
"Scientific models - are like all broad aesthetic statements, premised upon 
assumptions; moral or ought assumptions that define what will and what will 
not be permitted to be 'reality for the purposes of analysis and what will and 
will not be permitted to be the values given weight in the analysis. An 
empirical investigation unaware of its own assumptions and values is neither 
empirical nor an investigation. "40 
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Schumpeter also observed a quite important problem which scientists and 
philosophers constantly face. He wrote: 
"[W]henever we attempt to interpret human attitudes, especially attitudes of 
people far removed from us in time or culture, we risk misunderstanding 
them not only if we crudely substitute our own attitudes from theirs, but also 
if we do our best to penetrate into the working of their minds. All this is 
made much worse than it would be otherwise by the fact that the analysing 
observer himself is the product of a given social environment - and of his 
particular location in this environment - that condition him to see certain 
things rather than others, and to see them in a certain light. " 141 
Others including Flynn, have made similar observations supported through the use of 
Plato's famous Cave analogy. "' Schumpeter concludes that within economic 
analysis the problem of ideological bias is raised. 143 Flynn stated an important 
observation and recognition of the dangers of scientific claims. He wrote: 
"It is an exercise in confirming one's fixed and unchallengable ideological 
beliefs. " 144 
A professor of economics at the London Business School John Kay raised the 
question about the accuracy of economics. He wrote: 
"It is a conventional joke that economic forecasters always disagree, and that 
there are as many different opinions about the future of the economy as there 
are economists. " 
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However, Kay's own opinion did not agree with this conventional wisdom. Instead, 
he stated the truth about economic forecasters was the opposite. Most forecasters 
proclaim the same predictions. 146 Another study of economists and their tendency to 
agree has a similar conclusion, yet with an important difference. Round and Siegfried 
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stated: 
"[S]ome economists do appear to be more agreeable than others, and that the 
most agreeable are those who have earned the distinction of being regarded 
as experts ... 
" 147 
The important admission though, is the agreement within groups and not necessarily 
between groups of economists. 148 Kay seemingly separated economists through their 
forecasting and the actual result. "The difference between forecasts are trivial", Kay 
wrote, "relative to the differences between all forecasts and what happens .,, 
149 He 
also found that the economic forecasts are almost always wrong. 'so As to why this 
seems to be the case depends, like anything else, on the examiner's interpretation and 
materials such as information available. More importantly though, questioning the 
reliability of economic forecasting further questions the 'law' of economics. That is to 
say, economics as a natural law is called into question. Furthermore, in Kay's words: 
"The degree of agreement among forecasters is outstanding. It is just the 
economy is different. " 15' 
If economics is a law of nature and a science of such high reverence, why then can 
the applicants fail to be considerably more accurate in their forecasts? While Kay 
sought to find an answer, it leaves those who are told to rely on economics as the 
means to determine legal judgements or to leave events, issues or problems to be 
resolved by 'predictable' outcomes of natural economic laws, with uncertainty. The 
poor performance in predicting the future of the economy is a practical example of 
Popper's theory that the future can not be known. It is not a surprise that forecasters 
or other economists who use the same models such as the Chicago School, will find 
the same answer. 152 
"Economic forecasters know very little about why they are forecasting, so 
there are worse rules of thumb than expecting that the future will be like the 
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past. " 
153 
The difficulty in forecasting is quite important. This is due to the structural changes 
in the economy. 154 According to Kay, the failure appears to be in the approach of 
identifying the changes. Popper generally argues it is impossible to make such an 
identification. The result in sofar as forecasting economics in relation to competition 
law, is that 'predictions' replace proof. Economic models and their predictions have 
become proof or 'fact'. This has been the relatively recent experience in the United 
States. 155 The risk which follows may be stated as Flynn did with specific reference 
to the Chicago School philosophy. 
"Neo-classical analysis of the reality confronted by antitrust disputes 
misstates the idea of good to be pursued (the normative purposes of the law) 
and wanders about in a cave of seeing shadows generated by the false sun 
(normative assumptions) of its own creation. " 
156 
A misunderstanding of economics leads not necessarily to 'truth' or accurate judicial 
decisions, but risks harmful results in the long term. Instead economics is at risk, if it 
has not already achieved such a faithful following of disciples, of being akin to 
astrology and promoted by quack doctors. 157 Either a misunderstanding or misuse 
of economics can only further its parallel to unscientific methods and astrological - 
type prediction. The greater reliance on economics risks leading to legal - idealism; 
something a model such as the Chicago School attempts to overcome. As Turner 
wrote: 
"Ideal rules are those that are both clearly predictable in their application, 
and economically rational, in that they render unlawful conduct that is anti- 
competitive, but not conduct that is economically beneficial. "158 
Once again this is the appeal of economic models like that of the Chicago School. 
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Models must be kept in perspective. 
"Economic models are created by devising links between the main economic 
variables ... to predict how 
they will change. " ßs9 
However, the reality of economic models is that they are "... biased towards 
expecting the future to be like the past, and will often fail to identify the most 
important changes in economic behaviour. " 160 
It should be emphasised that economics is not being dismissed. Economics is not 
being dismissed as fraudulent or even denied as a resource or benefit to legal theory 
and judicial decision-formation. Perhaps Popper was correct when he claimed 
economics is the most successful of the social sciences in coming close to achieving 
a method in scientific explanation like physics. 161 It is its use or abuse that is of 
concern. Furthermore and again, Soros observed that Popper appears to have over- 
looked the human involvement in economics. This reduces the level of certainty. 
Soros went further to develop what he called his Theory of Reflexivity. One critic 
claimed this was simply 'speculation! . 
16' Although elementary in definition, in 
essence this is all that is achievable. Expectations of economics and its application to 
such things as law in any extreme form may threaten the credibility of the subject. 
Instead, it is a beneficial guide in providing rational and logical explanations. 
Nevertheless economic like any science, is not infallible. As Magee explained: 
"The popular notion that the sciences are bodies of established fact is entirely 
mistaken. Nothing in science is permanently established, nothing unalterable, 
and indeed science is quite clearly changing, all the time, and not through the 
accretions of new certainties. " 
163 
The appeal of science and the appeal to regard areas of studies such as economics as 
science may be found in the glorification of the search for eternal truths as earlier 
stated. Truths therefore may be regarded as providing certainty and stability, and 
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with it knowledge. Yet any understanding of knowledge as a certain and stable 
position is a mistake and misrepresentation. Magee wrote: 
"[W]hat we call our knowledge is of its nature provisional, and permanently 
so. At no stage are we able to prove that what we 'know' is true, and it is 
always possible that it will turn out to be false .... So it is a profound mistake 
to try what scientists and philosophers have almost always tried to do, 
namely prove the truths of a theory, or justify our belief in a theory, since this 
is to attempt the logically impossible. What we can do, however, and this is 
the highest possible importance, is to justify our preference for our theory 
over another. " 164 
The problem is less to do with science or any of the so-called social sciences and the 
theories under those titles, but with their interpretation and social-expectations. 
"That the whole of science, of all things, should rest on foundations whose 
validity it is impossible to demonstrate has been found uniquely embarrassing. 
It has turned many empirical philosophers into sceptics, or irrationalitists, or 
mystic. Some it has led to religion. " 165 
The issue is to separate the 'religion' from the 'science', and the science from the non- 
scientific theories (i. e. faith and observation). Furthermore, it is socially responsible 
to recognise that non-scientific ideas are not necessarily useless, bad or lacking in 
beneficial substance. 166 One must recognise the risk and misapplication of declaring 
a statement a universal, scientific or natural law. Frequently they prove to be 
unsustainable, because of verification problems. 167 Yet they are commonly used in 
this way and as with theories claiming to be scientific, the sole purpose is to declare 
a'truth'. Too often claims of universal law are confused with'trends'. Popper wrote: 
"[T]rends exist, or more precisely, the assumptions of trends is often a useful 
statistical device. But trends are not laws. A statement asserting the existence 
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of a trend is existential, not universal. ... And a statement asserting the 
existence of a trend at a certain time and place would be a singular historical 
statement, not a universal law. The practical significance of this logical 
situation is considerable: while we may base scientific predictions on laws, 
we cannot (as every cautious statistician knows) base them merely on the 
existence of trends. A trend (we may ... take population growth as an 
example) which has persisted for hundreds or even thousands of years may 
change within a decade, or even more rapidly than that. " 168 
Popper further emphasises a significant opinion to remember. 
"It is important to point out that laws and trends are radically different things. 
There is little doubt that the habit of confusing trends with laws, together 
with intuitive observations of trends (such as technical progress), inspired the 
central doctrines of evolutionism and historicism - the doctrines of the 
inexorable laws of biological evolution and the irreversible laws of motion of 
society. " 169 
This is of direct relevance to the business world that has adopted the Spencer- 
Darwinian interpretation of evolution. The context of competition and the survival of 
the fittest has been applied to both the human-players in business and to businesses 
themselves. The adaptation of these ideas and others such as speed, track, course, or 
direction of social movement 170 (e. g. industrial development) is harmless as long as 
they are simply, as Popper wrote, "intuitive impression; but if used with anything like 
scientific pretension, they simply become scientific jargon, or to be more precise, 
holistic jargon. " 171 When applied, in this case to the commercial world, as universal 
or natural laws (i. e. 'truths'), the confusion which has been discussed is created. 
In the instance of economics and competition law, applications of an artificial model 
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such as the neo-classical (Chicago) theory to produce 'truths' may mislead or distort 
what may be termed as "... the general responsibility of the Courts,,. 112 At the same 
time, it is misleading to regard the laws of states as 'eternal truths'. One hardly needs 
reminding that laws are created and passed by governments; - people (political 
players) with their own ideologies; not from a divine science. The pursuit of 
knowledge and 'truths' is not necessarily a problem. Magee stated: 
"Popper's notion of 'the truth' is very much like this: our concern in the 
pursuit of knowledge is to get closer and closer to the truths, and we may 
even know that we have made an advance, but we can never know if we have 
173 reached our goal. " 
To Popper it is the method that is a problem. In this instance, the glorification of 
ideas and their interpretation as 'universal truths' which are more ideologically 
presented is the problem. In recognising the deception two things may be 
accomplished. The first is in receiving ideas, discovering their relationships with past 
events and seeking to correct perceived flaws in the argument. The second is using 
the new understandings in an effort to avoid previous errors, but also recognising 
and accepting the fallibility of ideas and their implementation. This then allows for 
easier flexibility or acceptance in correcting new legal problems which arise. Judicial 
decisions are then more adaptable to the needs of society of the time. The problem 
under present social acceptability, is the elimination of the certainties and the 
predictions of actions such as court results which artificial modelling allows for. 
As unfashionable as it may seem, the course this appears to take the analysis back to 
the origins of competition law. The chapter began with a synopsis of the origins of 
competition law. Of the United States' antitrust history, Flynn wrote: 
"No one can read the legislative history of the Clayton Act, for example, and 
reach the conclusion that the purpose of that statute was solely to control 
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mergers, jeopardising economic 'efficiency' as that technical concept is 
defined by neo-classical theorising. The Supreme Court's reading of the 
legislative history of the statute in Brown Shoe Co. v United States and its 
finding that the Act was designed to stop economic concentration in its 
incipiency for a variety of economic, political and social reasons is an 
accurate one. " 
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Although efforts have been made in changing the judicial interpretation of antitrust 
cases, 175 social and political objectives as well as economic ones need to be 
administered. That is to say, while economics provides greater creditable analysis (or 
a means) than a simple instinct, it does not exist in isolation. Baker stated: 
"Markets rarely exist in a political vacuum. Indeed, the more important a 
market is seen as being, the more likely that it will be subject to special 
political intervention. " 176 
Recent political trends especially in the United States and United Kingdom (but not 
necessarily exclusively), have been towards the political 'right'; towards values of 
greater individual independence and less government intervention. Given the history. 
and values of the United States, it should not be surprising that any effort to 
eliminate government intervention is regarded as a positive one. This ideology 
continues and its application to telecommunications has been called for by some 
observers of the industry. An example of this philosophy and its relation to 
telecommunications is found in the words of Gasman. 
"All public policy should aim at two primary goals: to maximise economic 
efficiency, and to leave individuals as free as possible to do as they wish as 
long as they do not impose undue costs on others .... 
The second goal is 
seldom given much thought, possibly because there are wide (and widening) 
philosophical differences about what constitutes freedom and what individual 
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rights are and are not. Communication policy probably seems only marginally 
relevant to the questions about individual freedom.... " 177 
In Gasman's opinion: 
"Current telecommunications policy falls dangerously short when measured 
against the goal of either economic efficiency or individual freedom. ". 78 
Although American telecommunications legislation has changed since Gasman wrote 
this statement, it is nevertheless an important reflection of an ideology applied to a 
specific industry. 
These thoughts seem to follow suit with the neo-classical view. With this political- 
economic philosophy and the pursuit of liberty in American history, it should 
therefore not be surprising that under the guise of science, the logical economic 
analysis of antitrust intervention (-or even the argument for a reduction of antitrust 
legislation) has been accepted. Freedom of the marketplace, regulated only by the 
free choice of the individual consumer is especially compatible with American 
ideology. It is interesting to note, large industry was regarded to be a threat to such 
liberties and therefore government intervention was deemed necessary and 
acceptable. Such is the paradox which has been experienced during the past century 
of competition laws. According to the logic of Chicago School theory, big business 
is not necessarily bad. 19 
Possibly alter having either experienced or observed the extreme ideologies' 
influence on developing antitrust theory, as in the United States, a new learning and 
a new balance may be developed. Questions must first be asked in order to achieve a 
positive new balance, rather than simply reacting to fashions of ideologies. If 
Popper's premise that it is not possible to know the future, least of all accept the 
future will be much like the past, the question which requires addressing asks; how 
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does one predict the future and influence control over it as best as one can? One 
answer may He in questioning the methodology used to predict. It is not economics 
which is the primary problem; nor is applying economics to competition law the 
issue. 
The problem lies in how it is used. It has been said that economic theory is now quite 
sophisticated beyond the use and understanding of the layperson. 18° However the 
economics on which competition theory has been based is more basic. The theorists 
at the time had not envisaged other complications that distort the theory. The 
distortion of perfect competition raises the question, why should it be relied on 
beyond a simple guide? An additional problem lies with the false expectations 
assigned to the legal system, as well as ignoring the non-linear approach affecting. 
aspects of law. In other words, law reflects the values of contemporary society. In 
doing so, it may also (or even should) consider where problems existed in the past in 
either achieving those values or if they were to be achieved. A further question may 
be asked. Is one model, for example the neo-classical economic model, realistically 
acceptable to cover all aspects of commercial society? Or is one model more suitable 
at one level of the economy and another model for another level? The liberalisation 
of telecommunications to the marketplace - philosophy may not only benefit from 
such consideration, but it also presents some contradictions to the pure free-market 
approach. 
3.6 Competition Legal Theory Applied to Telecommunications 
The rules of competition law "... should be construed in the light of the objectives... " 
of the EC. 18' One objective is to prevent the distortion of competition while another 
is to promote national market integration and the prevention of private barriers or 
interference with the goal of a borderless market. 182 However, there are industries 
that, by their historic political nature, have not been entirely receptive to these 
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fundamental objectives. Telecommunications has been one such example. The focal 
point of the problem may be described in the following manner. 
"The close association of competition law with issues of national power and 
competitiveness creates tensions in shared values of competition and 
economic interdependence. " 183 
Remaining strictly within the context of the EC objectives, some states have been 
reluctant to surrender their control over telecommunications within their territory. 
Yet there is a wider necessity that this is done, otherwise the true meaning of a 
common market is not only distorted but essentially fails due to the nature of modem 
economics. In the Green Paper concerning Telecommunication Services and 
Equipment, it was stated: 
"The strengthening of European Telecommunications is one of the major 
requirements for improving the competitiveness of the European Economy, 
strengthening Community cohesion and achieving the completion of the 
Community-wide market for goods and services... " 184 
The philosophy of the EC is thus summarised and tied to a degree to a successful 
and organised telecommunications sector. 
Secondly, there is little reason for such national control to exist. In removing the 
obsolete government control over the industry from consideration, there are two 
means of anticipating the future of the industry. In turn, the law may be appropriately 
applied. These means are the Idealist model and the Strategic model. "' 
3.6.1 The Idealist versus Strategic Model 
The Idealist and Strategic terms are useful for labelling two perceptions about how 
competitive the telecommunications market will be, and the best means of regulating 
competition. 
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The Idealist model is the opinion or philosophy supporting the existence of "... a 
mature and fully articulate competitive market. ""' This is the classical (and later 
neo-classical) economic market envisaged by Adam Smith and others. It is or as 
close to being, the perfect competitive situation with a large number of sellers each 
offering identical products. The buyers have perfect or sufficiently perfect 
knowledge allowing them to make rational and informed decisions and thus ruling 
the marketplace through their purchasing power. This model also envisages the lack 
of barriers to entry or exit. The forces of market competition through the buyer's 
power and the necessity for continuous innovation prevents the domination by any 
seller. Applying this to the telecommunications industry, it translates to mean the 
liberalisation of the industry and complete deregulation will ensure through such a 
competitive-based market that any "... monopolisation control of the 
telecommunications infrastructure and services.... " will be eroded. 187 
The Draft Interconnection Directive intended to further the Telecommunications 
Service Directive (90/388/EEC) refers to "... an environment of open and competitive 
markets". It is in short, a common goal for telecommunications shared apparently 
not only by the EC and the United States, but among many states around the globe. 
This is demonstrated by simply observing the number of states liberalising their 
telecommunications markets towards such a general goal. Some examples are China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Mexico and Eastern European countries including 
Hungary. '" The goal of January 1,1998 is set for all EC states with a few 
exceptions like Spain, for liberalisation to be completed. This goal of an environment 
of open and competitive markets has been criticised as not being clearly expressed. 18' 
It is widely recognised that one does not exist even in the more liberalised states 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States. However, it is questionable as to 
how detailed an expression of this goal needs to be defined. 
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The interpretation of how open and competitive markets are, can be, or should be, is 
subject to continuous debate. Although in competition law theorists (e. g. from the 
two principal schools of differing thought) might begin with the same or similar 
position (e. g. recognising the efficiency of competition, anti-competitive effects and 
misallocation of resources of monopolies), 190 their approach to analysis and therefore 
conclusions can be different. 
Returning to the antitrust debate in the United States for guidance, the difference 
between the Chicago School and the Post-Chicago School is in the analytical 
approach to preserving and/or promoting an open and competitive environment. In 
the Chicago School as explained by Sullivan; "... analysts who focus on antitrust tend 
both to start and stop with deductive analysis based on a sequence of truisms 
expressed through highly abstract models of reality. " 191 
In contrast, the Post-Chicago philosophy according to Sullivan; "... digs into 
empirical material in an effort to fathom the significance of observed distinctions 
between the classical models and the configuration of the particular market under 
examination. "192 There is the potential for being less of an Idealist model per se than 
the Chicago School. In applying the Idealist model to the telecommunications 
industry, Mansell wrote: 
_ 
"In this model the diffusion of an advanced telecommunications infrastructure 
and the entry of new service providers means that no single supplier can 
dominate the market sufficiently to foreclosure entry or to discriminate 
unjustifiably among customers. Telecommunications supply is treated like 
any other competitive commercial activity. ""' 
This type of non-intervention economic policy supports that economic efficiency will 
be maximised and individuals will be left "... as free as possible to do as they 
wish ...... 
194 It will be the marketplace which governs the individual freedom of the 
seller, and the buyer will have the liberty to choose. There are demands to be met 
that are in a more complex and sophisticated environment than the simpler 
marketplace of Adam Smith's writing. Nevertheless, supporters of this model argue 
the basic principles are the same and are applicable. They argue 'demand drives the 
market' as does the need to keep and attract customers. Therefore, innovation will 
develop an efficient telecommunications infrastructure. 
According to Mansell, "... the Idealist model insists upon the effectiveness of 
competition and technical change in eroding monopolistic control of 
telecommunications development... ". By contrast, the Strategic model "... shows the 
strengths and weaknesses of the forces of competition". 1'5 Mansell further stated: 
"Where competition does exist, it displays signs of superficial product 
differentiation, effective service competition in certain submarkets, and 
closure of network access at key interfaces in the network infrastructure. "'96 
The Strategic model envisions a market that is imperfect. Monopolisation of markets 
within the industry and rivalry between firms that are deemed oligopolistic are the 
distinguishing feature of this approach. The obstructions to achieving more perfect 
competition are both technical and non-technical, and often result in some form of a 
barrier to entry. 197 In this approach the firms are few in comparison to the Idealist 
situation. There exist dominant firms, either in the form of incumbent operators or 
new firms to the market. 198 If the Idealist model was accepted, this issue of 
dominant firms would be regarded as less of a problem than to the Strategic 
approach. The Idealists would argue the telecommunications industry should be 
treated like any other market open to competition. An acceptance of the position put 
forth by the Strategic interpretation would lead to recognising a need for some form 
of law to be applied. The purpose would be to prevent certain behaviours or 
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activities from occurring. In other words, the anti-competitive effects in this 
imperfect marketplace would be addressed. 
Contemporary antitrust thinking in the United States (i. e. Post-Chicago) is generally 
compatible with the Strategic approach. Yet, in contrast to and more interesting than 
the Chicago theory, the Post-Chicago environment does not contain an united front 
concerning the answers or solutions to the problems of anti-competitive activities. In 
describing Post-Chicago, Sullivan wrote: 
"It is far less likely to yield definitive conclusions than is Chicago's use of 
more universal, less particularised and empirically informed antitrust 
models. " 199 
The telecommunications industry in its contemporary form and in light of its 
transition is affected by many of the issues the Post-Chicago theorists argue require 
more consideration. Although the Chicago School influenced opinions about issues 
shared by Post-Chicagoists (such as predatory pricing, conspiracy inferences as well 
as vertical restraints), and which are also of importance in telecommunications, the 
latter theorist-group's concerns extended further into behaviour. One policy area, 
Sullivan wrote; "... concerns strategies for exploiting power in a market vertically 
related or complementary to the market where power reposes. 000 While Chicago 
theorists are likely to agree with one another about the conclusions or solutions, 
Post-Chicago theorists are not necessarily going to be as unified. Sullivan explained: 
"[P]recisely because Post-Chicago thinking ... 
does not rely on broadly 
applicable deductive models that are insensitive to observable empirical 
differences, any set of litigious facts leaves ample reason for analytical 
debate, not just between Chicago and Post-Chicago thinking, but also among 
post-Chicagofans themselves. 001 
113 
The newest 'learning' in competition thinking leads away from the methods 
subscribed to by Popper. The Post-Chicago thinking by using induction, is using the 
method Popper argued against for achieving scientific status. Popper's opinion was 
that for social sciences to achieve a greater likeness to science, the deductive method 
was the proper route. Although writing about American antitrust history, Wise 
described the central problem to antitrust thinking. The basic message though may 
be applied generally to any contemporary thinking concerning competition laws. 
Wise wrote: 
"American antitrust law is an advanced case study of the law's self-denying 
aspiration to model itself on, and incorporate the authority of science. Two 
generations of antitrust lawyers have been taught that their subject must be 
rooted in the modern science of economics. That was the lesson Edward Levi 
and Eugene Rostow in the 1940s, and that was the lesson of Richard Posner 
and Robert Bork in the 1970s. What professors call 'modem economics' 
changes, of course. But what remains unchanged is how antitrust 
practitioners understand and use the advice to be scientific. " 202 
Wise further states an important point of observation. 
"The century of effort to apply science through law, or rather, to do law in 
the image or shadow of science, teaches that science in law, like everything 
else in law, is rhetoric. " 203 
It is by acknowledging the wisdom of these words that philosophy perhaps comes 
closest to its goal; the pursuit of truth. In recognising law, science and the relevant 
social studies for what they are rather than what the experts of these fields desire 
them to be, could provide for greater problem-solving. 
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3.7 Summary 
Competition theory and its legal application to the marketplace has reached a point 
where strong parallels may be drawn with the situation in the previous century. 
Competition questions have arisen with the changes in emphasis entailed on the 
move from an industrial-based to a information-service-based society, similar to the 
change to the industrial society a hundred years before. These questions require 
some foresight as to how these changes will affect the market, competition and the 
general shape the market and (telecommunications) industry will take. 
In applying competition policy and law to the new telecommunications, there must 
be a philosophy supporting the argument for the course of action and the approach 
taken. The experience of two extremes of legal thought can prove beneficial. 
Lessons may be learned from their strengths and failings in application, as well as in 
determining what problems persist. While one interpretation was more social, 
political, and less-predictable in nature at times, the other scientific method towards 
a more neutral, predictable and 'rational' approach could not account for human 
involvement nor the social-dissatisfaction with some results. 
The enthusiastic adoption of scientific practices to other fields, particularly of a 
social nature, has left an impressive mark. With approaches which suggest conclusive 
answers, and at times seem indisputable 'truths', scientific applications risk 
misleading policy-makers and regulators; hence an alchemy of legal science. Yet, the 
methods applied have value. The problem is twofold; One is the application of 
scientific principles to an imperfect environment of social behaviour. Although 
predictions may be made, the human involvement in the system distorts the scientific 
results, reducing them to predictions rather than definitive known conclusions. Thus 
the second part to the problem, is the usage of scientific methods. Since scientific 
methods are highly revered the expectation is to have the ultimate answer to any 
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given situation. Altering this misuse of scientific methods could enhance the ability 
and decisions of policy-makers and regulators. Accepting that there are in fact a 
number of interpretations that use such methods, resulting in seemingly conclusive 
answers, and using scientific methods as a tool rather than an all-knowing leader 
might enhance the quality of legal debate. The removal of the glorification of 
"science" as a near - infallible guide and applying its various insights in a more 
pragmatic manner, might liberalise legal (competition) learning; facilitating the 
reaching of more rational conclusions. This would benefit the development of 
competition law and the success of an enduring and sustainable competitive 
telecommunications market. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Concentrations and the Future Strategic 
Telecommunications Industry 
4.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is upon the problem of concentrations in markets, 
particularly telecommunications. Among the problems include the need and strategic 
attraction at times for alliances between rivals. Both the current trend in the 
telecommunications industry of alliance-formations and the competition problem of 
corporate-convergence are addressed. These also raise another competition problem 
which is addressed: the challenge of oligopolies. 
Having set out in previous chapters the state of the telecommunications industry, as 
it was at the time of this thesis, the state of the EC's telecommunications policy and 
lastly addressing a fundamental point of the theoretical foundation of competition 
law interpretation, this chapter progresses the thesis through a practical analysis. 
The methodological structure of this chapter is a study of events with policy, 
forming a practical assessment of the competition problems in the industry. The 
chapter begins by introducing some of the competitive obstacles to market 
competition and then addresses the matter of strategic alliances. The first half of the 
chapter is devoted to the rise of alliances, with examinations of some significant 
alliances between telecommunications firms in the EC. These examinations cover the 
European Commission's Decisions about these alliances, leading to a discussion 
about mergers, joint ventures, concentrations and the problem of oligopolies in the 
second half of the chapter. This part covers the EC's established law that will 
oversee joint ventures and concentrations in telecommunications. 
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The interest of strategic alliances is twofold. On the one hand it contradicts pure 
competition through the co-operation or union of (in some cases) competitors. On 
the other hand it can reduce the number of competitors, thereby affecting the 
competitiveness of the market. Industries, markets and state-economies have become 
more concentrated. ' In contrast to the perfectly competitive market model, only a 
few corporations either exist or a few are in such a dominant position in a market 
that other considerably smaller players effectively demand relatively little or no 
consideration. This trend not only contradicts the perfect market model espoused by 
neo-classical economists, but also is a risk to the competitive process. It could also 
be an example of Schumpeter's theory of competitive destruction. 2 Concentrations 
may lead to an oligopolistic situation. The nature, importance and threat of 
oligopolies present strong opposing arguments. These may equally have valid 
comments and analysis despite polar conclusions. 
4.2 Anticipating Structural Developments of the Marketplace 
This thesis is as much about anticipating the future state of a marketplace (in this 
instance telecommunications) as it is about the present state of competition matters. 
The anticipation in the telecommunications sector is most interesting because it is 
also a large problem for developing a suitable regulatory framework. In an industry 
and market which is visibly changing at a pace that encourages the use of the term 
"revolutionary", the opportunity is present for competition law to address certain 
problems. These problems are to do with the way in which industries or markets 
have resulted, such as being highly concentrative instead of perfectly competitive. 
There is a major division of opinion over oligopolistic market structures relative to 
other structures such as a monopoly, because of its ambiguous character. Oligopolies 
lack the clarity in definition and understanding compared with such other market 
structures. The range of possible opinions is illustrated by the vague definition of the 
phenomenon itself -a market or industry containing few firms. Beyond the question 
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of definition, oligopolies are not necessarily the same from one industry or market to 
the next. So one side of the (polar) opinions about oligopolies could have greater 
relevance and validity in some industries or markets than in others 
The central issue of the oligopoly-debate is that of the effect, if any, which 
oligopolies have upon the competitiveness of the industry or market. If a market or 
industry is highly concentrated, is competition strengthened or weakened. Also, are 
the added values associated with competition such- as efficiency and consumer 
welfare improved or impaired? There is the problem of measuring both dominance 
and concentration. Is this appropriately accomplished by establishing the per cent of 
market share, by profits, by numbers of other competitors (and perhaps potential 
competitors), or by a mathematical formula such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) in the American system? Is the issue of concentration concerned with 
behaviour or structure of the industry (or market)? Which of these two are to be 
addressed by legislation and the courts - if public intervention is deemed acceptable? 
These are some of the issues in the debate addressing oligopolies and concentrations 
as a whole, which require greater attention in a reconsidering the approach to 
competition law. 
There is also the continuing problem as to whether common answers are suitable for 
all or certain industries. In an industry such as telecommunications, the need for 
interconnection may be important enough that greater co-operation or corporate 
integration is more acceptable than in other markets. Competition law would then 
have to make allowances and judge competition separately rather than commonly 
among markets. The risk is that such co-operation could lead to concentration and to 
collusion which do have negative effects. 
More frequently than not, judicial and legislative decisions occur after the damage is 
done. It would of course be improper to state X is to be found guilty because X will 
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commit Y-crime in the future. Of course the action must occur before it is judged. It 
is nevertheless essential in policy development in the present telecommunications 
market to anticipate problems and take measures upon the evidence available to 
avoid the emergence of unacceptable conditions in the industry. The current situation 
in the telecommunications industry provides the chance to anticipate, consider and as 
best as one reasonably can, take measures to avoid the development of anti- 
competitive behaviour and structures. 
If one accepts the more neo-classical argument that big does not mean bad, larger 
firms would be accepted as possibly being more efficient. This is better for the 
consumer. Oligopolies could then be accepted to be competitive. - Intervention may in 
this light either not be acceptable at all or rarely be so. Alternatively this view could 
come to be discounted, just as the idea that the telecommunications sector is a 
'natural monopoly' has been disregarded. 
Then there is the method of addressing any problems. Generally speaking, American 
antitrust law has historically been more 'structuralist' in its original approach than EC 
law. 3 The Clayton Act was used to address industry and market structures through 
judicial intervention in mergers. The (younger) EC law approached competition from 
a more 'behavioural' position, judging the abuse of a dominant position, based on its 
market-integration principles. 4 Nevertheless there is the valid argument that EC law 
has structuralist elements since one of its principal concerns is with agreements 
affecting trade between Member States. ' The significant difference until recently has 
been the EC's lack of a sufficient and effective mechanism to control mergers. 
Coincidentally, the laws concerned with concentrations (mergers) became available 
in the EC at the time of the beginning of the transformation of the 
telecommunications industry. Not only did the Commission begin the process of 
liberalising the telecommunications market and industry within the EC, but the 
industry also began a structural transformation initially through 'strategic alliances'. If 
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a market is to be and to remain competitive, present and future relations between 
strategic alliance members are important. 
The situation in telecommunications is interesting for three reasons. The first is the 
unique quality (in common with other 'utilities') of its basic form (i. e. traditional 
telephone and network provider) in that the market is already established -unlike a 
situation in which one firm creates an innovation which others copy and enter the 
new market. It is also unique because there are a number of ready-made competitors. 
To use a simple image, the former telecom monopolies within the EC are at the 
starting line together waiting for the 1998 competition flag to wave the beginning of 
the race. Therefore, in theory, the rules of the game may be established before the 
race begins rather than somewhere further down the track. In reality, the practice is 
not as simple 'as the image. The 1998 deadline is when all (but for a couple of 
exceptions) must have entered the race. Others have already started, as will become 
clear later. 
The second reason is the fact that the future of the market is less clear. The 
telecommunications industry is no longer simply concerned with the provision of 
telephony and data - transmission by its original definition. Even 
the term 
'telecommunications' may soon be regarded as archaic as 'the wireless' and 'the 
moving - pictures' or 'the talkies' are today. 
6 Technology now allows for other 
services, products and other industries to be involved in the development and the 
transmission of modern communications. 
The third reason is concerned with the interesting legal aspects of the 
telecommunications sector. It is the inherent need for interaction and co-operation 
between firms to network for the provision of the communication services. Where 
this has been done by international agreements by state-owned and operated telecom 
firms, the competitive market and expansion of firms through subsidiaries and 
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alliances can theoretically fulfil this task. The need to connect, to have a presence in 
other markets, and to provide a variety of services and functions can encourage the 
formation of alliances. The needs and types of needs vary between firms, but the risk 
of alliances (in the broadest meaning) to the market is the actual reduction of the 
number of competitors. The closer the alliance, the greater the risk of reduction or 
concentration. In telecommunications, instead of competing as individuals and simply 
relaying the communication - service from one firm to another, there is the risk of 
the firms uniting together. The risk is that this could result in only a few 
representatives remaining in the market, which would be not too dissimilar to the 
pre-liberalised market situation. 
The attitude taken by governments and the Commission about competition and 
liberalisation in the telecommunications industry is similar to that of the Netherlands. 
It was stated by Mansell and Davies: 
"Government policy is proactive in encouraging competition as a response to 
global developments in the telecommunications market and to demand by 
customers in the national markets. "' 
Within similar policy and statements about the future of the industry much of the 
rhetoric suggests a fully competitive market will evolve while the present stage is 
one of transition. " 
A fully competitive market follows the neo-classical economic thinking, and as much 
as this market may be desired it is (for the time being at least) an Idealist model. The 
Idealist model, as outlined in the previous chapter, would have the following 
outcome. There would be, according to Mansell and Davies, permeable seamless 
networks, ubiquity (i. e. universal service diffusion), demand-led telecommunications 
industry, open systems, common interface standards, co-operative partnerships, 
transparent network access, and minimal regulation to achieve efficiency and equity. 9 
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Also, product differentiation would be strong as would service competition. 1° 
Although the industry is in transition, there is no guarantee or possibility to 
accurately predict an outcome of the Idealist model. Some of the elements may exist, 
but a more suitable description of the industry in the immediate future may be the 
Strategic model. Mansell and Davies stated: 
"[I]f the Strategic model is a more appropriate description of the political and 
economic incentives in the market, a continuous process of rivalry will need 
to be assessed in terms of its social and economic benefits. " '1 
In contrast to the Idealist model, the Strategic model's characteristics include: 
fragmented networks, reduced ubiquity in service diffusion, supply-led industry 
based on multinational - user pressure, weak stimuli for co-operation, 
monopolisation and rivalry with non-transparent network access and increasing 
regulation. 12 Product differentiation and service competition would be superficial. 
Access and control of the network would be closed to selected suppliers and users. " 
Yet this too is not a guaranteed result of changes in the telecommunications industry, 
but it is a threat and an obstacle to achieving something closer to the Idealist model. 
The movement away from an openly competitive market to a concentrated market 
through alliances and in some cases mergers is not a prediction. It is happening. The 
final result of only a few players remaining is expected. 14 With such expectations, 
the opportunity for the referees of competition to have some influence over the 
development of a new form essentially from the start is available, but such an 
opportunity can not last. 
The EC Commission does not want state telecommunications monopolies to be 
replaced by a private domination, claimed competition officials in the EC 
Commission. " Some in the EC have recognised efforts to liberalise EC telecom 
markets might serve to develop cartel-like domination by the private sector, thus 
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eliminating effective competition. " Such power would be great because of the 
inherent co-operative feature in contemporary telecommunications, the network and 
infrastructure. An important concerned is the control of infrastructure, because the 
behaviour of the supplier will affect the service and competition. " The supplier 
could be anti-competitive with regard to network access and distribution. Control of 
the information gateway is a control over the market. The importance of this is 
further emphasised by the growing reliance on communication(s) for the new 
information-service based economies of states. 
Alliances may not only increase product availability and a seamless infrastructure, 
but depending upon the type of alliance, they reduce the number of competitors. 
Horizontal alliances have such a risk. Conglomerate alliances may be more beneficial 
in the primary stages of the transition in so far as providing an increase in services 
such as financial or entertainment to the communication - consumer. The risk is also 
of a vertical element in conglomerate and especially in the result of horizontal 
alliances. The risk is vertical foreclosure barring competition. In telecommunications 
an important anti-competitive element is the foreclosure of access to infrastructures 
for other firms. This may not only eliminate existing competition, but creates a 
serious barrier to entry to potential competitors. " Therefore the Idealist model 
would fail and not be achievable. 
4.3 Strategic Alliances 
4.3.1 Definition 
Strategic alliances in the telecommunications industry have been an increasing 
phenomenon particularly in recent years. The major telecommunications firms in the 
1990s have been preparing for the legislative and industrial changes that will affect 
the industry in the. next century. 19 The term "strategic alliance" does not have a 
precise definition. 20 It may be understood as "... a wide arrangement between 
companies which does not reach the level of a full merger of all of their activities but 
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does go beyond a limited agreement to do some activities in common (i. e. a 
distribution agreement). "2' Another variation of the term is: 
"A coalition of two or more organisations to achieve strategically significant 
goals and benefits that are mutually beneficial. [It] does not imply equality of 
benefits, but each party receives benefit roughly in proportion to its 
contribution. The stability of the alliance is a direct consequence of the 
benefits outweighing those of alternative arrangements. " 22 
Strategic alliances may also be suitably defined for the current trends in 
telecommunications as, "... alliances (going beyond mere super-correspondent 
relationships) between carriers in order to create regional, intercontinental or global 
networks with a clear purpose of attracting traffic from major business users. " 23 
An underlying concern about strategic alliances in telecommunications is their effect 
upon change in the structure of the industry in the long term. There is also a question 
about their form. Are they loose relationships filling voids and compensating for 
weaknesses of the partners, or do they form a group which is similar in nature to a 
conglomerate? In other words, will the uniting of firms which previously had little if 
any reason to be associated with one another become more than an allies, but 
dependants? Furthermore, if the 'new' communications industry consists of alliances 
will member firms within the alliances be at liberty to leave their respective alliance? 
One concern is that their dependence on the other firms will be too great due to the 
nature of the industry's structure. This risk may be because of the necessity to be 
allied, whereas if one is not allied or can not find an alliance the firm's success may 
be in jeopardy. 
One observer of strategic alliances stated: 
"Mergers and acquisitions are not alliances, because at least one of the 
parties to the deal is not at liberty to leave. " 24 
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Therefore it could be assumed that strategic alliances are more casual in their 
relationship. However, are they at risk of amounting to be a merger (or acquisition) 
because of the complex technical nature of the market? The lack of definitiveness in 
the meaning of strategic alliances causes uncertainty about what specific features 
may either be condemned or condoned absolutely, like for example with mergers. 
Whereas mergers are a formal unification of legal entities, strategic alliances may or 
may not involve such bonding. The problems of defining strategic alliances arise 
because there are different types of relationships. Their impreciseness may not fall 
foul of the law, but their result may offend the principles the law was intended to 
protect. 
In general terms these connections are for example, between firms within the 
telecommunications industry or between a telecom firm and a non-telecom firm. 
Examples of non-telecom firms are computer and entertainment companies. Three 
occurring trends in the industry have been found. The trends may be labelled as 
'network alliances', 'multimedia alliances', and 'commercial and capital support 
alliances'. 25 The first is to create geographical networks. The second is concerned 
with creating multimedia ventures. This means linking voice telephony, data 
communications, video communications and entertainment into one network. The 
third trend concerns financial and commercial partnerships to link both fixed and 
mobile telecommunications between the developed and the developing countries. 
26 
Common to all of these categories are two types of strategic alliances. One may 
establish a legal entity such as a joint venture. The other may consist of companies 
pooling resources without establishing a legal entity. Also common to strategic 
alliances is the alleged continuation of competition between companies forging the 
alliance. The competition though is "... between the partners in other fields". 
27 Firms 
for example, may be allies in the provision of services but competitors in the 
equipment market. This does not excuse the potential elimination or serious threat to 
competition as the alliances may affect a market. 
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4.3.2 Purpose for Establishing Alliances 
Broadly speaking the purpose for telecom firms in establishing an alliance is 
twofold. 28 Firstly, it is for survival as internal markets open up allowing for a greater 
global or simply regional (e. g. the EU) market. Smaller and/or weaker national 
providers in the EC are uniting with one another to compete with the larger and 
stronger firms. Examples of the larger and stronger firms include at present, British 
Telecom, France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom, or even non- EC firms such as 
AT&T. Similarly, they are uniting with such larger firms for strength and self- 
preservation. Secondly, it is for basic commercial success. In one respect the market 
may be understood to be driven by demand. In simple economics, failure to be able 
to meet the customers' demands means loss of business. Firms may form alliances 
for a number of reasons. The members of the one alliance may not have the same 
reasons as the other member(s). Two important influencing factors for firms to seek 
an alliance may be termed 'economic' and 'geographic'. 
Economic reasons could include a desire to increase market share or power, to offer 
additional products and/or services, or for access to resources or to share risky 
investments. A reason may also be "... to accelerate return or investment by putting 
an asset or skill to use more quickly". 29 
Geographic reasons have been equally influential in recent years. With the 
liberalisation of markets, opportunities previously closed to foreign firms have 
emerged. In the case of the European Union, liberalisation has been occurring at an 
uneven rate. Where firms have found the markets closed, but have the knowledge 
that the market is due to be opened in the near future, it has been popular to 
establish ties with a local communications company (normally the state 
telecommunications operators (TO)). This evades trade barriers and provides for a 
'backdoor' to a share of the market, while in many cases continuing to benefit from 
closed markets in their `home' market. (This is also the case for countries [non-EC] 
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where the market remains closed for an unknown length of time). Alliances are a 
means to prepare for full market participation when the barriers have been removed. 
Three other motivating characteristics could be attributed to individual firms' seeking 
to form alliances. These include 'adventure' which is where "... firms pursuing a policy 
of vigorous expansion, or which see themselves as pioneers, may use alliances to 
bring about change and make an impression.... " 3" Another is known as a `Follower' 
which is simply joining because it is popular to do so. The third 'Fear' resulting from 
a threat of arrival of stronger competitors and/or from uncertainty of the industrial 
structure emerging from the changes 31 Alliances provide shelter, strength and 
reassurance for smaller, weaker firms. 'Traditional' TOs that are often inefficient, find 
safety in alliances to protect their markets. 
The importance of many alliances being established may be summarised as to 
include, "... a possibility of evolution in accordance with market changes". 32 
"They are mostly answers to a progressive, very substantial and quick change 
of the conditions and characteristics of the market(s) in which incumbent 
operators operate in terms of technologies available, scale of operation and 
geographical coverage required and/or the existing regulatory 
framework. " 33 
The changes in the industry as analysed in this dissertation have been described to be 
"... of such a magnitude that even puts into question the survival of traditional 
operators in the medium term. " 34 
Consequently, competition law is put to the test in its anti-trust application. Some 
recent pressure has been from the demand side of the market-equation. The 
demanding consumers in this case are a minority percentage of the whole market, but 
provide the most profits for telecom companies. 
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4.3.3 Examples of Market-Demand 
Multinational corporations in many instances are representative of consumer-led 
motivating forces of change. 
"Corporate telecom managers are now demanding reliable and seamless 
international networks. And they know that if their national operator cannot 
provide what they need, they can go elsewhere. " 35 
The multinationals in some cases have begun to apply additional pressure on the 
telecom firms to provide the service they demand. 
In 1994 some of the largest companies in Europe established the European Virtual 
Private Network Users' Association to pressure telecommunications firms to 
improve service and meet the customers' demands. The corporate consumer 
demands 'service quality'. This means the ability to transfer information whether its 
voice, data, video or all three simultaneously quickly, directly and smoothly. In many 
cases the transmissions are not always direct from A to B. They often would be 
routed through other countries usually to reduce cost. Secondly, delays may often 
occur due to the inability by telecom companies to meet the demand of traffic. 
Thirdly, there is the poor quality of the transmitting of information which can be a 
problem. A fourth concern is billing. At present there are moves towards fulfilling 
the demand for what is called 'one-stop-shopping'. The consumer (again mostly 
corporate) will receive only one bill and will in future be able to operate through one 
company that will provide all the communication (including multimedia facilities) the 
customer requires for their business. Finally companies need the ability to 
communicate as the global exchange of information increases. The barriers to these 
issues are twofold. First there is the problem of infrastructure. Secondly there is the 
obstacle caused by politics and regulations. 
Telecommunication companies had not constructed modern systems to meet these 
demands either because of the high cost or the lack of technical know-how. There is 
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also the problem of physically keeping up with new developments. A further 
infrastructure problem is "... differing standards and signalling protocols across 
country borders". 36 This becomes the second barrier, the political obstacle. Different 
standards, a lack of international co-operation and regulatory matters obstruct the 
flow of communications. It is widely recognised that there is a great imbalance in 
telecommunications in the world. Yet it is not only a 'first world - third world' 
imbalance. The imbalance is presently within the EU. The President of AT&T (UK) 
observed: 
"It is inevitable that the competitive advantage of a company seeking global 
markets is a reflection of that company's national market base. " 37 
A few examples of many of the major users and benefactors of such alliances 
between communications firms include multinationals such as Unilever, Proctor and 
Gamble, General Motors, and Ford. There is also the financial sector that needs to 
transfer 'money' internationally, e. g. Lehman Brothers International. An executive 
director of this company provided a beneficial example of a situation applicable to 
many firms. 
"Originally, in common with other US Investment Banks, our European 
offices were simple sales outlets with a basic connectivity requirement back 
to New York (or London) main frame to process a sale. Not only have we 
- experienced a growth in the volume of business but the nature of the business 
within these locations has itself changed with complex trading teams, and all 
of their associated advanced technology, being established over incredibly 
short timescales. " 38 
Companies and industries have changed commercially and also structurally. Branches 
have formed which (such as Lehman Brothers' London office) are no longer 
'outposts' representing the head office (e. g. in New York), but have greater equality 
and semi-independence to conduct more business. 
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Similar examples may be found elsewhere such as the automotive industry. Ford has 
been designing a "world car" through its European, American and Australian design 
centres. Information may be exchanged more efficiently and simultaneously through 
a single network. 39 One final example to demonstrate the market's demand on 
telecom firms comes from the AT&T (UK) President. 
"A company that designs microchips in Spain and buys software in India and 
assembles its final product in Mexico for distribution in South America ... 
is 
... [s]uch a company [that] has a clear need to move and manage information 
efficiently. " 40 
While alliances do provide service and technical benefits to the consumer, they do 
reduce the number of the wider market players to a mere few. This can create a risk 
that market barriers will form which the EU's competition law was established to 
prevent. It may be beneficial to consider the usage of the term 'Strategic Alliance' as 
one that is over-used and possibly abused, and therefore needs clarification. 
4.3.4 Alliances, Partnerships and Corporations 
Two important points need addressing. The first concerns the interchanging use of 
'strategic alliance' and 'strategic partnership'. The second point of concern is over the 
difference between 'network alliance' and network corporation'. It would be helpful 
to distinguish between agreements among companies, which may be termed 
'alliances' from those that may be called 'partnerships'. This could provide a means to 
separate acceptable unions of co-operation from those with a long term and more 
permanent position. Such distinctions could be used to determine whether or not the 
agreement of co-operation is judicially acceptable. 
An 'alliance' may be more beneficial to the competitive system particularly in terms of 
market entry and market exit. 'Partnerships' which, although they are not proper 
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mergers or acquisitions, may been seen as having the effect of a union and being to a 
large extent functionally convergent. By establishing partnerships the union is more 
permanent and potentially evasive of regulation governing mergers. This may affect 
market share, power and threaten the pursuit of a competitive market by removing 
actual players from a position of competition. 
On this basis a Strategic Partnership may be defined as one where an investor 
acquires a large share of equity from another and invests "... commercial awareness, 
management expertise, technology expertise and investment capital into the more 
moribund ... enterprise" 
4' A Strategic Alliance may be said to be an arrangement 
between telecom operators usually of different countries to work together in 
carrying traffic from one to the other. One motive is to provide their clients with a. 
seamless service that would in an ideal relationship cover regions or preferably be 
capable of covering the globe. 
4.3.5 Network Alliances 
'Network alliances' are between telecommunication firms to create links both 
regionally and globally. 42 On the one hand it is a business-survival strategy. On the 
other it is the commercial prosperity which is attractive to join forces with 'potential' 
rivals. The fundamental question to analysing the present and future development of 
the industry concerns who is leading whom. Is it the supply or is it the demand that 
is forcing firms to make changes and the industry to be restructured? 
Network alliances not only provide an international link (where traffic has grown 
between 15-20 per cent a year despite periods of recession in domestic economies), " 
they also allow telecom firms to enter the national markets of others. This entry is a 
type of backdoor and enables the foreign firm to prepare as much as possible for the 
day when the national market is liberalised. With liberalisation of the market further 
access may then be obtained, but the early preparation will give a competitive edge 
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over others who have not previously gained some form of access. It also allows for 
greater survival potential against the established domestic firm(s). Since the 
government review in 1991 of opening the market in Britain, there have been 150 
companies licensed to compete with British Telecom. 44 Network alliances also allow 
for greater access to markets for smaller and newer telecom carriers competing with 
the larger and older firms despite the latter having established their own alliances. 
New carriers of international traffic are reported to have added volume to the 
market. In some instances, new carriers out-perform more established firms . 
4' For 
example, Mercury had the highest per cent of international call revenues, surpassing 
major established rivals including British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and AT&T ab 
Again, the question about the appropriate use and hence the appropriate 
understanding of'alliances' is raised. 
Mansell uses the term "network corporation". 7 In some instances this may be a 
more appropriate term. Although she does not use the term interchangeably with 
what many prefer to call 'network alliance', it may be of value to establish a 
distinction between the terms. The difference between the two is relative, but 
nevertheless possibly significant. 'Alliance' seems to maintain separate entities but 
sharing a common purpose. 'Corporation' suggests a much closer bonding and a 
more permanent arrangement. Another means to see the difference between the two 
terms is to ask whether or not the alliance members are individually able to exit the 
relationship or are there barriers. 
The "network corporation" has been explained as follows: 
"[It] is based upon 'inter-company alliances of technical, production, financial 
and marketing competencies across national boundaries' 48 The network 
corporation depends increasingly upon the public and private 
telecommunication infrastructure to achieve its goals. ... It 
is characterised by 
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formal and informal co-operative agreements among its subsidiaries, sub- 
contracting organisations and customers, as well as with other 
corporations. 1149 
The importance of establishing a distinction between the term alliance and 
corporation helps in determining the future shape of the industry. A concern is that 
these connections between the firms "... can become a bottleneck to economic 
growth and development. " 50 In turn it would defeat the purpose of liberalising the 
industry. As one official from the EU Competition authority (DG-IV) stated: 
"It is possible to say, on the one hand, that the Commission's efforts to 
liberalise the telecommunications sector will serve no purpose if cartels were 
allowed to develop, eliminating competition in liberalised markets... "" 
In order to further this analysis, it would be best to describe some of the major 
alliances occurring. They may be assessed in relation to the issue of alliance 
proximity and the impact on the competitive system. 
4.3.6 Network and Alliance Players 
At the time of writing, the largest and also most important of the popular alliances 
are; 'World Partners', 'Concert', 'Phoenix', 'Global One', and Unisource' (and also a 
joint venture between Unisource and AT&T called `Uniworld'. This became AT&T- 
Unisource in 1996). Concert, Phoenix, Unisource and Global One are more 
important with regard to the EU. One that has particular significance to the EU is 
called Global One (formerly known as 'Atlas'). In order to develop a picture of both 
the shifts in telecom companies' interests and 'the web of communications being 
formed, it would be best to break down the telecommunications industry into simple 
sectors. From this preliminary base the connections may begin to be formed and the 
proximity of telecom firms' relations may be better understood. 
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These alliances are 'telephone-dominated' alliances. Other alliances exist in other 
tele-communication exchange sectors and they may be labelled as 'cable', 'cellular', 
and 'other' (which combines new participants not previously regarded as among the 
telephone company status quo). It is not unusual for telecom firms to also have 
interests in other sectors. For example, the British company Cable & Wireless 
Communications (CWC) (formed through merger in 1997 between Bell Cablemedia, 
NYNEX, and Cable & Wireless plc 's Mercury) has interests in 'telephone', 'cellular' 
and is developing interests in the 'cable' sector. Some telecom operators also have 
interests in more than one alliance of the same 'sector'. To further complicate the 
web, the interests overlap into multimedia. 
The alliance called Unisource is an European alliance consisting of Swiss Telecom, 
Telia of Sweden, the Dutch firm KPN, and until July 1997 Telefonica of Spain. All 
of these firms have equal ownership of the alliance. 52 The ideal result from the 
alliance may be seen in the following way: A call to Sweden from a Dutch mobile 
phone in Spain could be made through one company. In this European example, it 
might be through a company formed through an alliance of established telecom firms 
under the name, Unisource. 53 The ambitions do not end with a trans-Europe, 
regional service. 
4.3.6.1 Unisource, Uniworld, WorldPartners/WorldSource and AT&T 
Unisource intended a joint venture with the largest American long-distance carrier 
AT&T: this was called Uniworld. The idea was stated that it would be an integrated 
telecoms network meeting the demands by large firms operating across Europe 
(European VPN Users' Association - EVUA), 
54 and presumably between Europe 
and the United States. (Uniworld later became a more permanent venture under the 
name AT&T-Unisource). Unisource and AT&T-Unisource required EC approval, 
which was duly received in October 1997. In particular, Unisource's links with 
AT&T were scrutinised by the Commission. The Commission reported: 
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"Given the importance of these partners on the telecommunications market 
and in order to ensure a fair and balanced scrutiny under the EU competition 
rules of all alliances in this sector, the Commission has at its own initiative 
launched an examination of the arrangements regarding Unisource as well as 
its links with AT&T. "55 
Most arrangements of this nature do in fact require the scrutiny of the Commission. 
The reason is similar; concern for market domination. 
AT&T is an example of a firm with an interest in more than one alliance and this 
multi-alliance interest should be kept in mind when considering market dominance. 
AT&T's intentions are clear: global connections to be a global firm. It is also a firm 
with both signal carrying and equipment manufacturing interests. 
AT&T has a quarter of its revenues from business beyond its country of origin, the 
United States. It anticipates half of its business will be from outside the United States 
within ten years. 56 Perhaps this is an under-estimate. This company's international 
interests ten years ago were limited. By way of example only 60 people employed by 
AT&T worked outside of the US. In 1993 there were 56,000 employees57 of AT&T 
working outside the US "... and virtually all of them are citizens of the countries 
where they work. " 58 Its success at becoming a global company depends very much, 
at this stage, on acceptance by national regulators for alliances as well as establishing 
the company in non-US markets. For example, Britain only recently gave AT&T a 
licence to operate in the United Kingdom. 59 A couple of examples of AT&T's 
involvement in the UK include its intention to provide domestic switched voice and 
data services, private line service and international re-sale service. It has established 
an agreement with COLT Telecommunications to provide the latter with 
international network access, while at the same time having access to COLT's 
network in Central London. In other European states, AT&T began to provide 
businesses in France with Internet access and support. In Germany it has provided 
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Deutsche Telekom with fibre optic cable. While direct and formal establishment in 
Germany's telecommunications market has remained largely closed, AT&T used its 
calling-card system (AT&T U. S. domestic and international long distance calling, 
AT&T USADirect and AT&T World Connect Services) for many customers to 
avoid using DT. 60 This shows a few of the numerous ways in which firms have been 
creating a presence in closed or semi-closed markets. 
Apart from AT&T-Unisource, AT&T has had other alliance-interests. One was 
called 'WorldSource' (-earlier it was 'World Partners'). This alliance is a joint venture 
between AT&T, KDD of Japan and Singapore Telecom. The purpose of the alliance 
has been described as one that offers "... seamless voice and data services designed to 
efficiently meet the needs of multinational corporations. The offering is designed to 
address these companies' requirements for a single source of telecommunications 
capabilities across international boundaries. 01 It can be seen as AT&T's extension 
into the Asian market. In theory a consumer connected to AT&T or one of its 
partners could communicate through any of the services offered by the partners 
between Asia, the United States and Europe. An exchange of information such as 
video conferencing could take place among people somewhere in each region, as a 
simple example. This is where AT&T, or for that matter any firm in such a position, 
finds creating Asian alliances and European alliances advantageous so as to offer a 
complete, global package. AT&T, ROSNET (Russian Telecommunications 
Network) and INTERCON International USA Inc. created a joint venture for 
operating a national public data network in Russia. The joint venture (ROSNET 
International) will purchase products and services from AT&T and ROSNET, while 
marketing will be under INTERCON. 62 However, this is an opportune moment to 
demonstrate overlapping and interconnection of alliances. 
In the mid-1990s Singapore Telecom was not only involved in a joint venture with 
AT&T, it was also involved with a rival of AT&T in another alliance. The Infonet 
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alliance involved the Singapore firm as well as European firms France Telecom, 
Telia (Sweden), PTT (Holland), PTT (Switzerland), Telefonica (Spain) and 
Belgacom (Belgium), which also encompassed Unisource. However, Unisource itself 
had a 31.2 per cent stake in Infonet. AT&T's long distance rival MCI (the second 
largest long-distance US carrier) also had 25 per cent stake in Infonet. Deutsche 
Telekom was also involved indirectly through its alliance with France Telecom in the 
'Atlas' venture (see below). Within this web was another threatening rival of AT&T; 
Concert through MCI, which incorporated BT. 
British Telecom held a 20 per cent stake in MCI, and the two firms established the 
network-alliance called 'Concert'. Concert was further enhanced through BT's share 
in Spanish, Italian and links with Nordic telecom firms. BT, for example, has 
established an alliance with Telecom Finland, TeleDenmark and Norwegian 
Telecom. It was connected to Europe through a major player (BT) and also to 
America through BT's relation with MCI. 
Although BT's relations with MCI have since soured, with speculation during the 
summer of 1997 about the future of the merger and hence of Concert, the principles 
of this arrangement are a matter of interest and precedent in relation to EC 
competition policy in the contemporary telecommunications industry. 
4.3.6.2 Newco/Concert 
In 1994 BT and MCI notified the European Commission about their agreements 
forming an alliance, on the basis that the co-operation was a concentration under the 
Merger Regulation 4064/89. According to the notification the BT/MCI alliance 
(called at this time, Newco) was "... for the provision of enhanced and value-added 
global telecommunications service to multinational carriers". 63 Secondly, BT 
acquired 20 per cent of MCI. BT became the largest shareholder of MCI. 
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The Commission decided the acquisition of the shareholding in MCI did not fall 
within the scope of Article 85(1). This was because the drafting of the agreement 
would not allow BT: "... the ability to seek to control or influence the company and, 
furthermore, both American corporate and anti-trust law would impede any misuse 
of (or even access to) any confidential information of MCI by BT. " 64 In the decision 
by the Commission the issue of restrictive practices and shareholding was addressed. 
It was stated: 
"Although, as a general rule, Article 85 (1) EC does not apply to agreements 
for the sale or purchase of shares as such, it might do so, given the specific 
contractual and market contexts of a particular case, if the competitive 
behaviour of the parties to the agreement is to be co-ordinated or 
influenced. " 65 
The reasoning given for the purchase of BT's equity in MCI was "... to ensure a 
common interest expressed by the parties to go global to better serve (and keep) 
their existing customers and to better address new areas of the market. " 66 
This rather vague explanation fails to define the necessity of BT's purchase of 20 per 
cent of MCI, and not for example, a mutual exchange of equal shares if such an 
exchange was necessary. An explanation for the purchase of shares comes in 
inference to investment in MCI, implying a form of cash injection from BT into the 
American firm. The result of this investment was the creation of the joint venture 
('Newco'). 
"[T]he creation of Newco and the investment of BT in MCI are steps taken 
by the two parent companies to pre-position themselves for when full 
liberalisation is in place, steps that are being followed by many 
telecommunications operators who are creating sets of products comparable 
to those of Newco. " 67 
150 
The purpose for Newco was better explained in the Commission's Decision. It was 
stated: 
"Although national borders are still in place as regards the provisions of most 
telecommunications services, strategic alliances like the present one are being 
created now in anticipation of a market situation where national boundaries 
will have substantially disappeared. In addition, both the services that Newco 
is going to offer, ... and the customers 
it intends to serve are by nature 
international; consequently Newco will not be involved in the provision of 
services within one country only. " 68 
The alliance and formation of a separate company for a more global role was not 
established by two equal firms. MCI provided BT with greater access to the 
American market. Although BT had access to 35 per cent of the American market, it 
could not provide consumers with voice and data. 69 MCI did not have as great a 
presence in the multinational market as BT. 70 Together, BT and MCI were able to 
fulfil each other's weaknesses and establish a company (Newco - later called 
Concert) to compete with one of the largest carriers AT&T. An analyst explained: 
"MCI and British Telecom got a jump in global networking because Concert 
is a single company. This has allowed them to come out with integrated 
service offerings faster than AT&T. " 71 
More than 20 per cent of shares ($4.3 billion) was exchanged. It has been reported 
that senior-level executives were exchanged which "... helped the companies get to 
know each other better". 72 This calls into question the practicality of the restriction 
of influence and confidential information outlined earlier regarding Shareholdings. If 
such an exchange did occur, beyond the establishment of a board of directors for 
Newco, 73 the actual relationship between BT and MCI might warrant review. 
Interestingly, a third aspect of the alliance was the commitment by BT and MCI. 
151 
This was: 
"... not to engage in the core business (public basic telecommunications 
services) of the other party in its territory; this reciprocal non-compete 
obligation effectively amounted to a territorial protection dividing the world 
market between the Americas (territory reserved for MCI) and the rest of the 
world (territory reserved for BT) in respect of activities which remain outside 
the scope of activities of the joint venture. 
This included acting as exclusive distribution for Newco's products. 75 The 
Commission's agreeing to closing the EC (including the European Economic Area) 
market to potential competition (MCI) is interesting. It would seem in principle, to 
go against Article 85(1); prohibiting agreements and other practices which distort 
competition and which could affect trade between Member States. The reasoning 
given for allowing territorial exclusiveness included licensing provisions. 
"Newco sublicenses BT solely for the 'territory' and MCI solely for the 
Americas to use the combined technology it has received from its parent 
companies in the distribution of Newco's products. " 76 
Thus, in a manner of speaking, the child permits the parent to act. By excluding one 
another, BT and MCI benefit through the creation of a third company. Newco is 
used both for marketing and creating a global firm, but also gaining access to each 
alliance member's territory while overtly being denied access to compete. 
Furthermore: 
"[E]ach parent company (or distributor) receives directly from the other a 
non-exclusive licence to use and licence the trademarks of the latter within its 
own territory. Thus BT grants MCI such a licence for the trademark of BT 
but limited to the Americas ... and vice versa. 
" 77 
This allows two things. First the product can be sold under the name of the other 
firm, but secondly the market remains controlled in so far as BT or MCI competing 
152 
with one another. Although creating the benefit of selling (presumably where 
profitable) the others name, it effectively eliminates the other firm from becoming a 
true competitor. 
Nevertheless, the prohibiting agreements and exclusive licensing arrangements are 
permitted under Article 85(3) concerning exemptions to Article 85(1). 
"The general rule is that restrictive practices which affect inter-State trade 
are not allowed, and undertakings engaged in such activities will be ordered 
to stop doing so as well as running the risk of being fined by the 
Commission. " '8 
The exemptions to this principal are permitted "... if the harmful affects of restrictive 
agreements or practice are sufficiently counterbalanced by a number of beneficial 
elements". 
79 
BT and MCI argued the arrangement protects valuable intellectual property rights 
they have contributed to the Newco joint venture against an outsider, and also each 
other. Importantly: 
"In this context, both parties have stressed that they have not found a more 
efficient manner of organising the distribution of the products in a balanced 
way. " 80 
The Commission accepted BT and MCI's reasoning. In the Decision it stated: 
"Taking those facts into consideration, together with the high level of 
competition that the parent companies will be facing (as distributors of 
Newco) and the substantial bargaining power of customers, the exclusive 
distribution arrangement for BT (including here those provisions in the 
intellectual property agreement that enforce it) can be accepted as being 
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indispensable to the positive effects (in particular the distribution of the 
products in an efficient manner) resulting from the restrictive clauses .... " 
gý 
A condition was attached to this acceptance stating there was to be a possibility for 
passive sales available for customers in the European Economic Area (EEA). By 
'passive sales' it was explained that EEA customers should be able to receive Newco 
products through MCI without BT's intervention or support distribution. 82 The 
Commission concluded that: 
"... any potential European customer, with activities in at least two Member 
States, but no presence in the United States of America, can contract with 
MCI (instead of BT, the exclusive distributor for the EEA) the provision of 
Newco services in the EEA only. " 83 
The Commission makes an interesting effort to further establish Newco as a separate 
firm. This is done in connection with the right of the customer to contract with MCI 
in the EEA. This conclusion of sale will not involve breaching the licences agreed 
between MCI and BT. 84 According to the Decision: 
"MCI ... will then ask 
Newco to procure all necessary use of remote 
networks (third-party networks) on the most competitive terms 
available. " 85 
This may involve BT, however the Decision insists it "... will always be obliged to 
obtain supplies on a competitive basis. " 86 This attempt to maintain a strong degree 
of separation or independence between MCI and BT and Newco is interesting in so 
far as the latter statement has parallels to law concerning procurement by public- 
owned firms. 
The Decision by the Commission is now only guidance and a source for debate like 
any Decision or caselaw, because just over two years after the Decision was 
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published in the Official Journal, BT and MCI announced their merger in November 
1996.87 
4.3.6.3 Atlas/Phoenix (Global One) Alliance 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom formally announced on December 7 1993 
their alliance. Both companies at the time were state-owned monopolies. Discussions 
between the two firms were public knowledge, and the possibility of an alliance 
between the two was controversial. One commentator wrote: 
"It is hard to imagine a scenario more grotesque than a merger of France 
Telecom and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (DBT). Europe's largest state- 
owned telecommunications companies enjoy 100% monopolies in the 
provision of telephone services in their respective markets. ... But wait. It 
gets worse. In Paris and Bonn, the conception is to include a third partner in 
this unsavoury deal: AT&T, America's largest telephone company. " 88 
This alliance presents a number of characteristics and issues of interest to the 
regulation of competition. One is the increasingly common 'need' for alliances in 
order to provide service demanded by consumers (mostly multi-nationals). An 
observer explained: 
"The heart of the alliance will be a state-of-the-art European 'backbone 
network' providing companies with international private network and high- 
capacity data communications across the continent.... " 89 
Marcel Roulet, chairman at the time of France Telecom, stated the alliance would be 
a global player for Europe. 90 This second point raises the question of the relevance 
of promoting firms (especially where competition may be affected) under the guise 
of nationalism. Nationalism (in this instance under the flag of the EC) was further 
used by Roulet when he also stated: 
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"'We think that the Brussels authorities are aware that it would be somewhat 
paradoxical if their rules led them to block a partnership between large 
European players from different continents. " 91 
This raises the point about the paradox of national favouritism and a government 
policy of intervention that may distort or conflict with a policy of open market and 
competition. The European Commission too is an example of having such 
contradictory policies. The White Paper concerning the matters of growth, 
competitiveness and employment could be interpreted to promote Euro-telecom 
alliances for the social and commercial benefit of the EC. 92 Roulet voiced criticism 
that the alliance between the two European telecommunication firms might be 
scrutinised while, he claimed the BT-MCI alliance formation announced earlier in the 
year might not be examined. This led to speculation that EC authorities might 
support an alliance between France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom and AT&T in 
light of the BT-MCI agreement 93 
An alliance between FT-DT is also for reasons other than providing a European 
telecommunications organisation to meet 'foreign' rivals and provide the EC with 
commercial benefits. The alliance could potentially obstruct competitors from 
gaining access to the domestic markets of France and Germany. There is the risk of 
such large and monopolistic organisations forming a cartel that would dominate 
Europe. 94 It must be remembered that EC telecom markets were not open at this 
time, although the legislative process had begun. The deadline (1998) was still just 
over a few years away at the time. Thus it could be regarded as a defensive move by 
the two telecom monopolies in an effort to secure as much of their national markets 
prior to the inevitable market liberalisation. 95 
Alliances not only creates cross-border benefits (such as one-stop-shopping) to sell 
to their customers, but it also increases their position and power among the global 
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telecom firms. At the time of the alliance, Deutsche Telekom was regarded as the 
second largest and France Telecom the third largest carriers. Together they were 
only behind AT&T - the world's largest. British Telecom was also their only 
European rival (in terms of competitive strength), which was placed as the world's 
fourth largest telecommunications carrier. A FT-DT alliance would then make them 
three times larger than BT. 96 This alliance may have been encouraged by the BT- 
MCI alliance announcement, which could have threatened FT and DT's strengths. 97 
Sprint replaced AT&T in the global strategy FT-DT alliance (called 'Atlas' at the 
time), particularly in connecting European traffic with the American market. 
Although Sprint was small in comparison to FT and DT with regard to turn-over, 
operating income, employees and subscribers, Atlas gained access to Sprint's 
multinational , corporate customers, modern data network and brand-name. 
98 
Significantly, it was the American market access that benefited Atlas 's one-stop- 
shopping strategy. Similarly the alliance of the three companies benefits from the 
credibility of FT and DT and the sum total of their financial strength. Therefore there 
is a strong attraction for new customers 99 In comparison though, Atlas only 
achieved a third-best partner since AT&T, the largest long-distance provider did not 
enter the alliance and BT united with the second best (long-distance) American 
telecom firm MCI. 
Other telecom firms objected to the alliance-agreement between Deutsche Telekom 
and France Telecom: beyond the obvious rivalry. The disapproval centred on the 
problem of the closed nature of Germany's and France's telecommunications market. 
BT called the arrangement, "'... the biggest telecommunications monopoly in the 
world. "' 10° Although the complaints from rivals of DT and FT such as AT&T and 
BT could also be used to disrupt the competition, the objections may also contain 
some validity. MCI later joined the list of complainants sharing the 'closed markets 
of France and Germany' argument. '°' 
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According to the EC's Directorate-General for Competition, there were several 
problems with the Atlas venture. First, the alliance did not appear to be able to meet 
the needs of multinational corporations. Secondly, the venture seemed to be more 
suited to providing services (data) to the domestic companies of Germany and 
France and less capable of doing so within Europe and globally, and through the 
alliance the parent companies had agreed not to operate in each other's territories. 
Furthermore, the percentage of market share was also high which would further 
hinder any prospects of sustaining competition. Thirdly, 45 per cent of the EC's data 
communications services were provided in France and Germany. 102 
The arrangement with Sprint went under the name of 'Phoenix'. 113 At the time it. 
appeared that there would be two, separate alliances even though each had two of 
the same firms. in the partnerships. Phoenix was described as a joint venture between 
Atlas and Sprint. During the investigation process leading to a Commission approval, 
DT and FT agreed to keep their data transmission subsidiaries separate from Atlas 
until the open market date 1998. Atlas and Phoenix were to provide data 
transmission services to major corporations. '°4 The approval process extended 
beyond the letters of the law into politicking. The Commissioner received 
agreements from both the German and French governments that alternative 
telecommunications networks were allowed to compete with the state-owned 
telecom firms prior to 1998. '05 
"The European Commission warned the French and German state 
telecommunications giants ... that their Atlas project would not get 
EU 
approval until their national telecommunications markets had been opened to 
competition. " '06 
Alternative networks included other potential telecom providers such as rail and 
energy firms. These alternatives were important because competitors of DT-FT 
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could effectively be squeezed out unless other networks were available, argued Van 
Miert. 107 An absence of alternative networks would mean DT-FT competitors 
would have little option but to deal with the state-monopolies for network access. 108 
Access to other networks is important if open competition in a liberalised market is 
not entirely obtainable. This, in theory, prevents the domination and even destruction 
of a potentially competitive market. It was feared such a deal between two large 
state monopolies could protect the closed market. This was argued by both BT and 
AT&T. Ian Valiance, chairman of BT at the time of the Atlas agreement, was quoted 
stating: 
"'It should be a matter of deep concern that the commission has been pushed 
into a position where it has to defend the basic tenets of the Treaty of Rome, 
that there should be open and free competition across Europe, rather than the 
phone companies having to defend why they should enjoy a continuing 
monopoly. " 109 
AT&T argued, particularly in reference to Sprint's involvement with a DT-FT 
alliance, the deal should be blocked unless both France and Germany opened their 
markets to competition before the 1998 deadline. The French and German markets 
were described by one AT&T source as "'... two of the most closed markets in the 
world for telecoms service and equipment'. " 110 John Hoffman, a senior vice- 
president at Sprint, stated the opposition to the deal by AT&T was "hypocritical". 
He claimed: 
"'They have already entered into alliances with companies in some of the 
most locked-up countries in the world without any regulatory approval at 
all... " iii 
Although the alliance between Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and Sprint was 
accepted in the middle of 1996 and now operates under the name Global One, it is 
not simply an agreement of pooling resources that can cause alarm. The issue can be 
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extended beyond an agreement to the act of an alliance. The next step could involve 
exchanging equity stakes and thus expanding the alliance. "' Such an extension 
could proceed to a merger between the two. This is a further cause of concern for 
protecting competition. This scenario happened between BT and MCI. 
An important problem faced by competition authorities in opening state-controlled 
markets in particular, was presented in the example of the Atlas alliance. Karel Van 
Miert stated: 
"[T]he elimination of competition on national markets is aggravated by the 
fact that the parent companies of Atlas at present enjoy monopolies for the 
provision of infrastructure, the necessary building blocks for service 
providers competing with Atlas; in the absence of alternative infrastructure 
allowing competing service providers to build up their own networks at 
competitive prices, competition will suffer a set-back precisely at the time 
action taken by the Commission to liberalise all telecommunications services 
except basic voice services should begin to bear its fruits for the benefit of 
users. " 113 
4.3.7 Beyond the Alliances 
Although the corporate motives are interesting as they provide guidance about the 
evolving structure of the telecommunications industry, the legal and political 
problems emphasise the difficulty the industry presents to achieving the ideal of 
(perfect) market competition. One problem faced by competition authorities in the 
EC is the different speeds and levels at which the various players and potential 
players are. Within the EC, there is a division between powerful telecom operators 
with experience in competition such as BT, and weak national monopolies and 
powerful monopolies who lack competition experience (at least within their own 
state-territories). Then there is the problem of liberalising the EC market so that non- 
EC players can be rightful participants. While the latter, comparatively speaking, 
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may only be important in politically assisting EC firms accessing non-EC markets, 
the issue faced by competition authorities is preventing one monopoly replacing 
another. In other words, while the telecommunications market in the EC is being 
opened and thereby breaking the individual state monopolies, there is the risk of 
allowing alliance formations dominating and in effect monopolising the market. One 
spokesman from the Commission stated: 
As long as there are monopolies in place, we don't want to reinforce 
them... Once access to the markets is liberalised, then we may be more 
indulgent in granting approval to alliances. "' 114 
While on the one hand, there is the risk and concern that alliances could form cartels 
or dominate the market, there is another argument that favours supporting alliances. 
Historically telecommunications (as has been previously cited) has been divided by 
national boundaries. Liberalisation leads to some restructuring and, it has been 
argued trans-border restructuring is natural. ' 15 This could lead to an elimination of 
the 'frontier-effect', i. e. lower the cost of calls because territorial borders have been 
removed. There is also the (previously noted) benefit of further services offered to 
the corporate customer. 
The focal point of accepting alliances may centre around the argument that 
alternative cross-border, trans-EC networks and infrastructures may be established 
and also be in competition with other alliances. One commentator stated: 
"Rather than blocking such link-ups and so losing the potential benefits of 
cross-border restructuring, Europe's competition authorities must seek to 
make alliances work in the public interest. " 116 
This, it is argued, is best done by allowing infrastructures to provide 
telecommunications services. Furthermore, liberalisation must extend beyond basic 
voice services to allow the private sector to build a competitive market and thus a 
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separate infrastructure. "' This pro-market approach could contrast with one 
Commission - spokesman's comment: 
"'Liberalisation has to do with more thanjust getting rid of a monopoly, it 
has to do with helping all European industry compete. "' 118 
However, a pro-marketer might agree with this statement adding that the best way 
to help European industry is by liberalising telecommunications to include 
infrastructure. An alternative approach is allowing selective competition while 
governments (and/or the Commission) are involved in overseeing the infrastructure 
directly (such as state-owned and operated) or through monitoring a private 
infrastructure (such as Railtrack in the UK with regard to the railway network). The 
issue of infrastructure and networks is an important and potentially obstructive, 
contradictory, - but essential feature to a competitive telecommunications industry. 
Alliances may solve the problem, at least in the short term, by providing an 
integrated European network and involving some competition in the industry. In the 
case of the BT-MCI merger, this example qualifies for the definition stated earlier 
which finds Concert now outside of the definition of strategic alliances. 
Once inter-connected, what happens to the competitive process? Firms become 
dependent, and develop and invest in their alliance network. Where is the freedom to 
enter and exit alliances and networks? The term 'competition' then becomes one of 
many meanings, subject to qualifications such as oligopolistic-competition, 
complementary-competition, or (ambiguously) co-operative-competition. 
If, rather than following a model based on the presumption of open market 
competition, affiances consolidate the telecommunications industry into one of few 
players, the problems of oligopolies and proper regulatory powers are raised. 
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4.4 Industrial Concentrations and Their Control 
4.4.1 Oligopolies 
"It should be the aim of competition policy to prevent situations arising which form a 
hotbed for tacit collusive behaviour" ' t9 
The term 'monopoly' is one that is understood and plainly defined. Oligopoly is not 
as straightforward and is a term that contains paradoxes, ambiguities and 
dichotomies, and therefore confusion. This grey area of contention among 
competition authorities is therefore one of great interest. Whereas 'monopoly' may be 
condemned as either the ultimate failure or the ultimate success of an end-game in 
the competitive process, 'oligopoly creates uncertainty in so far as understanding its 
position within the philosophy of competition. Galbraith once wrote about 
monopolies: 
"In the English language only a few words - fraud, subversion and sodomy - 
have a greater connotation of non-violent wickedness. " 120 
The problem with the concept of oligopoly is its vague position within economic 
theory. 121 While in perfect competition profit-maximising firms will produce an 
optimum level of output at the lowest price thus efficiently allocating resources 
through the economy, monopolies produce less at a higher price and therefore 
resources will not be efficiently allocated. The latter is deemed undesirable. 122 
However, oligopolies may contain elements from both monopolistic and competition 
concepts. The consequence arising from the devilish term is uncertainty in the minds 
of regulators - be they lawyers, government officials, or philosophers - as to whether 
or not there is justification to intervene in the marketplace. It is helpful to consider a 
few definitions from the writings of other observers and experts. 
One legal expert on competition, Whish, stated: 
"An oligopolistic market is one which is characterised by the presence of a 
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few suppliers, none of which individually is in a position of market 
dominance, but each is relatively large. " 123 
Some other definitions come from the writings of Burke, Genn-Bash and Haines. 
They claimed: 
"Oligopoly refers to a situation where there are a few producers. There is no 
longer complete freedom of entry into the industry. Instead entry barriers 
exist and help to explain why only a few firms are present in this market. 
Supranormal profits can not exist in both the short and long run. " 124 
and also: 
"Oligopoly is a market situation in which firms realise that their actions are 
interdependent, i. e. that a change in output by one firm will alter the profits 
of other firms, which will induce them to alter their outputs. This reaction 
alters the first firm's optimal output, which again causes the other firms to 
alter their behaviour and so on. " 125 
An economist Sloman wrote: 
"Oligopoly occurs when just a few firms between them share a large 
proportion of the industry. There are, however, significant differences in the 
structure of industries under oligopoly and similarly significant differences in 
the behaviour of firms. " 126 
American legal expert Sullivan also provides a definition that is noteworthy. 
"An industry is oligopolistic when so large a share of its total output is in the 
hands of so few relatively large firms that a change in the output of any one 
of these firms will discernibly affect the market price. It is not essential that 
there be no small firms that individually cannot affect market price. There 
can be a vast number of them; so long as there are two or more large firms, 
each of which is conscious of its individual power to affect price, oligopoly 
prevails. The profound effect of oligopolistic structure is consciousness of 
interdependence. Each of the few large firms will assume that the amount 
which it can sell at any given price will depend on the prices set by its larger 
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rivals and that the amount they can sell will in turn be affected by the given 
price it sets. " 127 
These few definitions show there is some consensus about the meaning of oligopoly. 
However, more significantly, these definitions highlight a number of (potential) 
contradictions. Whereas the term 'monopoly' is understood by nature of its meaning 
(one) and therefore refers to a one-firm industry or market, and while perfect 
competition is understood as the polar opposite to monopoly, oligopoly is less 
definitively placed. Sullivan's definition is an important one because it includes the 
possibility of some small firms within the industry or market. It appears many others 
writers either dismiss such a possibility or simply ignore them because of their lack 
of influence. 
The similarities between the definitions include the fact that there are either few 
suppliers or producers. Size is important so long as there is more than one large firm, 
neither of which dominate the industry or market. As a result, it seems to be 
generally agreed that interdependence exists as the actions of one firm would 
normally affect the other(s). It was suggested there is no complete freedom of entry 
into the market. This seems acceptable otherwise, according to economic theory, 
others would enter and thereby reduce or eliminate the oligopolistic situation. 
However, the less than perfect freedom of entry could have to do with regulatory 
restrictions as opposed to the natural laws of economics. 
Within the comparative context of the definitions some dissension appears in 
Sullivan's writing whereby a number of other firms may exist in the market or 
industry, but the importance lies at the centre of power. Thus in an oligopolistic 
situation, the existence of smaller firms is less relevant because they can not affect 
the market but only be affected by it. In other words the flow of influence is in one 
direction (downwards) to smaller firms. 
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Thus, the 'evil' of oligopolies stems from the existence of some form of barrier to 
entry, domination of a few firms over the market, and interdependence. A further 
'evil' often associated with monopolies was raised; supranormal profits. Nevertheless, 
Sullivan warned: 
"To characterise a market as oligopolistic is rather to claim to exercise an 
experienced judgement. Most economists who have studied oligopoly 
visualise a continuum moving from the most highly concentrated markets 
where three or four firms control 100% of output, to the least concentrated 
which might still stimulate some awareness of interdependence .... The extent 
of awareness of interdependence will vary not only with the number of larger 
firms and extent of concentration among them, but also with the number of 
firms which produce the remainder of the output. " 128 
Oligopolistic markets may be said to in fact distinguish themselves from other types 
of markets because both monopolistic and competitive states may exist 
simultaneously. This ambiguity may be the source of confusion and difficulty about 
market problems. Whish stated an interesting observation that may be the centre of 
the debate affecting antitrust methodology. 
"In reality few markets are perfectly competitive and many are oligopolistic, 
and the general trend -in recent years has been towards an increase in 
industrial concentration. " 129 
An increase in industrial concentration by its very nature reduces the number of 
competitors in the given market. Through the reduction of competitors is the 
increase in likelihood of an oligopolistic situation. The existence of only a few firms 
in an industry means that, according to the definition of oligopolies, interdependence 
becomes a factor. The reaction of firms to a situation of interdependence may vary. 
Collusion with rivals could occur if public policy or law permits, or if the players 
believe they could risk getting away with it. Collusion could provide stability, joint 
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profit maximisation, or either as a defensive or offensive measure against another (or 
each other) rivalry in the oligopolistic situation. In effect a monopolistic situation 
emerges from acts of collusion. "' Formal or informal agreements may set quotas, 
fix prices, limit production promotion, limit product development, or restrict market 
entry or competition between its members. 131 
The benefits from such collusions include profit gains from avoiding waste or 
advertising, price cutting and even competition if agreed. 13' A formal agreement of 
collusion establishes a cartel. It is determining the informal agreements of collusion 
that cause regulators difficulty. Yet while this describes what an oligopoly is and 
some of the behavioural issues which may arise under such circumstances, an 
important question asks can this situation be avoided? Furthermore, is it the 
oligopoly that is undesirable or is it only the potential anti-competitive behaviour that 
is the problem? These are two separate topics. One could claim oligopolies are 
undesirable because it is essentially against the ideology of competition. That is to 
say it is unacceptable that a few firms dominate the industry and/or market. The 
second issue goes beyond the problem of formal collusion. It is the problem of tacit 
collusion that is where the pricing decisions of sellers are interdependent and the 
firms cannot fail to recognise their interdependence. "' The oligopolistic situation 
and thus tacit collusion is explained well by Sullivan: 
"Oligopolists will be less focused on their own demand and cost curves than 
on what rivals are doing and are likely to do, as well as on preserving or 
improving their respective shares of the market. They know they are part of a 
group; they perceive, just as one looking from the outside so readily does, (1) 
that if any barriers exist (or can be erected) which will slow entry 
appreciably, for them to engage in aggressive price competition would 
depress the profit of all without necessarily allowing any firm to increase its 
market share; and (2) that a strategy of maintaining prices at industry- 
maximising levels and expressing their rivalry for shares by other means - 
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advertising or product strategies, for example - will be to the benefit of 
all. "34 
The result of the situation can be best found in the words of Whish. He stated: 
"The main argument against oligopoly is that the structural conditions of the 
market in which oligopolists operate are such that they will not compete on 
price and will have little incentive to compete in other ways; furthermore the 
theory of oligopolistic interdependence asserts that they will be able o earn 
supra-competitive profits without entering into the type of collusion 
agreements generally prescribed by competition law. ... Thus the theory runs 
that in an oligopolistic market rivals are interdependent: they have a 
heightened awareness of each other's presence and are bound to match one 
another's marketing strategy. The result is that price competition between 
them will inevitably be minimal or even non-existent. Oligopoly produces 
non-competitive stability. " 135 
This then begs the question; "to what extent will the market structure allow 
oligopolists to behave as a single monopolist? "136 Through competition-avoidance, 
market power is shared and these few players in the industry will effectively obtain 
monopolistic profits. 137 A problem with approaching the subject of oligopolies is 
that there are many theoretical models; each based on different assumptions and 
therefore hold different conclusions. 138 As Sullivan stated in explaining the extreme 
opinions about oligopolies: 
"There may be those who would make oligopoly the whipping boy for every 
social and economic ill, those who, armed with righteous conviction, seem 
ready to break up firms in any industry in which concentration ratios exceed 
the danger point .... At the other 
fringe are the naysayers who are profoundly 
convinced that we know nothing untoward about oligopolies that would 
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warrant intervention, and that anything we may think we know from any 
other source may be discounted as sheer prejudice and suspicion. " 139 
If, as it was stated earlier, concentrated industries are not uncommon and if 
oligopolies and concentrated industries may by defmition be accepted as one (or 
nearly one) and the same, what can or should be done about the situation? One 
answer might be to accept 'the laws of economic nature' and, despite the lack of 
perfect competition, accept that the situation (by another name such as workable 
competition or contestable competition) is inevitable. This begins to cast doubt 
though, on some of the neo-classical assumptions and arguments. However it is not 
the purpose here to either assess all oligopolistic industries, but rather only consider 
the telecommunications industry. As the telecommunications industry undergoes a 
transformation from its traditional public utility role through the political and 
technological changes previously outlined, to a modern, service and broad consumer 
communications-goods provider, the tools in a) regulating a competitive oligopoly 
(if policy deems it desirable) or b) attempting to prevent an overtly concentrated, 
oligopolistic industry from forming, can be assessed. Again, it appears coincidental 
yet convenient that a competition managing tool in the form of the Merger 
Regulation was established during the initial stages of the EC's telecommunications 
liberalisation policy. 
4.4.2 Mergers 140 
It has been said that controlling mergers has been a weak point in EC law. The 
absence of any concentration control was suggested to have been deliberate on the 
part of those states who drafted the Treaty of Rome. 141 Neither Article 85 nor 86 
EEC specifically refer to mergers and their use proved unsatisfactory. During the 
1970s and 1980s there were four failed attempts to establish merger legislation. The 
Continental Can 142 case determined Article 86 could be used, '43 because the Article 
prohibits the abuse of one or more undertaking with a dominant position from the 
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acquisition of most shares in a potential competitor. Pathak explained this weakness 
of EC competition law: 
"In the alisence of merger enforcement legislation, the Commission was 
powerless with respect to mergers and acquisitions under Community law 
unless, exceptionally, the transaction was regarded as an abuse of a dominant 
position prohibited by Article 86 .... " 
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In 1987 the ECJ agreed to consider Article 85 in regard to a merger case. In British 
American Tobacco Co. Ltd. and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v Commission 145 the 
Court agreed to review a merger application through the use of Article 85 in some 
instances of shared acquisition. However the uncertainty and potential future 
conflicts which were furthered by the Court's decision in this case, added emphasis 
to the need for merger legislation. As Craig and De Burca explained: 
"It was in part the uncertainty generated by the BAT decision, and in part the 
need for a comprehensive merger regulation in the light of the impending 
completion of the Single Market in 1992, that led to the first promulgation in 
December 1989 of Regulation 4064/89 which became operative in 
September of the following year. " 
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The adoption of merger regulations occurred in time for the changes in 
telecommunications. 147 Examining merger regulation is of relevance in light of the 
'strategic alliances' which have been occurring between telecom firms. Alliances in 
telecommunications may continue to occur and closer ties may also evolve from 
initial (looser) alliances. In particular, mergers are expected to continue to be topical 
for the foreseeable future, as telecommunications and other communication-related 
industries converge. 148 In the XIXth Report on Competition Policy the importance 
of regulation in sector reform is stated, and this statement is appropriate to use in 
association with the telecommunications industry. 
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"The process of restructuring European industry has given rise and will 
continue to give rise to a wave of mergers. Although many such mergers 
have not posed any problems from the competition view, it must be ensured 
that they do not in the long run jeopardise the competition process, which 
lies at the heart of the common market and is essential in securing all the 
benefits linked with the single market. " 149 
Applicable to all industries and markets though, are the three types of mergers: 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. Common to American and EC laws are the 
intentions to prohibit specific behaviour in mergers which changes industrial 
structure. 150 However, the differences between state laws about antitrust exist 
depending upon policies and their degree of acceptance (or not) of the three types of 
mergers. Sullivan in writing about merger law stated: 
"The. concerns which shape it and the analytical concepts which inform it 
relate directly to those affecting other aspects of antitrust law. Public policy 
about horizontal consideration should be consistent with that about 
cartelization, oligopoly and monopoly. " 151 
Opposition to mergers is frequently concerned with the effect and impact the merger 
would have on competition. The three types of mergers affect the industry or market 
they are involved with in different ways. Horizontal mergers are between firms that 
produce the same product. Vertical mergers are between firms that operate at 
different levels of the same product market. 152 There may be a connection or 
relation in distribution. In the example of telecommunications, it has been known for 
one company to control communication laboratories, network connections, and 
equipment manufacturing. AT&T, BCE and BT are a few of many examples. 
Conglomerate mergers are those between companies with no product or market 
relation. Of the three, horizontal mergers can be the most damaging to 
competition. ' 13 This is because the number of competitive players is reduced and the 
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effect may be substantial if only a few originally existed in the market. However, on 
the opposite side of the proverbial coin, mergers may be beneficial by improving 
efficiency and/or cost-reduction for the consumer. Craig and De Burca elaborate on 
the term efficiency. This may come in the form of economic efficiency under which 
economies of scale, distribution efficiency and managerial efficiency are found. " ' 
The risk though, is market domination or at an extreme, monopolisation. Merger 
Law is intended to avoid such stages being reached where competition will be 
affected either in a negative manner or against a form of what the government deems 
to be in the public interest. 
EC Merger Regulation 4064/89 (hereafter 'the Regulation') distinguishes mergers 
from joint ventures. Article 3(2) paragraph I excludes joint ventures from the 
Regulation, except it stated under the second paragraph: 
"The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions 
of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to co-ordination 
of the competitive behaviour of the parties among themselves or between 
them and the joint venture, shall not constitute a concentration within the 
meaning of paragraph 1(b). " 
Two important terms are used in this paragraph, concentration and joint venture. 
4.4.3 Concentrations 
The use of 'concentration' is in fact in the full title of the Regulation rather than the 
term merger. The proper title is Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 
December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, but is 
referred to even by Commission officials as 'the Merger Regulation'. "' The use 
'concentration' in the title has been determined to be "a term of art". 156 It is a term 
used in a broad and general manner referring to both hostile and friendly takeovers 
and political mergers. 15' Concentrations are defined under Article 3(1) of the 
Regulation. 
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"A concentration should be deemed to arise where: 
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or 
(b) one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking - or one 
or more undertaking - acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, 
by contract or by any other means direct or indirect control of the whole or 
part of one or more other undertakings. " 
It is important that Article 3(1) is read with Article 3(3). 158 The latter reads: 
"For the purposes of this regulation, control shall be constituted by rights, 
contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination and 
having regard to the consideration of fact or law involved, confer the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by: 
(a)-ownership of the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; 
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, 
voting or decisions of the origins of an undertaking. " 159 
Although a concentration activities may breach the principles of EC law, they can be 
exempt under the regulation. Article 2 is concerned with appraising concentrations. 
This is relevant and important to subjects contained within this thesis, namely 
strategic alliances. Hence, it is worth noting Article 2(l) in particular. 
"Concentrations within the scope of this Regulation shall be appraised in 
accordance with the following provisions with a view to establish whether or 
not they are compatible with the common market. 
In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account: 
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the 
common market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the 
markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings 
located either within or outwith the Community; (b) the market position of 
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the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the 
alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to suppliers or 
markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for 
the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate 
consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition. " 
Article 2(2) and (3) are respectively concerned with those concentrations and the 
strengthening of dominant positions "... as a result of which effective competition 
would be significantly impeded in the common market". 160 Two features are 
important; determining 'dominance' and determining 'significant impediment'. One 
legal practitioner examined the tests of dominance. 
"Although Article 2(2), in reading the 'creation of dominance', is broader than 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (which may only prohibit the 'abuse' of 
dominant position), it is clear that the jurisprudence under Article 86, in 
addition to specific case law under the MCR are highly relevant as to the 
existence of dominance and to the determination of the relevant product and 
geographical markets. " 161 
Fine found Article 2(3) of the Regulation to be like Article 86 (EEC) with regard to 
geographical references; meaning a 'substantial part' of the EC market had to be 
affected. 162 Furthermore, economic dominance he claimed, was not restricted to 
market-shares alone. 163 Fine refers to an important case where the ECJ defined 
'dominant position'. In United Brands v Commission the Court stated: 
"The dominant position referred to in this Article [86] relates to a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
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power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers. " 164 
The United Brands dominance test was re-enforced in Hoffman-La Roche v 
Commission. The ECJ further stated: 
"A dominant position must also be distinguished from parallel courses of 
conduct which are peculiar to oligopolies in that in an oligopoly the courses 
of conduct interact, while in the case of an undertaking occupying the 
dominant position the conduct of the undertaking which derives profit from 
the position is to a great extent determined unilaterally. The existence of a 
dominant position may derive from several factors which, taken separately, 
are not necessarily determinative but among these factors highly important 
one is the existence of very large market shares. " 165 
The alterations or adjustments made within these definitions compared with an 
earlier case are important. The 1972 Continental Can case defined 'dominant 
position' as follows: 
"Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to 
behave independently, which puts them in a position to act without taking 
into account their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. That is the position 
when, because of their share of the market, or of their share of the market 
combined with the availability of technical knowledge, raw materials or 
capital, they have the power to determine prices or to control production or 
distribution for a significant part of the products in question. This power 
does not necessarily have to derive from an absolute domination permitting 
the undertakings which hold it to eliminate all will on the part of their 
economic partners, but it is enough that they be strong enough as a whole to 
ensure to those undertakings an overall independence of behaviour, even if 
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there are differences in intensity in their influence in the different partial 
markets. " 166 
Whish's observations about this case are noteworthy. He reported: 
"The question before the ECJ was whether mergers could be prohibited 
under Article 86. One argument against this was that Article 86 was 
designed to prevent the direct exploitation of consumers and not to deal with 
the more indirect adverse effects that might be produced by harming the 
competitive process. " 
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Korah interpreted the definition from the Continental Can case focused on prices, 
market decisions controlled by competition, and the need for capital and innovation 
technology. These are the very determinants that an economist would use. 168 Korah 
claimed that in later cases, such as in United Brands, the emphasis by the 
Commission and the ECJ shifted away from the economic influence of competition 
power over price. The new approach was a legal concept169 that suggests- a less 
economic and more political approach to interpreting market dominance. 
"Given the fluidity of the other indications of dominance, it is not easy, 
especially for jurists, to determine how dominant a firm may be, and both the 
Commission and the Court have failed to make clearly and cogently reasoned 
decisions. " 170 
Thus from Hoffman-La Roche the derivation of dominant position "from several 
factors" 171 may be regarded as problematic from a position on general competition 
(antitrust) law. Alternatively, the New Zealand Court's approach (in a 
telecommunications case) may be more practical. "Z Rather than confining the term 
'dominant' to a technical meaning, its ordinary definition may be more suitable in 
allowing flexibility where necessary and dependent on the particular circumstances of 
the case before the courts. The attempt is to recognise structures only function 
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through the actions of people, and as argued in the previous chapter, it is the 
behaviour of the market participants that matters. 173 
The implications of defining a dominant position are important, because the 
understanding of the term will affect the interpretation of the analysis of mergers in 
question under the Regulation. Whereas Article 86 is more concerned with the 
'abuse' of a dominant position, the Commission's enforcement of the Regulation is to 
analyse, according to Picat and Zachmann, "... the foreseeable strength of the entity 
resulting from the merger and its impact on the competition structure of the market 
in question. " 174 
4.4.4 Joint Ventures 
Joint venture is a broad term, because of the many purposes for which such alliances 
are created. Craig and De Burca stated: 
"[T]he term is not one of art and cover a wide range of business 
arrangements, from the establishment of a new corporate entity by two 
competitors to a joint purchasing scheme or joint research and 
development. " 75 
Therefore the range of possibilities, combinations and types of joint ventures is a 
problem for competition enforcement. 176 The problems include type of corporate 
exchange, unity and involvement. This is identifiable in the definition stated by 
Czinkota, Ronkainen and Moffett. 
"A joint venture can be defined as the participation of two or more 
companies in an enterprise in which each party contributes assets, owns the 
entity to some degree and shares risk. The venture is also considered long 
term. " 177 
The problems for competition authorities may depend on the type of market, 
especially with regard to the number of players and entry barriers. In a market of 
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many and with limited or no barriers to entry, the effect of joint ventures may be 
minimal. It has been stated that such joint arrangements may be beneficial in 
furthering the efficiency of firms. 1' The term 'joint ventures' has been divided into 
three purpose-based types. One type is for government or legislative "suasion". A 
second type is to fulfil the other(s)' needs or assets. A third is to fulfil missing or 
weak skills. 179 Whish explained: 
"Firms wishing to co-operate, for example, for research and development 
may do so simply by meeting to discuss matters of common interest; they 
may agree by contract to pool information and share out research work; they 
may form a committee to oversee the work. They may go further and 
establish a joint venture to which the work in question is entrusted and over 
which they will exercise joint control; the joint venture the feeds back the 
fruits of its endeavours to its parents. Firms might even go beyond this and 
merge their research potential and retire from the market. The same 
possibilities exist in relation to other types of agreement, for example on 
production and specialisation. " 180 
This explanation provides for a good understanding of the broad to the narrow an 
close inter-firm relationship joint ventures may take. As with strategic alliances, joint 
ventures may form for one company to enter another market or state. Similarly 
resources may be pooled. "' In effect a joint venture is a form of a strategic alliance, 
but depending upon the type the joint venture could leave or fall outside the 
definition of strategic alliance if Czinkota's (et al) explanation is used. 
"A strategic alliance ... is something more than the traditional customer- 
vendor relationship but something less than an outright acquisition. " 182 
An acquisition is often associated with a take-over. In a relationship between two 
firms though, where one is larger and/or stronger than the other, the effect could be 
more of a take-over. The question 'is a merger really a take-over? 183 creates 
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potential for some re-examination of traditional corporate structure and behaviour. 
Whish stated: 
"As a general proposition the form in which collaboration takes place ought 
not to affect the application of competition law: in each case the important 
issue should be the effect that the co-operation might have on competition 
rather than the form in which the co-operation manifests itself. However 
form does in some circumstances have an important impact in particular 
because some joint ventures are treated under cartel laws and others under 
merger laws. " 154 
EC law has been criticised for its lack of a coherent policy regarding joint 
ventures. 18' The EC competition system has been interpreted to be inconsistent with 
regard to Commission policy declarations and policy implementation. Furthermore 
reasoning in decisions by the Commission have been described as "bewildering and 
unpredictable". '" This apparent confusion may be due to some uncertainty about 
whether or not joint ventures should be considered on behavioural or structural 
merits. 187 This is the heart of the problem with EC law (and perhaps others). The 
general purpose of Articles 85 and 86 is for the regulation of business behaviour 
more-so than market structure. 188 Since the introduction of the Merger 
Regulation189 the Commission has been able to consider joint ventures under either 
the- said Regulation or Article 85. The Commission attempts to seek to distinguish 
between a concentration and a co-operative joint venture. This approach has been 
promoted further in the Commission's Notice on Concentrative and Co-operative 
Joint Ventures (hereafter the Notice). 190 
The Notice recognises there are various types and purposes of joint ventures, but as 
a result of these differences the Commission concludes: "... it is impossible to make 
general comments on the compliance of joint ventures with competition law. 11191 The 
Commission separates joint ventures in both the Notice and the Merger Regulation 
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into co-operative and concentrative: The former exists where it is not the latter. The 
definition of joint venture is in Article 3(2) of the Merger Regulation: 
"The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions 
of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to co-ordination 
of the competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between 
them and the joint venture, shall constitute concentration. " 192 
The Notice clarifies this definition in so far as stating a joint venture is an 
undertaking under the joint control of other undertakings. A concentrative joint 
venture satisfies two conditions, according to the Notice. The positive condition is 
where the joint venture is in a lasting basis and is an autonomous economic entity. It 
must act as an independent operator in the marketplace, and must be able to pursue 
its own policies and not act as an instrument of its 'parents'. 193 The negative 
condition is where the joint venture does not have as either its effect or object the 
co-ordination of competitive behaviour of otherwise separate undertakings. 194 A 
problem with this Notice is its broad definition. Pathak claimed: 
"No attempt is made to distinguish between structural changes which invoke 
an integration of substantial resources of the parents and camouflaged 
cartels. Rather, the Notice distinguishes between structural changes where 
the parents exit the market of the venture, that is exit at least the 
geographical market if not the product market (or concentrative joint 
ventures), and camouflaged cartels and structural changes where the parents 
remain in the market of the venture (or co-operative joint ventures). "' 
If a joint venture does not meet the definition of a concentration under the Merger 
Regulation, it may then be regarded as a co-operative joint venture. 19' The rule of 
law which then follows is Article 85 and national competition laws (provided they 
are not contrary to the principles of EC competition law). Article 85 applies where: 
1) the parents of the joint venture are competitors, 2) the joint venture creates 
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foreclosure to competition or affects other markets, 3) non-ancillary restrictions exist 
(e. g. long or broad non-compete clauses), 4) the joint venture has a significant effect 
on trade and competition. 197 A problem emerging from this is the 'long-term basis' 
requirement for a joint venture to be recognised. What minimum amount of time 
would satisfy this? Under pre-Merger Regulation law six months or a year would be 
accepted as a co-operative joint venture. t9' Under the Notice this may not be the 
case. t99 Pathak stated: 
"The 'long-term basis' condition for co-operative joint ventures not only 
makes the Merger Control Regulation's concentrative joint venture test of 
'performing on a lasting basis' more difficult to apply, it makes the distinction 
between co-operative joint ventures and concentrative joint ventures even 
murkier. One may reasonably ask, for example, what relevance the 'long-term 
basis' condition has for cartel arrangements, since a cartel is normally 
unlawful whether it is long term or short term. ... 
[T]he application of Article 
85(1) should be limited to the assessment of arrangements which are 
disguised cartels and non-ancillary restrictive agreements accompanying the 
formation of a joint venture. " 200 
Case law which has emerged since the Notice indicates that for a joint venture to be 
concentrative, the duration is most-likely to be defined as long enough for lasting 
structural change 20' Such a definition remains vague and perhaps too much for 
those who require concrete predictability. While time periods may be fluctuating, a 
stronger indication of intention and structural effects may be permitted from the 
direct and indirect contributions and control of the joint venture by the parent 
companies. In the joint venture between Brau and Brunnen AG and Cadbury 
Schweppes case202 the joint venture was decided by the Commission not to be 
concentrative. Instead it would be applicable to Article 85(1) and therefore co- 
operative because the parents, Brau and Brunnen and Cadbury Schweppes, had not 
abandoned the product market. Under the joint venture licences had been transferred 
181 
for the production and sales of beverages under Appollineris and Schweppes 
trademarks. The parent companies remain competitors, despite Schweppes 
transferring its German and Austrian business to the new joint venture. The 
withdrawal from these markets did not eliminate the "realistic option to re-enter the 
German market". 203 While this decision appears to validate a concentrative joint 
venture, sufficient assets were contributed and a functional autonomous entity 
seemed to exist. Furthermore, the parents were not exiting the market and therefore 
an absence of market sharing satisfied the Commission. 204 A more recent case and 
one that finds a more developed approach in comparison with the Schweppes case is 
the Atlas case. 205 The Commission defined the arrangement in the following manner: 
"The Atlas joint venture is structural and co-operative in nature. " 206 
The original venture had Atlas benefiting from products from its parents Deutsche 
Telekom (DT) and France Telecom (FT), while developing its own research and 
development. DT and FT would have acted as exclusive distributors in their 
respective markets, while Atlas would have certain services transferred to it in third 
countries. Atlas would also have independently developed services while combining 
DT and FT activities in Europe-wide and third country markets. Two important 
conclusions by the Commission were: Firstly, "DT and FT will remain potential 
competitors for Atlas services and other services in neighbouring and upstream 
(transmission capacity) markets. i207 Secondly, "[t]his venture entails two major 
changes in the structures of DT and FT on two undertakings with very limited 
presence outside their respective home countries. " 208 To elaborate: 
"The Atlas venture eliminates actual and potential competition between DT 
and FT both in Germany and France and Europe-wide. " 209 
"In creating Atlas, DT and FT each abandon their own activities in the 
relevant markets for cross-border and ultimately Europe-wide 
telecommunications services. " 210 
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"The elimination of competition between the parents is substantial as the 
Atlas venture is created by two internationally active TOs and covers the 
joint development and provision of services throughout the European 
Economic Area. " 211 
This joint venture provided a further twist to the issue of time constraints. 
"The Commission usually accepts ancillary provisions for a limited period of 
time only. In this case, however, given the particular features of the market in 
which Atlas will operate, notably the substantial investment, the Commission 
accepts both the anti-competitive clause and DT and FT's obligation to 
obtain all provisions for Europe-wide services from Atlas as ancillary 
restraints for the entire duration of this exception Decision. " 212 
The Commission applied the same policy to another, but closely related alliance. In 
the Phoenix/Global One case213 the Commission also referred to the arrangement as 
a structural co-operative joint venture. 214 Whereas DT and FT each had 50 per cent 
share in the Atlas joint venture, the involvement of the third company, Sprint, with 
DT and FT to form Phoenix (now Global One) provides for some interest. In this 
instance DT and FT acquired shares in Sprint. The following restrictions were 
imposed, presumably to control FT and DT from using the alliance as a take-over 
mechanism of Sprint. Firstly, neither DT nor FT could dispose of its shares in Sprint 
for five years, after which the transfer of large shares are restricted with Sprint 
allowed the right of first refusal. Secondly, FT and DT could each acquire further 
shares in Sprint up to a holding amount of 10 per cent, but could not acquire 
additional shares for 15 years after the initial closing date that would increase their 
aggregate voting rights to more than 20 per cent. After this period, further shares 
may be obtained but not to increase their aggregate voting rights above 30 per cent; 
Neither could they undertake activities towards taking control of Sprint. 
215 The 
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Phoenix/Global One joint venture's relation with Atlas was explained by the 
Commission in the following manner: 
"The Phoenix joint venture is co-operative in nature, since Atlas, which takes 
over FT's Europe-wide Transpac network, and Sprint (jointly referred to as 
the 'parents) are potential competitors for the provision of Europe-wide 
services and certain global services offerings within Phoenix's envisaged 
offerings portfolio ...., namely customised packages of corporate 
telecommunications services. Prior to this transaction, Sprint was an actual 
competitor of DT in Germany and of FT in France. " 216 
"Phoenix combines Sprint's as well as DT and FT's joint activities in a range 
of Europe-wide and global markets for non-reserved telecommunications 
services.... This venture entails major changes in the structures of DT and 
FT, undertakings with very limited presence outside their respective home 
countries, and of Sprint whose international presence was limited for a lack 
of strong regional partners. Through Phoenix these three undertakings pool a 
significant number of assets in connection with the provision and marketing 
of non-reserved corporate telecommunications services. " 217 
Similar to Atlas, Phoenix (GlobalOne) was approved with the restriction and 
exclusive distributorship by DT and FT in Germany and France respectively. 
However, and importantly, one of the purposes of the joint venture as a means to 
eliminate competition was found unacceptable. As a joint venture to co-operate and 
eliminate competition in the relevant markets and affect trade between Member 
States, the Commission would not give negative clearance for such a request as 
found in the parents' of Phoenix application. 218 The Commission stated: 
"On the grounds set out under recital 38 of the Atlas Decision, Atlas and 
Sprint were competitors for the provision of outsourcing services. DT and 
184 
FT and Sprint were also competitors for the abstention of large customers' 
telecommunications `hubs'. Sprint ... also competed with FT ... 
for the 
provision of non-correspondent services, notably Europe-wide and national 
packet-switched data communications services with limited global 
connectivity, under licences in several European country. This competition is 
eliminated by the creation of Phoenix. " 219 
The relationship of Atlas and Phoenix/GlobalOne is of interest as DT and FT are the 
major parents in both alliances. Just as Atlas allowed DT and FT to refrain from 
some competition, similar provisions including research and development, cross- 
licensing, and intellectual property agreements were allowed under 
Phoenix/GlobalOne. The Commission's acceptance of this joint venture was 
explained: 
"DT and FT and Sprint each have the financial and technological capabilities 
required to enter the relevant markets on their own. DT, FT and Sprint are 
among the world's largest telecommunications companies in terms of traffic. 
While DT and FT are dominant in their respective home countries, Sprint is 
the third-largest long-distance carrier in the United States. Creating Phoenix 
is therefore not DT, FT and Sprint's only objective means to enter the market 
for international non-reserved corporate telecommunications. " 220 
This explanation was further developed: 
"The combination of Atlas and Sprint's technology will allow Phoenix to 
offer new services with global 'connectivity' at lower cost and better than 
either Atlas or Sprint are capable of providing alone given their current 
business. Combining different platforms and product features will still require 
a considerable investment of time and money. Like BT and MCI's Concert 
and like Atlas at the European and national level, Phoenix win add value to 
leased line capacity by implementing own homogeneous network elements 
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such as switches, software platforms and signalling systems to provide 
seamless international telecommunications services. " 221 
This affiance connects the EC and the United States under a joint venture umbrella 
much as BT and MCI do through Concert. It also benefits the parent companies 
individually like Sprint. The Commission noted it would take Sprint longer to 
become a global-supplier and longer to meet the needs of the increasing number of 
multinational companies? 22 Here can be witnessed the influence of direct industry 
policy on competition rulings. It also seems to be accepted to provide a creditable 
competitive alternative to the Concert alliance. 223 While a form of industrial policy is 
active in the decision-making, the Commission sought to impose antitrust measures 
to regulate against discrimination and obstacles for other competitors. Commissioner 
Karel Van Miert stated the Commission recognised the continuing domination of 
some incumbent telecom firms aller the 1998 liberalisation deadline. 224 According to 
Van Miert, the Commission particularly wishes to have avoided discrimination by 
incumbent telecom operators towards firms requiring network access. Van Miert 
stated: 
"In cases involving incumbent TOs, continuing dominant positions will be an 
essential element in examining whether a concentration leads to the 
strengthening of a dominant position, as required under the merger control 
rules. " 225 
The acceptance of joint ventures by dominant and incumbent firms such as DT, FT 
and even BT creates such a risk of strengthening their powerful positions. Although 
the Commission has taken steps in its rulings on Atlas, Phoenix/Global One and 
Concert to ensure to its satisfaction that the alliances are co-operative or structurally 
co-operative, it affects the competitive system. The Commission recognised in both 
Atlas and Phoenix/Global One Decisions that a potential competitor had been 
removed. 226 The Commission accepted that there was a new, global 
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telecommunications-provision market. It ruled that FT and DT were prevented from 
integrating their nation-wide networks before at least two other competing nation- 
wide carriers were licensed. 227 The Commission allowed the continuation of the 
divestiture of indirect subsidising Info AG in Germany228 among some technical 
provisions. 229 The Commission encouraged investment towards a trans-European 
network. This originated in the acceptance of the BT-MCI joint venture forming 
Concert , 
230 and re-enforcement in the Phoenix/Global One Decision. The 
Commission stated in this Decision: 
"Two years after the Commission's BT-MCI Decision global markets are still 
only emerging..... BT and MCI's Concert was the first player to enter that 
emerging market, with a head-start over its competitors. Phoenix is set to 
become a competitive player once the substantial required investment is made 
and a reliable seamless backbone network created..... The Commission... sees 
no elimination of competition in the emerging global market. " 231 
In recognising and defining a new market, the emerging global market, it could be 
seen that the Commission regards the joint ventures not so much as a consolidation 
of corporate power but as a (structural) co-operative joint venture in entering and 
developing this consumer-demanded132 new market. These arrangements are, despite 
the removal of at least one competitor (e. g. Sprint and perhaps DT and FT's direct 
involvement in each other's market), acceptable provided the domestic markets are 
not closed. 233 The alliances fail to meet the criterion for defining concentrative joint 
ventures because no parent has withdrawn from the market because it (the global 
telecommunications market) previously did not exist. 
These cases are examples of a combination of competition law and direct industrial 
policy. Some would argue this should be left to the marketplace. 
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Bensaid, Encaova and Winkler suggested, the practice of a rigid test for 
concentrative joint ventures is becoming obsolete. Whereas the test for long-lasting 
basis and the withdrawal by both parent-companies from the market determined a 
concentrative joint venture: 
"The Commission now considers a joint venture to be concentrative whereby 
only one parent withdraws from the relevant market, provided the other 
parent effectively plays the leading role in determining the industrial 
behaviour of the joint venture. " 234 
In this latter modification is the industrial leadership doctrine. This has the effect of a 
joint venture being regarded as under the control of one parent company while the 
other is merely a financial partner. 235 Another and slightly more recent observation 
of the Commission's approach in this regard suggests further changes. Brown 
explained: 
"The signs are that the Commission is now moving away from its industrial 
leadership doctrine. The Commission expressly acknowledged in the Joint 
Ventures Notice... that co-ordination between a parent and the joint venture is 
relevant only if it reinforces co-ordination between parent companies. Since 
the Notice was adopted.. . the Commission 
has relied on the lack of co- 
ordination between the parents, rather than trying to explain away the lack of 
co-ordination between the dominant parent and the joint venture. " 236 
Criticism of the EC approach to joint ventures through forming a distinction between 
co-operative and concentrative has been made. One authority on competition law 
stated: 
"The concentrative - co-operative distinction serves a mainly jurisdictional 
function. It assigns a particular joint venture to different substantive and 
procedural systems. As a jurisdictional rule, the distinction is woefully 
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inadequate. Jurisdictional rules must provide quick and predictable 
outcomes. 11237 
Hawk believed the distinction made by the Commission "exaggerates" the 
significance of the economic distinction between structure and behaviour. 23' He 
stated: 
"The solution is not to continue to engage in the metaphysics of refining and 
re-refining the co-operative - concentrative distinction. The best solution is to 
provide a unified analysis of joint ventures that include both behavioural and 
structural considerations. " 239 
Dissatisfaction about the approach to joint ventures is noted through complaints 
regarding the lack of predictability, and the lack of clarity of those which are 
structural in nature and more applicable to Merger Regulation, compared to those 
which are more behavioural and suited to examination under Article 85.290 Brown 
concluded: 
"The distinction between concentrative and co-operative joint ventures 
continues to cause difficulties and constraints. While many joint ventures 
clearly fall into one or other category, the classification remains far from 
straightforward.... " 241 
4.4.5 Vertical Mergers 
Vertical mergers or alliances (as opposed to agreements between continuing 
autonomous firms) are developing that include telecommunications firms. While 
mergers can have an impact in competition, a merger between firms within an 
oligopoly (such as two of three firms in a market) can have a serious effect. 242 Of 
the three types of mergers (horizontal, vertical and conglomerate), Whish states the 
horizontal ones "... have the most significant effect upon competition". 243 Some 
antitrust treatment of vertical mergers has been controversial. 244 
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One of the principal difficulties about vertical mergers has been in determining 
anticompetitive effects. There are strong arguments favouring vertical mergers 
primarily because of efficiency benefits. The Chicago School has criticised some of 
the earlier American cases that opposed such mergers, and favoured a more 
permissive approach. Vertical mergers may benefit competition by improving brand 
promotion or may result in encouraging inter-brand competition. 24' Furthermore, 
efficiency may be gained for example through distribution or production 
improvements. In general, co-operation between firms in a vertical relationship may 
be more efficient than in an horizontal one. 246 Encouraging efficiency has been an 
important principle in competition theory. 247 Efficiency derived from vertical 
mergers according to Riordan and Salop includes; co-ordination in design and 
production, the elimination of free riding' through internalising incentives, 
rationalising input usage, eliminating double mark-up costs. 248 A consequence of a 
vertical merger though can be foreclosure to competitors. Costs for a competitor 
may increase. Costs in this case may include not only price but quality and the ability 
to deliver the goods or service. 
One example of a vertical merger is the American case famously known as Brown 
Shoe. This case has been the test for 'substantially lessening competition'. The 
purpose was to stop a trend before any of the firms achieved oligopolistic size. The 
plaintiff was the fourth largest shoe manufacturer with per cent of the market and the 
third largest retailer with 6 per cent of that market. The firm it was purchasing was 
twelfth largest (5 per cent) of the manufacturing market and eighth in the retail 
market at 2%. In this case both horizontal and vertical types of mergers were 
involved. In this instance of a vertical merger the importance of the percentage of the 
market being foreclosed was emphasised. The court stated, if the trend within the 
industry was vertical mergers and if not checked the result would be substantially 
less competition. Criticism of this case by the Chicago School was best summarised 
as follows: 
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"First, the mere fact that a vertical merger forecloses rival firms' access to the 
supply of inputs produced by one input supplier does not mean that the net 
supply of inputs available to rival those firms has been reduced. When the 
rivals lose access to the input supplies produced by one firm, they are likely 
to gain access to the input suppliers that previously supplied the merging 
supplier's downstream merger partner. In that case, according to Chicago 
School theory, the vertical merger doe not reduce the net supply available to 
rivals. Instead, it merely realigns purchase patterns among competing firms. 
Second, the Chicago School utilises an oversimplified microeconomic model 
to conclude that vertical mergers carried out by a monopolist cannot enhance 
monopoly power. The idea is that there is only a'single monopoly profit' that 
can be earned by the monopolist, whether or not the monopoly power, the 
only economic motive for vertical merger is to reduce costs by achieving 
synergies. " 249 
Thus the two prominent motivating factors behind a vertical merger are efficiency 
and power. Neoclassical economists deny the latter. Perhaps this is due to a 
weakness in the basic model used, which cannot account for power unless there is a 
'rational' economic explanation. Further is the explanation of 'market realignment' 
suitable for all markets. Do such opportunities exist in oligopolistic ones? In 
telecommunications these topics are important. Some examples of course could be 
found to support the Chicago theory since the industry is broad and the term 
'telecommunications' is becoming more general. Yet there is one crucial element in 
the structure of the industry that can call into question the validity of Chicago 
theory: This is market foreclosure to the infrastructure and network. There are two 
aspects to the telecommunications industry and market in the United States that 
emphasise concern about vertical mergers, and these can be applied to the EC. 
Although the examples are not perfectly fitting, the principles behind them are 
relevant. Klass and Salinger stated: 
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"First, many telecommunications infrastructure are highly concentrated. In 
most areas there is only one provider of local telephone service and one cable 
television system operator. ... Second, many telecommunications services 
require the interconnection of two or more networks. For example, a 
standard long-distance call requires the interconnection of two local 
networks and one long-distance network. Such interconnections are vertical 
arrangements. 
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In applying these principles to the context of the EC, the examples require some 
modification. With regard to high concentrations, the service providers have been 
few in number in each member state. In most cases there has been only one, the state' 
telecommunications operator. Even where competition has been introduced such as 
the United Kingdom, the choice was mostly limited to BT for local providers (except 
Hull which has its own monopoly-service). In the late 1990s, despite advances in 
furthering competition, places beyond London were only beginning. to receive a 
viable competitor to BT in the form of a cable company. In the second example, 
competitors to the incumbent telecom firm require infrastructure access, and in some 
cases it may seem logical to use the existing network because of the time it takes for 
other networks to be constructed. In the instance of the United Kingdom, where a 
cable service had not existed, users of Mercury for long-distance and international 
calls still had to be connected to BT for basic service access. Thus Mercury fits the 
American example. 
Broadening the scope of this example, there are a variety of reasons why telecom 
firms 'need' alliances. For example a need would be a seamless connection. This 
example is applicable at both an EC-level and a global level. One is only required to 
look at the Atlas/Global-One arrangement and at BT's ambitions (via Concert) to 
find such interconnections. Although many alliances between telecom firms like 
Deutsche Telekoni, France Telecom and Sprint, and BT and MCI are horizontal 
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mergers, such alliances nearly always include a vertical component . 
25 1 This 
component invariably is access to infrastructures, networks or service. These are "... 
indispensable for the development of the competitor's activities. " 252 The 
consequence does not match the policy rhetoric of competitive telecommunications 
markets. 
"High concentration and complex vertical interdependencies are jut the sort 
of conditions under which both the outcome and the nature of the 
competitive process are not likely to look at all like perfect competition. 
When markets are concentrated and entry is difficult, the viability of each 
competitor can be essential to the extent of competition. If the competitive 
position of each competitor in turn rests crucially on its vertical relationships, 
then any structural change that affects those relationships can have 
consequences for the extent of competition. " 253 
It would therefore be inappropriate to accept the Chicago School philosophy's 
approach to vertical mergers, at least in the initial stage of telecommunications 
liberalisation. Even in the long term the neoclassical argument's validity has been cast 
into doubt. 
"Recent academic literature on vertical mergers has shown that the results of 
the older models, which were based on assumptions of perfect competition 
and single-product monopoly, do not generalise to models based on 
structural assumptions that are closer to those in which antitrust typically 
arise" 254 
Klass and Salinger elaborated: 
"This means neither that the old conclusions are wrong in all or even many 
cases nor that it is improper to apply the older models in many situations - 
for example, those where competition is vigorous. " 255 
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Therefore the questioning of the appropriateness of the applied model to the specific, 
given situation should be considered. Furthermore, is the model to narrow for the 
required application? Theory has begun to move beyond the Chicago thinking. 
"Post-Chicago industrial organisation economics accepts, as a starting point 
... criticism of pre-Chicago foreclosure theory. However, it has extended the 
economic models to more realistic assumptions that reach a more refined 
understanding of foreclosure ... In these post-Chicago models, some vertical 
mergers can be anticompetitive, although others are procompetitive. " 256 
An important example of a merger in the new telecommunications is the one 
announced in November 1996 between BT and MCI. 
4.4.5.1 BT-MCI (Concert) Merger 
The initial alliance between BT and MCI establishing the joint venture Newco (later 
Concert) had six categories of services for offer to customers with global 
telecommunications demands. In the Commission's Decision concerning the 
alliances, it defined the requirements for a product to be considered 'global' and to 
separate it from similar products. The characteristics are: "to provide ubiquitous 
service across multiple borders, to promote consistent service levels and feasible 
delivery schedules, to make time-zones, languages and currencies irrelevant, to 
overcome inadequacies of local infrastructures, to make customers assume service is 
local when it is actually being promoted from the other side of the world. " 257 
According to the Decision the requirements for telecommunications by large 
companies are, 'one-stop-shopping' and 'end-to-end' or 'seamless' service. This 
includes cross-border service between companies and customers, and speed and 
access of information! " In spite of the existence and development of such demands, 
one opinion was that many large corporations "... already look unfavourably at the 
alliance of Global One and AT&T Unisource". 259 It was said: 
194 
"'Business customers ... don't consider those entities to be very secure. 
Customers do not know who to contact and see the groupings as transitory 
marketing agreements"' 260 
The BT-MCI merger was one, of significance as it was the first of the large 
telecommunication corporations to go beyond the 'strategic alliance' stage and unite. 
The result of this latest stage in telecom relations has possibly begun the process 
towards the anticipated conclusion of only a few firms to globally dominate 
telecommunications. The BT-MCI merger was called "... an international 
telecommunications 'power houseii261 Another colourful description of the 
significance of the merger was stated before it received approval. 
"If the deal does go through the once bloated British Telecoms monopoly is 
set to become the Heathrow airport of international telephone traffic. " 262 
Although businesses and business reporting may be prone to exaggeration and 
excitement either about events such as corporate relations, or new technologies and 
their possibilities, it is reasonable to assume analysts have a fair idea about the 
significance of this particular event. It may be an event akin to an observation of a 
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission in the United States, who 
once wrote: 
"What may be called'defining events' come to every field. International 
affairs provide stunning examples: Nixon in China, the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
and the Rabin-Arafat handshake. Historians, as well as ordinary people, mark 
time by such events. Once these events occur, nothing it seems is ever the 
same. In communications, the benchmark for a decade had been the AT&T 
divestiture decision. " 263 
Read then claimed the new defining event was the Bell Atlantic - Tele- 
Communications Inc. merger. The significance of this merger, according to Read, 
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was that it should help motivate the changing of dated communications laws. 264 It 
will probably not be surprising to see new defining events arise over the next few 
years with regard to telecommunications. The 1996 BT-MCI merger appeared to be 
such a 'defining event' and quite possibly of the decade. In such a case it could be as 
symbolic as the AT&T divestiture has previously been to communications observers. 
However, events may move beyond this interpretation. Following disagreeable 
financial reports in the early summer of 1997, BT began re-evaluating its relationship 
with MCI - despite Concert's approval from regulators. A bidding war began with 
the American company WorldCom over MCI. A. change in partnerships not only 
disrupts the corporate plans of BT, but increases speculation about the shape of the 
telecoms industry and leading players in it. Nevertheless, the formation and approval 
of the trans-altantic company Concert was significant in so far as it was among the 
first alliances and the first to take the step towards a full merger. 
4.4.6 Converging Telecommunications Providers 
Sir Ian Valiance (BT's co-chairman at the time of the BT-MCI merger 
announcement) symbolically claimed the merger was not merely a pebble being 
dropped into water but a rock. 265 This colourful imagery continues to reflect 
popular opinion about the significance of the event. Rivals have attempted to portray 
a relaxed image in their responses to the deal. Richard Brown, chief executive of 
Cable & Wireless was claimed to be "... neither surprised nor 'frightened' by the 
merger between BT and MCI. " 266 Deutsche Telekom's Ron Sommer claimed to be 
" 'relaxed'" about the merger. 267 However, according to the Financial Times; 
"The company may have good reason ... to play 
down the implications of the 
new global partnership. " 268 
Others were less publicly reserved. AT&T claimed any acceptance by regulators of 
the deal should be questionable. 69 
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With mounting debts there is the risk of investors not wanting to make further stock 
purchases of the recently floated Deutsche Telekom. The BT-MCI merger in 
addition to other alliances in the telecommunications industry may cause DT to 
increase its spending to remain competitive. 270 This is an effect of the consequence 
of competition law. More importantly in this particular instance, it is an effect which 
should be of concern when attempting to begin competition within a market. 
Although the health of a company should not necessarily be of concern to 
competition law, it should raise some questions about the permissiveness of the law 
with regard to mergers and other alliances in the early stages of liberalisation. 
BT's public admission that it is ambitious to be a global supercarrier271 is the source 
for BT's scramble for partners, and the cause of worry for weaker rivals. BT is also 
seeking partnerships in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain 72 and Asia. The 
European ventures "... attack the state-controlled monopolies... ", 273 while Asia would 
add significant strength to BT's global character. BT nevertheless would have 
benefited by MCI's 40 per cent claim to US-Asia telecom traffic. 274 
Earlier in the year, BT had sought a deal with Cable & Wireless. This deal would 
have helped fill the weak Asian link in BT's global ambitions? " Cable & Wireless, 
claimed Richard Brown is the "... one truly global telecom... " with coverage of at 
least 55 countries. 276 However, one observer claimed regardless of BT's relationship 
with Cable & Wireless, BT would have had to merge with MCI. 277 It was suggested 
that it would have been better for BT if it had first merged with Cable & Wireless. 278 
With Asia as the current weak link in BT's global chain (network), another 
alternative is a deal with Japan's largest telecom firm NTT . 
279 The attraction of Asia 
is twofold. First it is a piece of the global network BT and others need to fulfil global 
ambitions. Secondly, local Asian telecom companies are reported to be weak, 
creating a general advantage for market power for firms like BT or AT&T. The 
collapse of relations with MCI, threatens the company Concert, and also BT's 
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ambitions. With MCI removed from BT's plans, other partners would be required to 
fill its place. 
In comparison with Cable & Wireless' claim above, the merger would have created a 
telecom firm operating in 70 countries, providing a range of services to appeal to 
multinational corporations. 28° The benefits to BT and MCI of the merger extended 
beyond connecting political boundaries into the local market of the United States. 
This was not just an additional market, but was another component to producing a 
seamless 'one-stop-shopping' telecom service provider for the user. There was even 
the suggestion that some of the traditional local telecoms in the US might have been 
tempted to join BT-MCI. NYNEX and Bell Atlantic (which merged to form Bell 
Atlantic in August 1997) were suggested to be the best match. 281 
Connections are, though an important part, only one aspect of the wider 
telecommunications game. The ability to provide Internet and data services is also 
important. They are demanded by the corporate consumer. 
As strategic alliances and mergers between telecommunications form, covering weak 
areas and links, connecting countries and the international market with local markets 
into single entities, competition between the alliances and mergers should - in theory 
- reduce prices and increase efficiency. A decrease in prices, should, again in theory, 
encourage usage. Increase in usage then encourages innovation and demand for 
more service. Despite the fact that prices have fallen over time, especially in the 
long-distance market and also especially in the United States and Britain (since 
competition was introduced in the 1980s), prices have not fallen low enough to meet 
the natural cost of a call. This disrupts basic classical economic theory. According to 
AT&T's Merrill Tutton, the cost of a long-distance call is 1000th of the cost in the 
1950s. Prices however, have not fallen as much. He cited the example that a call 
between London and New York is cheaper than between London and Paris or 
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Frankfurt and London - the latter two are obviously closer in proximity than the first 
example. 282 This, he argues, is because competition has not been introduced. 283 This 
is a common criticism from AT&T of the EC's market. 28' The reverse of the coin is 
that competition and potential competition may be under threat by such strategic 
alliances including Unisource and Uniworld. 
Cable & Wireless's Richard Brown is quoted as saying: 
"'I don't think the world is well served by five or six telecoms companies. 
There will be many and there will be rich expertise in various niche markets 
and capabilities and this will be good. No one shoe fits all. "' 285 
This was said in response to the suggestion that only a few telecom firms will remain 
in the form of mega-mergers. Other people concerned with the industry believe 
otherwise, as stated earlier. The question that will only be answered with time, is 
what kind of pressure has resulted from the BT-MCI merger. 
France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom have claimed their Global One alliance with 
Sprint will not result in a merger because of a different structure from Concert. 286 
One opinion was that Global One lacks "'... the same degree of coherence... ' in their 
strategy". 287 It was been suggested that members were "... pursuing their own 
international agendas". 288 Such alleged variations of structure and strategy will no 
doubt determine the fate of the alliances and even the firms; yet at what risk is 
competition? If the. trend becomes one of mergers or tightly-knit alliances that may 
be regarded as quasi-mergers, then there is the risk of competition being short-lived. 
As Brown is quoted stating above, the world would not be well served by a few 
firms. What he appears to be suggesting is a recognition for a need of alliances, but 
with some independence. Under such a scenario, competition is maintained. One 
question though is, how feasible is cohabitation? The marriage of BT-MCI was to 
ensure MCI would not find a more attractive partner and defect to another alliance, 
as a German partner of BT did in October (1996). 289 
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The merger required approval from American, EC and UK regulators. This decision 
was not expected until the autumn of 1997290 but in fact was given in late spring. 
Whether or not it will still be regarded as a 'defining event' which affected the 
direction of the telecommunications industrial structure is at present a matter for 
speculation. One can still expect the United States to demand UK and EC markets to 
be opened more than they have been. 291 Yet, American authorities should be 
expected to give greater openness in return. As Noam wrote at the time of the 
merger announcement: 
"It would be hypocritical and counterproductive for the United States to 
oppose the MCI merger after pressuring other countries to lower their 
barriers to American telecommunications investments. " 292 
It was ironic that the marriage was between a former monopoly and a monopoly- 
buster. 293 
4.4.7 Oligopolies Under EC Law 
The formation of the Merger Regulation should provide greater clarification for the 
rules of Articles 85 and 86 concerning competition. Those Articles are more 
'behavioural' oriented than the Merger Regulation, which is concerned more with 
market or industry structure. This is evident in the development of two separate 
concepts; the concept of concerted practice and the concept of joint or collective 
dominance. According to one lawyer: 
"The concept of concerted practice is now, through a substantial amount of 
case law developed by the European Commission, the European Court of 
Justice ('ECY) and more recently the Court of First Instance ('CFI'), well 
established and reasonably well defined. However, that of joint dominance is 
still at its earliest stages of development and inevitably lacks clarity: indeed, it 
would appear that two distinct forms of joint dominance analysis are 
developing.... " 294 
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One form is purported to fall under Article 86 in connection with the abuse of a 
dominant position. The second is applicable under the Merger Regulation regarding 
control of concentrations. 295 In practice the behaviour as opposed to structure of 
oligopolies (or more precisely the subject of collective dominance) was regulated by 
EC authorities. The EC (i. e. the Commission and the European Court of Justice) has 
not had a history of a developed concept of collective dominance. 296 The application 
of collective joint dominance under Article 86 has been limited and is still in 
development compared with the concept of concerted practice under Article 
85(1). 297 The Nestle/Perrier case was the first occasion in which collective 
dominance was applied under the Merger Regulation. 298 
"The Commission determined that Article 2(3) allows a concentration to be 
declared incompatible with the common market where a collective dominant 
position is created or strengthened, as a result of which effective competition 
would be significantly impeded. The case marks a departure from the early 
practice under the Merger regulation in which the countervailing power of 
other suppliers in narrow oligopolistic markets was cited as a ground for not 
finding dominance. " 299 
The concept 'collective dominance' according to Winckler and Hansen, "... does not 
have a specific significance in economic literature. It is a concept developed from 
analysis of behaviour in oligopolistic markets where a limited number of firms are 
able jointly to exercise market power". 30° The definition of a dominant position in 
the Hoffman-La Roche case formed a distinction between "parallel courses of 
conduct which are peculiar to oligopolies", emphasising there may exist an 
interaction within the nature of oligopolies, and "an undertaking occupying a 
dominant position the conduct of the undertaking which derives profits from that 
position". 301 This is a conduct test -a behaviour test, separating the action of a firm 
in a position of dominance and abusing such power from a firm in a position of 
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dominance on the basis of the oligopolistic structure of the market or industry. The 
ECJ in Hoffman-La Roche held that an oligopoly (with non-collusive parallel 
behaviour) fell outside of Article 86.302 While the definition in the case was more 
single-dominance oriented than joint/collective dominance303 two other pre-Merger 
Regulation cases are interesting in so far as the EC's approach to oligopolies. 
Schodermeier summarised: 
"In the Flat Glass case, the Commission relied on a structural link-up 
between the oligopolists in order to find joint dominance while in the Magill 
TV Guide case it put the emphasis on the fact that the dominating enterprises 
did not compete with each other and that third parties therefore found 
themselves in a position of economic dependence. " 304 
Inspite of these two cases which, separately, recognise a distinction between 
structural and non-structural oligopoly, the Merger regulation which followed 
"... does not contain a legal presumption of the existence of a collective dominant 
oligopoly as soon as certain companies attain a certain combined marketshare ..., 
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This case specifically brought into question the notion of collective or oligopolistic 
dominance and the Merger Regulation's interpretation of it. The ECJ ruled that to 
presume an existence of collective dominance through the application of the Merger 
Regulation would reverse the burden of proof. The Commission (the plaintiff) must 
prove effective competition would be impaired because of "structural grounds 
between the leading companies in a highly concentrated market. "306 Morgan 
encapsulated the importance of an effective merger regulation regarding oligopolies. 
She stated: 
"The main aim of the regulation is the maintenance of effective competition. 
Economic theory suggests that competition can be jeopardised not only by 
the market power of a single firm but also by the avoidance of active 
competition by two or more oligopolistic firms... If the control of mergers 
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involving oligopolistic dependence is judged outside of the scope of the EC 
regulation, it would leave a gap in European competition poHey. ". 307 
Morgan uses what she called "an extreme example" to prove her point. 
"[T]his would apparently leave the Commission unable to act in the face of a 
merger between two firms with 26% and 24% of the market respectively if 
the other company had a 51% share; the merged entity would not dominate 
the market because it would not be the largest supplier yet its position would 
raise severe concern about the effect on competition. " 308 
Thus the question raised asks, if there is a provision (e. g. through the Merger 
Regulation) to object to oligopoly-formation, what means is best for oligopoly 
interpretation? Ridyard noted: 
"[T]he compatibility test contained in Article 2(3) of the Regulation allows 
the Commission to object to mergers of and only if they create or strengthen 
a dominant position, the most natural interpretation is that the regulation 
exists to prevent single firms from achieving a position of market dominance. 
... [H]owever, that a merger control that was confined strictly to this narrow 
objective would contain a serious blind spot when it came to mergers in 
highly concentrated oligopolistic markets. " 309 
There are three different approaches which may be applied. One is the American 
system of the Herfindahl - Herschman Index (HHI), 
31o the German concentration - 
presumption311 and the United Kingdom's 'public interest' declaration. 312 Future 
oligopoly tests will be affected by the Nestle/Perrier case which was an effort by the 
Commission to overcome the blindspot. 313 Nestle/Perrier was the first case to be 
challenged with oligopoly concerns since the Merger Regulation's implementation. "' 
As Juan F. Briones Alonso independently wrote about this case while he was in the 
Commission: 
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The first merger case on oligopolistic domination offers useful insights on 
how the Commission intends to apply this concept. " 315 
The Commission used this case to widen Article 2(3)'s position about dominance to 
include oligopolitistic dominance. Although this was also used (though 
unsuccessfully) in Alcatel/AEG Kabel, the Nestle/Perrier case was the first case in 
which the term was used where the merger was declared incompatible with the 
Common Market. As one EC Commission official stated: 
"In its Nestle/Perrier Decision, the Commission explicitly decided to 
incorporate the analysis of oligopolistic markets into its merger control 
system. -Subject to a possible sentence of the Court of justice to the 
contrary, oligopolies are now an established feature of the Commission's 
policy. " 316 
There is however, uncertainty among commentators about how successful the 
Commission and the ECJ will be with their new collective dominance doctrine. 
Despite the apparent landmark case Nestle/Perrier is with regard to oligopolies, 31' 
the lack of some form of codification in the form of guidelines or checklist of factors 
for assessing oligopolies31' leaves questions about reliability and predictability about 
the 'qualitative' standards which have been used. 319 One reason given for the under- 
developed means for prediction and certainty is given by Winckler and Hansen: 
"This may be due to the relatively recent adoption of the Merger regulation 
and the novelty of the collective dominance doctrine in EC merger control. 
The difficulty in reconciling the many decisions under the Merger 
regulation may be due to the 'learning by doing' process the Commission is 
going through. " 320 
The current principle the EC authorities follow is that; 
"... there is no presumption of dominance built on threshold's of supply 
concentration or any other parameter. This acknowledges the fact that 
oligopolistic structures of supply are consistent with both competitive 
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markets and dominance, and that no single parameter will allow one to be 
differentiated from the other. " 321 
In other words the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff (in most cases this has been 
and will probably be the Commission) as the case cited above, Alcatel/AEG Kabel. 
In addition to this approach is the Commission's analysis of cases individually with an 
examination of the specific market conditions. This approach acknowledges different 
markets and industries have different factors regarding competition. 322 
4.5 Summary 
The restructuring of the telecommunications industry is an opportunity to re-examine 
and indeed seek to correct the failings of competition law with regard to the aversion 
of anti-competitive practices. Competition theory seems to suppose the existence of 
(near-) perfect markets, yet there is often in " practice a trend towards either 
concentrated or oligopolistic markets. Why then are the laws not more focused 
towards the real rather than the ideal marketplace? True, there are laws regulating 
the abuse of a dominant position, and agencies such as the EC Commission or the 
FCC (US) which give approval to merger and other such alliances. However the 
assumption of perfect market conditions might mislead judicial interpretations. The 
problem is perhaps how to adequately deal with oligopolies: for not all oligopolies 
are necessarily anti-competitive, while others are. So, instead it is perhaps easier to 
assume idealistic market conditions in order to regulate, as well as to regulate 
towards achieving such an ideal situation. Although oligopolies are not only 
interesting, but also a concern for a system based on competition, the problem may 
not entirely he with the fact that oligopolies exist. Rather, the problem can be about 
how such a situation arose in the first place; Was it natural, or could something have 
been done? 
This is an interesting area, especially in regard to telecommunications. First, there 
seems to be a need for alliances between firms to cope with the technological, 
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political and consumer-demand changes. This might also be socially desirable 
because of the changes and demands placed on these firms. Secondly though, there is 
the matter of consequences. How loose are these alliances so as to maintain the 
competitive-potential? Do closer relations such as mergers unnecessarily risk leading 
to an ultimately oligopolistic and even concentrative industry, whereby earlier 
intervention or discouragement might have avoided such a situation? Then there is 
always the argument that in the long term the market cannot sustain the existence of 
a number of firms, and therefore an oligopolistic situation is more efficient and 
preferable. This returns the focus of the question back to asking why are perfect 
markets assumed or preferred in the first place. Also, there might be the argument 
that telecom firms as we have known them will naturally evolve into entirely new 
entities, with some separation in the long term of corporate activities such as 
infrastructure and services, because of economics. 
These are all matters of debate in the changing telecommunications environment in 
conjunction with legal problems that need addressing. On the one hand, if everything 
was left to their 'natural' course, the result could be unfavourable in regards to the 
competitive system many societies espouse. Alternatively, can the law be expected to 
predict much of the future? Recent (neo-classical) competition legal theories sought 
to address this problem. This leaves the law as a mechanism to influence events in 
order to prevent undesirable consequences. To achieve this, a greater understanding 
of mergers and other alliances, and particularly oligopolies, interwoven into the 
foundation of legal principles would benefit judicial review of markets. This then 
begs one to question if the EC's presumption against sector dominance is a viable 
approach, and is a matter which should be part of a competition law and policy 
review. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Safeguarding Competition in Modern Telecommunications 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the EC's approach to protecting competition in 
telecommunications and responding to the structural contradictions which the 
industry presents to a truly competitive market. Attention has already been given in 
this thesis to the formation of alliances, including joint ventures and mergers. In this 
chapter, the emphasis is placed on the behaviour of companies and the threat to 
competition in the telecommunications industry. The particular nature of 
telecommunications raises some problems for ensuring a competitive system in the 
telecommunications market. This is especially the case at a time when the market is 
very much in a stage of transition: a change from nation-wide monopoly to 
competition, and from basic communication to a multi-communication fabric of 
modem society and industry. During this period, there are ample opportunities to 
disadvantage and exclude new competitors by those already established (e. g. former 
Public Telecommunications Operators) in the market. 
Among the areas discussed are infrastructure, its control, access and alternatives. 
There is also the matter of universal service, originally a reason for allowing a 
monopolistic regime for telecommunications. Now it is something that has become a 
part of public policy and quite possibly regarded as a 'right' along with other 
Western-based liberties including freedom of speech and expression. 
These practical conflicts incorporate legal concerns about the domination and 
control of infrastructures and network access, including entry barriers and predation. 
224 
There are also the continuing problems with regard to the interpretation of 
competition law. Among the criticisms of EC law is an examination of arguments 
favouring an American style approach to EC law through per se rules and rules of 
reason. These would allow technically anti-competitive behaviour because of the 
actual benefit(s) such actions would have, in this case, for the telecommunications 
industry and the developing information society. 
The chapter's structure begins with Article 85, which is one of the EC's legal tools 
in regulating competitive behaviour. Following this, areas in telecommunications in 
which behavioural problems can occur are addressed: namely in infrastructure and 
network competition. Among these include matters of entry barriers, the theme of 
essential access, predation, tying and lastly alternative telecommunications providers. 
5.2 Article 85: Managing Competitive Behaviour 
Article 85 (EEC) has been described as; "... the principle weapon to control anti- 
competitive behaviour... "' The Article states: 
"The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in 
particular those which: 
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
b) limit or control production, technical development, or investment; 
c) share markets or sources of supply; 
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
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parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 0 
Both competition law Articles 85 and 86 were referred to in the Green Paper that 
initiated the liberalisation of telecommunications. The 1987 Green Paper3 for a 
common telecommunications market in services and equipment proposed: 
"(H) strict continuous review of operational (commercial) activities of 
telecommunications administrations according to Articles 85,86 and 90 
EEC.... 
(J) strict continuous review of all private providers in the newly opened 
sectors according to articles 85 and 86, in order to avoid the abuse of 
dominant positions.... " 4 
The Commission outlined its intentions in the Green Paper which were further 
supported by the Commission publishing a Notice on Telecommunications 
(Antitrust) Guidelines. ' The Commission explained these Guidelines were 
principally concerned with the application of competition rules to undertakings; thus 
forming a distinction between the competitive markets being established and the 
special privileges permitted by way of Articles 5 and 90(1) & (3). The competition 
rules applicable to undertakings in telecommunications are those which apply to 
competitive markets that are not concerned with the telecoms sector (i. e. the 
standard Articles 85 and 86 EEC). The Commission through its Guidelines stated: 6 
"Articles 85 and 86 apply directly and throughout the Community to all 
undertakings, whether public or private, on equal terms and to the same 
extent, apart from the exception provided in Article 90(2) ... Therefore 
Article 85 and 86 apply both to private enterprises and public 
telecommunications administrations and recognised private operating 
agencies.... " 
226 
Article 85 does not define the term 'undertaking', nor does the EEC Treaty. 
However, the term may be understood from a number of sources. Whish wrote: 
"Given the policy of Article 85 it would seem in principle that any natural or 
legal person, of whatever juridical character, capable of carrying on some 
commercial or economic activity in the goods or services sector should 
qualify as an undertaking.... " 8 
Korah stated the term was a broad concept and as in Article 86: 
"It covers any collection of resources to carry out economic activities. It 
embraces a company partnership, sole trader or an association whether or not 
dealing with its members. Even inventors and artists have been treated by the 
Commission as undertakings when they are exploiting their inventions or 
performances. A trust company authorised to police a cartel was held by the 
Commission to be an undertaking. " 9 
In the case known as Polypropylene 10 'undertakings' was not narrowly limited to 
organisations having legal personality, but rather a broader understanding of it was 
used to include any entity which was engaged in a commercial activity. " Thus a 
private individual to a state corporation or organisation is an undertaking. 12 
Importantly, case law shows that neither the Commission nor the ECJ have 
demonstrated any intention to adopting a narrow meaning of'undertaking'. 13 
In comparison with American antitrust law, specifically Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, Article 85 (EEC) "... reveals on the one hand a considerable degree of 
correspondence and on the other hand fundamental differences. "14 Helmuth Schroter 
stated: 
"Both provisions are roughly speaking, aimed at promoting competition, but 
the latter word no longer has the same meaning under the U. S. and EEC 
antitrust rules, because the respective policies have drifted in different 
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directions. " is 
Although written a decade ago, differences between American and EC approaches 
continue. In the instance of the United States recent antitrust interpretation has been 
concerned more with economic efficiency. However as Korah wrote: "Even if 
economic efficiency defined in terms of consumer welfare be the only objective of 
antitrust, there are problems in applying the policy to factual situations. " 16 
The EC's approach has traditionally been more interventionist in so far as the stated 
aims of the EEC Treaty's preamble are concerned. Such aims are, in regard to recent 
American Chicago School legal philosophy, too vague. '7 Article 85 is a competition 
rule to prevent restrictive trading practices obstructing a common market. This is to 
prevent private trading agreements resurrecting the commercial barriers defined by 
political boundaries the EEC Treaty aims to eliminate. This principle alone affects 
how philosophies such as the Chicago School's efficiency ideals can be adapted. By 
the very nature of this legislative intervention attempts to adopt the American 
efficiency ideals may conflict with EC law.. However, the centre of EC competition 
policy, similar to the original nature of the American Sherman Act, is also to act 
against cartels. "' Secondly the abolishing of political boundaries and thereby form a 
common market also has the political motive to create a European market, as Korah 
stated; "... to obtain economies of scale similar to those achieved in North America, 
without creating unduly concentrated markets. " 19 
Significantly, Article 85 may be breached if either the purpose or the effect of an 
agreement limits competition in the EC. This does not mean an agreement needs to 
be made in the EC, but the effect is in the EC for Article 85 to be used by the ECJ. 
20 
The issue of'efficiency' is an objective which is important 21 The differences between 
the EC and the US may be said to be as follows: "Europe is divided by legal and 
cultural factors in a way that the U. S. A. is not. " 22 
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Thus the approach to competition law is different not only by simple philosophical 
ideals, but also by some very practical problems. In effect the EC is attempting a 
balancing act through, 1) developing a common market among established nation- 
states and 2) attempting to open markets such as telecommunications to the 
competitive process. 
There is one comment made by Korah which could be argued to be important in the 
present and early stages liberalising telecommunications for both the EC and the 
United States. She stated in the context of the EC's policy towards competition 
enforcement: "Efficiency is... not the only or even the most important objective. "" In 
the context of telecommunications, telecommunications as an international industry 
and international corporations and business in general, this statement is also 
important if cartels are deemed anti-competitive. 
The XIVth Report on Competition by the Commission states: 
"[C]ompetition can be expected to perform three functions...: a resource 
allocative function, by encouraging better use of available factors of 
production, so that firms' technical efficiency is increased and consumers' 
wants better satisfied; an incentive function, by stimulating firm to better 
- their performance relative to their competitors; and an innovative function, 
by encouraging the introduction of new products in markets and the 
development of new production processes and distribution techniques. " 24 
However, such a policy in the EC is subject to the goal of "... the creation of a single 
market achieving conditions similar to those of a domestic market. " Z5 This goal of a 
single market as a whole (or in the particular context of this thesis, 
telecommunications), not only has contradictory elements when compared with other 
systems such as the American antitrust laws, but also contain specific concerns. An 
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important one, and one which could have development-potential with regard to 
telecommunications, is the interpretation of competition legislation. This is a subject 
of potential interest because of the ambiguous nature of telecommunications -or at 
least the social-political approach to the industry and regard of its importance. On 
the one hand liberalisation and competition are sought, while on the other 
exemptions are permissible in the interests of developing an EC-wide market and 
social objectives under the EEC Treaty and its successors. 
5.2.1 Rule of Reason and Per Se Rule 
There may be a valid argument for agreements, ventures or other restraints of trade. 
In some instances of co-operation or behaviour might result in efficiency or 
consumer benefits, but under competition law be technically illegal. This may 
especially be the case in telecommunications due to the technical, physical and 
practical nature of the industry and market. Some consideration of rules that permit 
actions or behaviour that might otherwise be illegal could be beneficial. 
Two concepts in judicial interpretation of antitrust law (in the United States) are the 
rule of reason and the per se rule. These are relevant to EC law in so far as they 
could be considered as a means in altering the traditional interpretation of EC 
competition law. Some commentators have argued these should be introduced for a 
more efficiency-based law. 26 Others have argued against such an adoption. 27 In the 
United States some agreements may breach Section 1 of the Sherman Act per se. 
However, other agreements require the rule of reason test to determine whether or 
not they are anti-competitive. 
The rule of reason, ("the guiding principle of Sherman Act construction" )28 has been 
said to be difficult to define and its meaning has really been developed through case- 
law. 29 Furthermore its interpretation has been both broad and narrow in its 
application over time, because different courts had different problems at different 
230 
times. 30 Waller explained: 
"The rule of reason in U. S. antitrust law is a rule of construction of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which was developed to avoid the harmful and 
unintended potential for a statute which appears on its face to prohibit all 
restraints of trade. When read against the common law background of the 
Sherman Act would be interpreted to prohibit only those restraints which, on 
balance, unreasonably restrain competitive effect of the agreement under 
examination, and not whether collusion was reasonable in order to promote 
some other societal goal. 01 
Article 85 however, is structurally different with the intention of weighing the effects 
of both pro- and anti-competitive agreements. 32 Under Article 85(3) agreements 
may be exempted from anti-competition enforcement. This allows for greater 
predictability and especially a more uniform interpretation. 33 Since Article 85(1) 
captures all agreements that are intended or have the effect of restructuring 
competition, Craig and De Burca note this creates two problems. The first is that all 
contracts by their very nature are restrictive in some form of competition and 
therefore would be caught by competition law. The second problem is that an 
agreement may not only restrict competition, but also enhance it simultaneously. 34 
For example, X may enter a market and use Y for distribution. Y may want incentives 
and protection to cover the risk involved especially if it is a new product. Therefore 
a restrictive trade agreement could be established whereby X guarantees not to use 
any other distributor in that territory. While the restrictive nature of the agreement is 
obvious, the competitive element is the introduction of a new product and/or market. 
Others, if it is deemed profitable, will according to economic theory then be 
encouraged by the market to enter and compete. 35 There is a third problem of 
ambiguity and this relates to efficiency. Restrictive agreements may be advantageous, 
particularly with regard but not exclusively to cost/price efficiency for the consumer 
and social benefits. Telecommunications is a market that readily comes to mind. 
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Strategic alliances, joint ventures and licences are some examples whereby it may be 
socially and social-economically beneficial for such selective and restrictive 
agreements to exist. 
In the United States the rule of reason is used to balance anti- and pro-competitive 
consequences. In this country the courts use economic analysis to examine 
agreements, and agreements that appear to. breach Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
could be held to fall outside the law. 36 Korah has been critical of the EC 
Commission and the Court in so far as their lack or limited use of economic analysis. 
Korah stated: 
"It is often difficult to reconcile the Commission's conclusions under Article 
85(1) with those under Article 85(3). Various ancillary restrictions necessary 
to make viable a transaction that may even increase competition are held to 
restrict competition contrary to Article 85(1) because they restrict the parties' 
freedom of action and have significant effects on the market. Yet, when 
granting the exemption the Commission describes them as 'necessary and 
reasonable' to make the transaction viable. 
These views are not consistent. It is of the nature of contracts to restrict the 
parties' freedom of action. The Commission's reasoning suffices to catch all 
contracts that have significant effects on the market, whether they increase, 
decrease or do not affect competition. 07 
Korah further states in another source: 
"There is fear that European firms that may have to compete in world 
markets may fall behind technologically or have to merge completely, so as 
to reduce the risk of collaboration. Market analyses are difficult, especially 
for lawyers and bureaucrats. But if such analyses are not made, agreements 
that may have overall desirable consequences should not be controlled. This 
232 
means that national courts will have to be strong in resisting claims that 
agreements are anti-competitive just because some competitor is 
harmed. "" 
The inappropriateness or inability of courts to assess complex economic matters has 
not been used as criticism aimed solely at the EC authorities. It has been suggested 
that the American courts also have difficulties, which may account for the per se 
rule. 39 The per se rule is, "a rule of construction" and rule of evidence. " 
"[l]t may be said that every restrictive practice that significantly impairs 
competition is illegal per se in modern antitrust; evidence challenging the 
desirability of unimpaired competition is scarcely ever admissible. When the 
courts have agreed in recent years that a practice is not illegal per se, this had 
not meant that they were prepared to judge each instance of the practice by 
reference to its effects on the public interest; it has meant only that the 
practice might not in every instance have a significant effect on competition 
at all. "4' 
Neale and Goyder assist in defining the difference between the rule of reason and the 
per se rule by claiming there really is not a substantive inconsistency between the 
two today. 42 They explained that some writers have suggested that these two 
principles conflict. The conflict though appears only if the rule of reason involved a 
distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable restraints of trade. But, they 
explained, the rule of reason in modem antitrust law is exercised by discretion only 
through questions of fact 43 
Whish on the other hand suggested there is some distinction, whereby some 
agreements infringe the rule of reason while others require the use of the per se 
rule. 4 The problem he acknowledges, is the lack of a fixed, rigidly defined boundary 
between the two tests. Nevertheless, Whish stated a distinction between the two 
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rules is "of central importance in US antitrust" 45 To add to the problem is the 
recognition that, "... agreements formerly subject to per se illegality may as a result of 
judicial assessment become subject to a rule of reason standard; there are some 
cases in which the courts appear to apply a hybridised approach. "4' Another 
influential commentator claimed that the American courts were moving away from 
using the per se rule to the rule of reason, but this latter rule continues to be 
problematic. The result has been to formulate truncated rules of reason. This 
reduces or eliminates the requirement of courts to investigate market analysis in 
great detail. 47 The Supreme Court has found there to be little distinction or 
significant clarity between the per se rule and the rule of reason 48 Hawk stated: 
"Two principal conclusions can be drawn about.. . recent 
US decisions. First, 
the line between the per se rule and the rule of reason is increasingly blurred 
with courts applying 'quick look' per se rules and 'quick look' rules of reason. 
Second, the major issue in the cases surrounds the circumstances in which 
inquiry into market power and market definition can be avoided. this issue is 
frequently addressed... particularly the definition of'naked' restraints and the 
question whether 'naked' restraints are the only exception to the rule that 
market power (and market definition) are essentially elements of the rule of 
reason analysis. "" 
Hawk condemned the position of the EC, despite the increasing recognition of 
problems with the American system. Even though there continue to be problems in 
the American system, he claimed it is more favourable than "... the near anarchy 
under Article 85 engendered by inconsistent Commission and Court interpretations 
of restrictions of competition under Article 85(1) and the bifurcation of what ideally 
should be a single anti-trust analysis into the double tests of Article 85(1) and Article 
85(3). iS° Hawk concluded: 
"This maudite bifurcation presents a more serious obstacle to predictable and 
coherent rules than the current doctrinal confusion in the United States which 
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maybe a transitional phenomenon. i51 
Prior to adopting or accepting such criticism, it is nevertheless important to keep in 
mind the differences between the US and the EC. In regard to the per se rule, there 
have been similar classifications of agreements which are technically illegal under 
both the Sherman Act and the EC's Article 85(1). In both instances it is also enough 
for the authorities to prove an agreement exists and not its adverse effects on 
competition. There, the parallels effectively end. 52 As stated earlier some analysts 
have called for the application of detailed economic analysis to EC rules to determine 
the anti-competitiveness of agreements. Others, including Whish, suggest otherwise. 
The adoption of such American approaches under the rule of reason has been 
criticised as "too formalistic". 53 
The differences in agendas and fundamental purposes behind American and EC 
competition law could suggest the need for different terminologies. While the 
problems and issues of markets, competition and anti-competitive behaviour may be 
similar if not the same, it may be more appropriate to use different terms to avoid the 
confusion of purpose and intent of the laws. In their article 'Article 85 and the Rule 
of Reason', Whish and Sufrin rejected the adoption of an American style rule of 
reason and called instead for the discarding of the term from EC terminology. (They 
also suggested discarding 'ancillary restraint' and 'per se illegality). While EC 
competition law has a broader usage-base into other areas of law (e. g. free 
movement of goods), an important reason to discontinue the use of the term rule of 
reason (and per se rule) is because "... it invites misleading comparison with antitrust 
law analysis in the United States. , 54 (In regard to economic analysis, Whish and 
Sufrin called for improvements to be made on the part of the Commission but these 
should not necessarily be entirely connected with rule of reason analysis. )" 
A recurring criticism of Article 85 by advocates of an American-style approach 
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concerns Article 85(3). As cited above from Hawk, there is claimed to be a double 
test under Article 85 involving paragraphs (1) and (3). Hawk stated: 
"[T]he bifurcation of Article 85 is the principal cause of the confusion about 
the definition of a restriction of competition under Article 85(1). Much of the 
analysis under the US rule of reason is reserved in the EEC for the exemption 
stage under Article 85(3). "56 
Horspool and Korah wrote: 
"Unlike the Sherman Act, Article 85(3) provides for exemption for 
agreements or classes of agreements that lead to the improvement of 
distribution or production or that promote technical or economic progress, 
while insuring that a fair share of the benefit is passed down to consumers. 
For the agreement to meet exemption, the restrictions of competition must be 
necessary to obtain the benefits and competition must not be distorted. 07 
However, while agreements under Article 85(2) are void automatically if they breach 
85(1), Horspool and Korah elaborated upon their concerns about Article 85(3) in 
relation to 85(2). 
"The problems are exacerbated by the Commission's practice of finding that 
any important restrictions of'conduct restricts competition even when it 
treats it as an ancillary restraint necessary to make viable some transaction 
and exempts it under Article 85(3). 08 
This signifies the difference between the EC and the US approach to competition 
law. Waller also pointed out this difference, suggesting the language of Article 85(3) 
goes further than the American (rule of reason) practice. The EC competition law 
interpretation takes into consideration the promotion of the goals of the Community 
or other social concerns. 59 
This is a significant difference to remember. Waller explained: 
"While Article 85(3) is most often applied to exempt anticompetitive 
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agreements that further the goal of community integration and the 
transcendence of national markets, there is also more than a hint of industrial 
policy in its application. Exemptions have been used to achieve the reduction 
of capacity in certain industrial sectors... and strengthen the competitiveness 
of Community producers relative to outside producers. i6O 
Yet, while the debate about the appropriateness of adopting American methodology 
will undoubtedly continue, there may be a further consideration. This could suggest 
the existence of an EC model; a form of a rule of reason may in fact be developing. 
However, as Whish and Sufrin contended, the use of the term rule of reason may not 
be a helpful one. It might rather be a misleading term and consideration for a more 
suitable one could be beneficial. A thorough assessment of this could be beneficial 
particularly to the telecommunications market and the ambiguity in it in relation to 
(pure) competition. 
5.3 Infrastructure 
The liberalisation of telecommunications has not been interpreted or approached in a 
universal manner. The significant differences can be defined through those that 
emphasise service-based competition and those that encourage network or 
infrastructure competition as well. Despite the trend to introduce liberalised 
telecommunications markets, there have been few countries in which the network 
infrastructure has been (fully) open to competition. Although this appears to be 
changing, it has nevertheless been a policy of controversy. 61 Stehmann and 
Borthwick explained: 
"The USA has led the way in liberalising both the network infrastructure and 
services while, apart from the UK, the European Community opted for 
competition in services alone. The Community's approach towards service- 
based competition will reach its final stage with the liberalisation of public 
voice telephony in 1998. "6Z 
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The technological developments which have also occurred during (and since) the 
initial political changes to operating the telecommunications industry have been 
described as having "... had a profound impact on the provision of 
telecommunications services". 63 Mosteshar stated: 
"This has led to a position where an increasing number of services can be 
operated independently of the operation of the network infrastructure, 
making telecommunications tradable in their own right. Furthermore, the 
provision of services, unlike the provision of telecommunications network 
infrastructures, does not require a physical presence of the provider in the 
geographical area where the services are provided. "64 
A significance of this is that a common market may be created (within the EC for 
example) of such services. 65 This also allows in principle for the separation of 
network infrastructure provisions from telecommunications services, thereby 
removing the need for the state to be involved or a monopoly over 
telecommunications as a whole. Exclusive or special rights granted for network 
infrastructure has not exempted it from EC Competition Law. Article 90 of the 
Treaty of Rome exists to control abuse of such privileged positions, particularly 
when other telecom firms wish to use or even have little choice but to use the 
infrastructure of the firm holding such privileged rights of control. With the 
introduction of competition and the liberalisation of telecommunications, the 
question why such exclusive or special rights should remain in telecommunications is 
an interesting one. Such an approach has not been uniformly adopted by liberalising 
states. The United States formally abolished network monopolies in 1982. Until 
recently, the United Kingdom has had a duopoly since a licence was granted to 
Mercury. The European Parliament stated: 
"Unlike the United Kingdom Government, which regards network expansion 
enhancement (e. g. conversion to fibre-optic cabling) as a purely commercial 
concern for telecommunications businesses, the Commission takes the view 
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that the Member States should be responsible for providing an integrated and 
efficient network infrastructure, in both the short and long terms, as the basis 
for optimised Community and world-wide communications services. This 
principle is endorsed by the overwhelming majority of Member States; the 
trend is towards maintaining exclusive powers for a single 
telecommunications administration or a limited number of non-competing 
regional administrations. "66 
The consequence of this approach is anti-competitive de facto and de jure, because 
Member State telecom firms could not establish rival networks in other Member 
States who choose to effectively retain a closed network market. National support 
for retaining exclusive control over the networks, again, can be understood as a 
purely political one in terms of power and revenue. Secondly there is the want to 
maintain the provision of universal service, supported by opinion that the state is 
better able to provide and guarantee universal service than a competitive market. " 
A distinction needs to be made between public networks and private networks. 
Stehmann states there is not a common definition of public network. " A private 
network may be defined as; "network composed of transmission lines leased from 
telecommunications operators (TOs) and switches provided by a party that uses this 
network (so-called value added services or VAS), such as electronic mailing 
ser'vices. i69 Private networks are commonly used by corporations that contain much 
internal communications traffic and also between branches or other office locations. 
These networks can be linked to the public network. There has not been a formal 
definition 
) of public 
telecommunications infrastructure. However the Service 
Directive) (90/388 EEC) did provide a definition stating it as one which; 
... permits the conveyance of signals 
between defined network termination 
points by wire, by microwave, by optical means or by other electromagnetic 
means. 00 
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A problem with this, noted Stehmann, is the lack of a specific meaning for the term 
'public'. This may be overcome if the following definition were adopted for Public 
Network: 
"Any network on which services are made available to all users on a common 
carrier basis. "" 
However, Stehmann observed further, the definition does not confine the public 
network to a particular type of transmission technology. 72 The use of private 
networks was not only nor simply because of internal corporate use. It was part of a 
trend due to corporate dissatisfaction with the inability of the incumbent 
telecommunications operators to meet their facility needs. 73 Mansell remarked on 
the subject of public network and competition: 
"Although the players in the telecommunications market have different views 
on the optimal supply structure for the future public network, larger business 
users have been vocal in their advocacy of competition in the supply of 
services as well as the network infrastructure. i74 
5.3.1 Universal Service 
Regardless of whether or not the monopolistic structure of traditional 
telecommunications was actually based on the policy that it was the best method for 
providing a universal service, general opinion may be said to deem communications 
as a 'right'. Universal service may then be regarded as a right paralleled with other 
basic rights associated with democracy. Blackman explained: 
"Universal service -a phone in every home - is 
one of the great and worthy 
pillars of telecommunications policy. The ability to make and receive 
telephone calls at reasonable prices is taken for granted - if not as a basic 
human right, than at least as necessary for full participation in a modern 
society. 05 
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The opinion supporting a monopoly for providing a universal service has come under 
attack with the general policy change towards a greater liberalised market. The 
historical position of traditional telephone monopolies has been called into question. 
This may be read in the words of an executive at Mercury, the first firm given a 
licence to challenge BT's domination of the United Kingdom's telecommunications 
market. 
"The great power of ideology is to fix the way we think, to order the agenda, 
to transpose fact and fiction. Above all, ideology is a mechanism for 
moulding perceptions so that the differences between observed reality and 
perceived imagery appear in harmony when they are in conflict.... The 
dominant idea in telecoms is that competition poses a threat, undermines or 
destroys the possibility of providing a universal service in the absence of an 
obligation to do so, and that competitors must compensate the monopolist 
for carrying this burden. "" 
The question is; what is Universal Service? As cited above from Blackman, it 
effectively is a telephone in every home with the right and ability to make and receive 
telephone calls at a reasonable rate. Is this appropriate in the late twentieth century? 
Oliver Stehmann claimed since the 1970s there have generally been two concepts of 
universal service. Between the first use of the term in the 1907 Annual Report of 
AT&T and the 1970s it referred to the interconnection of local networks to a unified 
and more efficient system. " 
"Broadly speaking, two different concepts exist. One implies a high diffusion 
of telephone terminals within a country. Progress made as regards universal 
service then can be measured by the percentage of households connected to 
the public switched telephone network. ... The second concept goes 
beyond 
the first one in linking a high access rate with certain tariff principles as 
uniform access prices, disregarding the costs of joining the network. This 
would for instance, require the internal cross-subsidisation of rural areas by 
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high density ones. "" 
Stehmann claimed the first concept "... does not determine the means of achieving a 
high access rate. i79 
The recent and important legislation for the United States, the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, lacks a substantial or specific, legal definition of universal service. It 
does call for a definition of service which is supported by the Federal universal 
service support mechanisms. 8° The Act sets out the 'Universal Service Principles' 
which could be the definitive elements of what is termed Universal Service. The 
closest the Telecommunications Act comes to a definition is as follows: 
"In general: Universal Service is an evolving level of telecommunications 
services that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section, 
taking into account advances in telecommunications and information 
technologies and services. "" 
The recommended definition of services to be supported by Federal universal service 
support mechanisms include telecommunications services which: 
"(A) are essential to education, public health, or public safety; 
(B) have, through the operation of market choices by customers, been 
subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers; 
(C) are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by 
telecommunications carriers; and 
(D) are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. "" 
The Universal Service Principles set out in the Telecommunications Act also provide 
insight into the American understanding of the term. It states policies are to preserve 
and advance universal service based on: quality of service and affordable, just and 
reasonable rates; access to advanced services for all regions of the Nation; access for 
rural and high cost (including for example low income) areas and regions of the 
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country; the provision of services on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis; 
access for schools, libraries and health-care; and also to allow for additional 
principles which are later determined necessary to protect the public interest. 83 
These principles contain the hallmarks of maintaining the traditional understanding of 
universal service (although not necessarily by a monopoly), yet recognising the 
necessity of having flexibility to meet future unforeseen needs of society and 
technological advancement. 
The economic rationale from the 'traditional' understanding of universal service 
combined with the importance of providing a telephone in every home has the risk of 
becoming a political tool to protect the existence of a monopoly. 84 The private 
monopolist. or the state operated Telecommunications Operator may use this 
reasoning. Stehmann stated: 
"In EU member states the ubiquity of the telephone has appeared during a 
period when the network was provided by a publicly owned monopolist. For 
this reason it is often asserted that there is also a casual relationship between 
monopoly provision and the advancement of universal service, whilst 
competition would threaten this achievement. Competition would deprive the 
public operator of the financial means necessary to subsidise access. As a 
result, poor households and underdeveloped regions would be cut off from 
the network, leading to further marginalisation. i85 
However examples of state monopolies (or recently former state monopolies) do not 
necessarily support the logic of arguments in favour of their protection. Inefficiency, 
high costs and poor service have become terms associated with state-operated or 
protected telecommunications. 86 
The policy of the EC to have a telecommunications market that is based on 
competition, also claims universal service is one of fundamental importance. 87 There 
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remains the question of its role and definition in the modem industrial society and its 
compatibility with a policy promoting competition. The importance of 
telecommunications in the modem industrial society can be seen in its effect on 
countries' national gross domestic product (GDP). For example, in the United States 
the visible telecom share of the American national GDP rose from 1.8 per cent to 3.2 
per cent during the 1980s. 88 Growth is also viable in the EC. 89 The importance of 
telecommunications, communications technology and innovation, and an information 
infrastructure have become widely recognised. Not only have countries such as the 
United States, France, Germany and Japan begun to promote a national policy for an 
information superhighway, 9° the EC governing bodies have recognised its 
importance. " 
In a period of liberalisation, privatisation and competition, such public policies that 
recognise the importance of every household having access to modem services are 
suggested by some experts as a redefinition of 'basic service'. 92 Consequently 
'universal service' is in need of a new or updated meaning. The American FCC's 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 recognises this, as cited above. The European 
Community's position is of interest. 
The European Commission in its Background Report in telecommunications 
liberalisation made the following important statement: 
"There is a general consensus within the sector that the current scope of 
universal service should be narrowly defined as being affordable access to 
basic voice telephony service throughout a Member State. 03 
This narrow definition, the Report explained, was needed in order "... to avoid 
creating barriers to effective competition, before it has even started. 04 However, 
like the American Telecommunications Act, the European Commission also seeks to 
maintain some flexibility for changes and additions as technology and social- 
communications needs are interpreted to be changing. The Report stated: 
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"Additionally, flexibility must be shown as policy develops with regard to the 
information society. New services are not today part of universal service, but 
initiatives will continue to focus on promoting public access to new 
information society services (through schools, hospitals etc. ). i95 
It would therefore appear that two forms of universal service are evolving within the 
EC and the US. One is the traditional basic voice telephony service and the second is 
one for institutions which in some form affect and benefit the public. Nevertheless 
the basic questions, problems and debates remain which focus on the fundamental 
policy objectives of universal service. In a report to the European Commission, 
Cave, Milne and Scanlan identify four basic policy objectives which include; 
universal geographical coverage, universal residential access at geographically 
averaged prices, widely subsidised access arising through n access deficit and 
targeted phone subsidies. 96 
In considering a re-evaluation of what universal service covers, Cave, Milne and 
Scanlan find it should be reviewed with economic, social and technological changes. 
However, at present, extending obligations to include other services are not 
necessarily economically viable. 7 The problem within the EC is combining 
competition and universal service obligation in the telecommunications market. In 
overcoming this apparent incompatibility there are some interesting ideas and 
models. 
Three suggested methods are: 1) Universal Service Obligation (USO) through 
taxation; 2) USO responsibility for the incumbent telecommunications operator; 3) 
shared USO costs by all TOs. The first is where the cost of the universal service is 
met through taxation generally or by the telecommunications sector. This has been 
ruled to be not practical, despite examples of other social funding (e. g. the social 
security system). 98 Cave, Milne and Scanlan best explained the other two. 
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"Traditionally, the costs of universal service obligations have been covered 
by cross-subsidy within the monopoly telecommunications operator. When 
competition has been introduced, in some countries a decision has been taken 
to continue to impose USOs asymmetrically upon the incumbent, in order to 
promote a new entry into the sector. 
In the long-term, however, it may be necessary to share the cost of universal 
service obligations among operators, in order to ensure competition on equal 
terms. One method of achieving this objective is to estimate the net cost of 
USOs..... That net cost can then be shared amongst operators. In practice, 
this will often be achieved by the inclusion of access payment in 
interconnection charges paid by long-distance operators seeking access to the 
local loop. "99 
A fourth method is putting USO up for tender or auction. '°° 
Universal Service Obligation is, by nature, a non-competitive feature at best in a 
competitive telecommunications market. At worst it helps the incumbent maintain a 
hold over the majority of the basic market. In the United Kingdom BT, despite the 
introduction of competition, has managed to maintain 90% of the market share. '°' 
So it therefore seems logical to have price and other controls over the dominant 
player's power. However it is important to contemplate other ways in which 
competition can be introduced, thus minimising the actual need for traditional 
'natural' monopolies. Secondly, Universal Service even under the traditional 
monopoly has not achieved actual full service in most countries, namely a phone in 
every home. One example is the United Kingdom where only 91% of households had 
telephone connections in 1996. This was nevertheless an increase from 78% in 
1984.102 One interesting observation is the increase in households having telephone 
in post-monopoly UK. 
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In achieving and fulfilling universal service in a competitive industry, a more 
precisely defined understanding of the term is required. BT suggested it should be 
regarded as; "... the provision of basic voice telephony service to those who could not 
afford to obtain it at market prices. " 03 Mansell and Davies have a slightly different 
approach; one which addresses a more specific problem in the understanding of the 
term. They wrote: 
"The traditional concept of a basic public telecommunication service is 
beginning to lose meaning as far as commercial service are concerned. In a 
market with a very high penetration of voice telephone service, there are 
issues about how to extend network connections to any unserved population 
and ensuring that the penetration rate for this 'basic' service does not decline. 
This applies to subscriptions to cable systems and their extensions (or 
substitution by other technologies) to unserved areas. The decision as to 
whether to subscribe to services which have reached a high level of 
penetration could be affected by changes in subscription fees, connection 
charges and/or usage charges for local access networks. "104 
Thus it is more of a question of how to connect areas. Once connection is 
established, the question turns to focus on that issue of economical access. It is also 
a question of how to introduce competition and maintain competition with 
competitive rates and fees. USO calls into discussion subjects of pricing and 
compensation for the provision of access. Another question asks if USO will one 
day, within a reasonable and foreseeable future, be a probable candidate for 
extinction. Will the possibility exist whereby it becomes a dated, archaic policy? 
Given the current technology available and that being developed, it could be 
possible. However such development is also dependent upon policy and legislation to 
encourage and protect a competitive industry and marketplace, thereby avoid a 
return to a monopolised system - private or otherwise. The development of new 
services and transmission of these services as stated above, and the definition of 
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universal service require re-evaluation. As the Telecommunications Act (1996) in the 
United States and EC policy also supports, the additional right of information access 
risks confusing political and legislative shaping of a new communications industry 
and market. Mansell and Davies make an important point. They stated: 
"A distinction needs to be drawn between basic access to networks at 
reasonable price and basic access to information. "'0' 
Despite the fact that it has taken nearly a century to develop communications from a 
voice telephone network to a greater multimedia, integrated system, a dichotomy 
still exists within the EC. This is seen in an observation by a Principal Administrator 
in the European Commission concerned with Telecommunications and Regulation, 
who claimed: 
"In several Member States, universal telephone service is not yet a reality 
because waiting times exist, penetration rates are low or access to telephone 
service in some form is limited. At the same time, the current rapid take-off 
and growth of mobile or wireless-based telecommunications now offers the 
prospect, in conjunction with the fixed telephone network, of mass-market 
development in personal communications. This in time will lead to 
substantially higher levels of telephone penetration than has been the case 
even in the mature or 'saturated' traditional telephone markets. " 106 
Universal Service is therefore essential at present for traditional reasoning. As 
Cawley further stated: 
"Developments in integrated or multimedia communications services and the 
emergence of the Information Society raise the important question of access 
to such services for all citizens. 007 
Martin Bangemann, European . Commission member 
in charge of 
telecommunications, also stated the importance of this. 1°8 The current policy trend 
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based on the language of government officials, businesses and legislation suggests a 
two-track, parallel course for a universal communication service. Implementing such 
a policy raises questions concerned with tariffs.. Secondly, according to Mansell and 
Davies: 
"With respect to access to networks, no country has succeeded in defining a 
universal service obligation for any operator beyond individual access to the 
network via analogue or digital switches for the provision of voice 
telephony. "tog 
While some countries (e. g. the United States) have attempted to encourage 
investment and/or the private sector to connect the public to greater facilities, others 
have decided to remain with a more traditional interpretation of universal service. 
The United Kingdom for example has regarded universal service to be individual 
access to voice telephony (analogue or digital)»° 
With regard to basic access to information, this has been interpreted to be more 
complicated. The problems centre on who controls the access and gateways. Who 
controls the information, and who will be responsible for covering the costs of the 
provision of access to information. 1 " 
"One of the greatest challenges is to create effective fora for debates about 
how to define and introduce incentives for universal access to advanced 
networks and applications that are responsive to both economic and social 
goals. "' 12 
Arguments supporting competition in the telecommunications market risk over- 
looking one very important concern; how many network operators can realistically 
exist to offer competing public telephony services. This concern, which should not 
be readily dismissed, is a practical obstacle by nature because network roll-outs are 
costly and time-consuming. Indeed mobile and satellite (i. e. radio technology) exist 
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as potential alternatives and such a likelihood will increase. Some parts of the world 
use radio-based communications more than other parts, and it is one answer to 
developing universal service. However, mobile systems presently complement 
'terrestrial systems' in the EC. They are not as of yet substitutes. ' 13 
The contemporary and important competition question remains: will competing 
private investors install two links to every home (e. g. one telephone and one cable 
operator)? ' 14 Extending the question further, it may be asked if it is reasonable with 
competition to expect a few physical connections to each or most homes by rival 
telecom operators? To answer the first, there is evidence that this is possible at least 
for most homes. (In North America telephone and cable connection is evident. ) In 
the EC, cable operators are developing networks to provide an alternative 
competitor to the TOs. The answer to the second question is less certain and perhaps 
less than practical. To encourage competition and to encourage universal service 
through the private sector, it would then be necessary for firms to have access to 
networks. 
5.4 Network Competition 
The deadline of 1998 is as important to telecommunications policy as 1992 was to 
the open internal EC market policy. The year 1998 is when full liberalisation of voice 
telephony is due to occur. ' 15 A communication to the Council reviewing the 
situation of the telecommunications industry voiced the opinion that further 
liberalisation would have a positive effect on growth, efficiency, tariffs, universal 
service and regional cohesion. It would also increase investment and competition in 
telecommunications and its infrastructure. t16 
The decision to liberalise voice telephony, previously excluded from provisions and 
legislation for opening up the EC telecommunications market, was made in 1993 and 
to be in effect by 1998.1" This is an important advancement for a telecom 
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competitive system, because voice telephony was a reserved monopoly for TOs 
which amounted to 80-90% of the TOs service-based income. "8 This proportion of 
revenue and (former) monopolistic situation adds to the importance of infrastructure 
access. This market increases the number of services that can be operated 
independently. As Mosteshar observed: 
"[T]he provision of services, unlike the provision of telecommunications 
network infrastructures, does not require the physical presence of the 
provider in the geographical area where the services are provided. In the 
context of the Community, the possibility of providing services between 
Member States is a significant element in the creation of a common market in 
such services. ""9 
Again, this separation enables the provision of the network infrastructure to be 
distinctive from the provision of telecommunications service. "0 
Nevertheless, what is required (at least in the initial years of telecommunications 
competition) is an infrastructure-means to deliver competing services. The EC 
authorities recognised access to existing TO networks was important to fulfil this 
need. Consequently, the Open Network Provision (ONP) 121 was created and in a 
Commission's Communication 122 it was stated: 
"In order to allow timely input to the Community-wide definition of fair 
access and usage conditions, it is suggested to concentrate on those issues 
most critical to providers of competitive services and a competitive market 
environment and to work accordingly to a stringent time schedule ...... 
123 
A product of this was Council Directive 90/387/EEC on the Establishment of the 
Internal Market for Telecommunications Services through the Implementation of 
Open Network Provision, in which it was stated: 
"This Directive concerns the harmonisation of conditions for open and 
efficient means to and use of public telecommunications networks and, where 
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applicable, public telecommunications services. 11124 
"The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are designed to facilitate the 
provision of services using public telecommunications networks and/or public 
telecommunications services, within and between Member States, and in 
particular the provision of services by companies, firms or natural persons 
established in a member State other than that of the company, firm or natural 
person for whom the services are intended. ""' 
The purpose of this Directive is to harmonise an important part of the 
telecommunications market that could deter, obstruct or otherwise affect 
competition. It also is a means to remove an important market and arguably political 
barriers to an open internal EC common market. Originally ONP-States did not 
allow any individual restrictions except those which were derived from special or 
exclusive rights. '26 This is an important move towards full liberalisation for, despite 
some accepted restrictions including network security, network integrity, service 
interoperability and data protection'. ' it aims to fulfil the principles of transparency, 
equal access and non-discrimination. While voice telephony is among the ONP's 
programme, it is permitted as a 'reserved service' only if it meets all of the four 
criteria: that it is provided on a commercial basis, provided to the public, provided 
from and to public switched network terminal points, and the switching of voice in 
real time. 128 One observer interpreted: 
"The restriction 'to the public' implies that private networks based on leased 
lines may also be used for voice telephony. " 129 
The importance of the ONP Directive (and subsequent amendments)"' is its basic 
principles and essential requirements for achieving harmonisation in open access and 
use of the public telecommunications network. However, the 1996 amendment to 
90/388/EEC, (Directive 96/19/EC), is a further step towards full liberalisation. It 
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removes the exemptions allowed for voice telephony under the original Directive. It 
states: 
"In order to allow telecommunications organisations to complete their 
preparation for competition and in particular to pursue the necessary 
rebalancing of tariffs, member States may continue the current special and 
exclusive rights regarding the provision of voice telephony until 1 January 
1998. i13' 
This Directive is also important towards eliminating restrictions on the establishment 
of network infrastructure. In July 1996 all alternative infrastructures, for example 
telecommunications networks operated by water, energy and railway companies 
were liberalised for commercial telecommunications services. 132 This provides for 
established telecommunications lines that were previously "in-house" 133 systems (or 
infrastructures to which telecommunications lines could used) to become immediate 
competitors to TOs or traditional telecommunications infrastructures. The question 
which remains asks whether these alternative fixed-wire (et al) providers will target 
just the corporate consumer for the large revenues or will domestic, households 
benefit as well? Secondly, newer and other potential alternatives such as radio-based, 
mobile/cellular communications, and even satellite communications (see below) and 
private networks raise similar questions. This returns attention to the topic about 
universal service and the relevant EC principles. 
5.4.1 Entry Barriers 
Entry-ability into markets is important if competition is to flourish. Similarly, exit- 
ability is also important. Therefore barriers to entry and exit can be a cause for 
concern. In relation to exit barriers, Whish explained: 
"Barriers to exit are significant when considering market-power. A customer 
of a powerful supplier will be more exploitable where it is difficult for him to 
leave the market on which he operates, for example because he owns assets 
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that are not easily adapted to other uses. In perfectly competitive markets, 
resources can move freely from one part of the economy to another. "34 
The ability to enter telecommunications markets is, at least in the primary stages of 
liberalisation if not in the long-term, important if competition is to develop. This 
ability to enter may be hindered or obstructed to various degrees by 'barriers to 
entry'. Barriers to entry are important in so far as defining market strategies for those 
firms already in the market. Barriers may be innocent or strategic. 'Innocent' barriers 
may be understood as those not created as obstacles to new entrants by incumbent 
market-players. 'Strategic' barriers may be defined as barriers created by the 
incumbent to obstruct potential rivals. 135 
Traditionally a barrier to entry in telecommunications has been government 
intervention or restrictions on the existence of market operators. Even in instances of 
market liberalisation, government controlled barriers could be and have continued. 
For example, when competition was introduced in the UK telecom market, it was 
only Mercury that was allowed to compete with the traditional incumbent British 
Telecom. Continuing examples of entry barriers in a now more liberalised and 
competitive UK market which serve as examples for other States as well include 
licensing, common connection technology, and price control for residential tariffs. 
Market structure theorists have defined four main 'natural' barriers to entry. These 
include: absolute cost advantages by those already in the marketplace, economies of 
scale, product differentiation advantages by existing players, and the total capital 
cost for establishing a position of a minimum optimal size. "' 
All four may be said to be relevant to telecommunications. The latter is of interest as 
it may preclude many players from entering the telecom market simply because of 
the need to establish an infrastructure, also known as a network. Electricity, canal, 
gas and water firms that effectively have an existing network may be attracted to 
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entering the telecommunications market or form alliances or partnerships with firms 
which already have telecom experience. 13' Market entry has also attracted and 
created alliances between existing telecom firms especially between firms of different 
States. However do such alliances actually increase competition? The benefits of a 
'seamless', 'one-stop-shopping' alliance may be debated, and thus economic benefits 
and efficiency may arguably be gained. It does not necessarily mean the market is 
competitive. It also does not mean two competing alliances is proper competition. 
Without further arguing the competitiveness of duopolies and oligopolies, it is of 
greater interest to examine the barriers of entry that may preclude other potential 
rivals from challenging duopolies and oligopolies. 
One legal observer stated the general position of economists about barriers to entry. 
He claimed "[m]any economists argue that entry barriers only exist in carefully 
defined. situations. For example, advertising and product differentiation can 
encourage entry or deter entry depending on the exact situation of the market. " 138 
A critique of the difference between the tangible and the intangible (generally 
economic-related) barriers is noteworthy. Whish stated: 
"Obviously legal provisions such as licensing laws and intellectual property 
rights conferring a legal monopoly act as barriers to entry; so might the 
advantage of scale and anti-competitive practices designed to deter new 
entrants to the market. After this consensus tends to break down. Some 
would regard the superior efficiency of a dominant firm, its technological 
know-how, the cost of advertising, product differentiation and the difficulty 
of gaining access to risk capital as barriers. Much of this has been 
questioned. In particular it has been suggested that a barrier to entry means 'a 
cost ... which must 
be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is 
not borne by firms already in the industry. ""' 
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Turnbull claimed that: 
"[T]here is now general agreement that entry barriers result from asymmetry. 
This is very important in the field of strategic entry deterrence.... 
Considerations of entry deterrence require precise and careful analysis as 
they rely on various conditions. The problem.. . 
is that there is considerable 
difficulty in distinguishing desirable competition from strategic 
behaviour. '40 
In telecommunications infrastructure (i. e. network) access is essential for any market 
entry. Already the option of alliances with other telecom firms of networks of a 
different type and nature has been voiced. Another alternative is to create a new 
system that is less reliant on the traditional fixed-wire access. Cellular mobile phones 
are one potential but debatable competitor. They nevertheless, have been dismissed 
as a true competitor for mass-communication until at least sometime after the turn of 
the century. l4' Similar technology (i. e. radio-based) is under development to directly 
challenge fixed-wire/cable connections through the aid of antenna and dishes for 
radio-telephone exchange. 142 Nevertheless, the importance of network access as: 1) 
a means of establishing competition and 2) to successfully provide the 
communication-product has not been eliminated. 
Market access to something common like a network is in itself a paradox; 
competition yet co-operation. Parallels to shared network access include railway 
infrastructure and more recently in the UK water, gas and electricity. In some 
industries it is. arguably easier than in others to establish competing networks. 
Telecommunications may be easier than rail or gas, but it does not entirely preclude 
the importance of network access thus far. 
The type and extent of network access determines the shape and success of 
competition. An argument about the type of competitive system can emerge from 
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this debate. If, on the one hand, a greater, more open and more pure competition 
was encouraged whereby any firm can access the network, would this be beneficial? 
On the other hand, if the market 'naturally' excludes the smaller and less efficient 
firms would this lead to greater economic and technological efficiency? This debate 
leads to the more general discussion about the EC's approach to competition. Korah 
has been critical of the EC's policy of generally protecting smaller and less-efficient 
firms at the expense of the larger and more efficient. Korah stated: 
"My fear is that competition rules are not being used to enable efficient firms 
to expand at the expense of the less efficient, but to protect smaller and 
medium sized firms at the expense of efficient or larger firms. I am concerned 
that the interests of consumers, and the economy as a whole in the 
encouragement of efficiency by firms of any size is being subordinated to the 
interests of smaller traders. " 43 
Just as big does not necessarily mean bad, neither does small necessarily mean 
inefficient, and given access to networks this could be possible. There seems to be an 
assumption that it is necessary to be large in order to be efficient and successful in 
telecommunications. Perhaps, given the circumstances this is true. Other 
circumstances however, might dispel such arguments and the opinion that only a few 
firms will dominate global telecoms could be challenged. This ideal depends upon the 
conditions and regulation of the market by competition authorities. It also depends 
on the political objectives of authorities to create national-champions to compete 
with other national names. 
5.4.2 Essential Access and Bottlenecks 
The concept of 'essential access' is interesting since it is one which contradicts the 
ultimate purpose for its existence. Essential access is a concept which counters basic 
competition law. The law generally tends to object in principle to competitors co- 
operating. Glasl explained: 
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"Market access for all competitors on equal terms is a controversial issue. In 
EC competition law and policy, third party access to essential facilities is of 
increasing interest and importance. ""' 
Glasl noted that the idea of third party access has usually fallen under the category of 
abuse of a dominant position. The concept of essential facilities has been applied 
relatively recently to the EC competition authorities' judgements. Although it has 
indirectly been used, specific reference is more recent. 14' The situation has been 
explained under EC law. It is when one competitor owns a facility and access to it is 
essential for other competitors to conduct business. The circumstances for such an 
occasion is when it is not expected for the other competitors to provide their own 
facility at which point the owner of the facility is obliged to provide access to it. 146 
"This principle must be treated with caution, because the law normally allows 
a company to retain, for its own exclusive use, all advantages that it has 
legitimately acquired. " 147 
The owner can make it difficult for competitors to compete by offering similar goods 
or service at improved offers. However: 
"[T]he principle that companies in dominant positions have a 
nondiscriminatory basis is one of great and increasing importance in 
telecommunications... and many other industries. ""' 
These industries whereby essential access is of increasing importance tend to share a 
common element. Prior to liberalisation they were monopoly powers. Although, in 
the instance of EC states (but not exclusively) the traditional telecommunications 
operator had monopoly powers from government authority, such powers can be 
imposed on firms simply because of physical and/or technical circumstances. 149 In 
such cases the term 'bottleneck' is used. A railway system may be used for imagery 
purposes. A multitude of tracks meets at a single point such as at a station. The 
station is necessary for the collection and exchange of customers. Conveniently this 
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image was an actual problem and deemed a classic case of the bottleneck problem. In 
the American case United States v Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis 
(1912), it was deemed impractical for the different rail companies to have their own 
-terminal facilities. In this case a group of railway firms jointly constructed and owned 
a terminal. The Supreme Court ruled (via the rule of reason) that this was not illegal, 
however the monopoly power legitimately acquired could not be used oppressively. 
(The group would allow others to join if the members agreed unanimously and the 
new members paid a fee). 15° Areeda wrote with regard to multi-company 
(American) cases: 
"(1)whenever competitors jointly create a useful facility, (2)that is essential 
to the competitive vitality of rivals, (3)and (perhaps) essential to the 
competitive vitality of the market, (4)and the admission of rivals is consistent 
with the legitimate purposes of the venture, then (5)the collaborators must 
admit rivals on relatively equal terms. " 151 
The citation was originally made in reference to the US case Associated Press v 
United States 152 whereby 1,200 newspapers formed Associated Press (AP) for news 
access among its members. Similarly its members could block new members 
(competitors). The Supreme Court ruled that the blocking of competitors did violate 
the Sherman Act but it did not state all should be allowed to enter the association. 151 
The Court did object to the agreement that no member will act as a "wholesaler" of 
news or sell to non-members. Sullivan stated: 
"In holding this arrangement invalid, the Court stated the '[t]he Sherman Act 
was specifically intended to prohibit independent business from becoming 
"associates" in a common plan which is bound to reduce competitors' 
opportunity to buy or sell... "' 154 
Sullivan found the problem with Associated Press is the risk that it may be 
interpreted as joint ventures not being permitted to exclude others from the 
venture. '" The difference between joint ventures and those instances of essential 
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access centre more around the notion of 'public utility, as one judge compared in 
Associated Press. Thus an understanding of greater suitability may regard essential 
access as comparable to a public utility where; "... a business infused with the public 
interest that was required to serve all... " 56 
The EC is not without cases, 157 but where telecommunications is concerned Temple 
Lang summarised: 
"The cases on telecommunications show that, in general, a company in a 
dominant position in one market may not use its power to extend its 
dominance or monopoly into other markets. This principle is relevant to, but 
not to be confused with, the principle that dominant companies must make 
facilities available when this is essential to enable competitors to 
compete. "58 
These dominant companies have been the (former, monopolistic) Public 
Telecommunications Operators. The Telecommunications Guidelines 159 refers to 
refusals by these national telecommunications operators to provide services, namely 
network and leased circuits to third parties on an equal basis to all users. "' The 
Telecommunications Service Directive16' defined 'telecommunications organisations' 
as: 
".. public or private bodies, and the subsidiaries they control, to which a 
member-State grants special or exclusive rights for the provision of a public 
telecommunications network and, when applicable, telecommunication 
services... "162 
Based on this definition, it may be interpreted that references to TOs by the 
Commission in Directives (concerning telecommunications) apply to those that have 
special 'monopolistic' rights. This begs the question; what happens if and when the 
TO is privatised (if previously public) and the exclusive or special rights are 
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removed? The Telecommunication Guidelines acknowledge the market changes, 
stating: 
"New private supplier have penetrated the market with more and 
transnational value-added service and equipment. ""' 
The Guidelines states that effective competition, application of EC competition laws 
and the duties of telecommunications administrations of States are important in the 
role of a competitive telecoms market. The Commission has also emphasised its 
concern that States need to avoid re-erecting market barriers. 164 The dual policy, 
however important in the developing stages of a modern and competitive 
telecommunications industry and information-based society, contains conflicting and 
potentially contentious elements as far as antitrust enforcement is concerned. While 
EC policy is for an EC-wide interconnection of networks (or pan-European 
telecommunications services), the emphasis of The Guidelines and related Directives 
(e. g. on Services 90/388/EEC and Equipment 88/301/EEC) is on public or private 
firms which have exclusive or special rights. 16' The Directives are an effort to make 
these privileged firms subject to competition. Again, the question regarding other 
network firms without exclusive rights is raised. What rights if any, or should there 
be rights for other firms to have 'essential access' especially where more than one 
network exists? One of the features of contemporary industries involving technology 
is the element of co-operation and strategic alliances. 166 The Guidelines state: 
"Co-operation between TOs and other operators is increasing in 
telecommunications services.... The Commission recognises that it may have 
beneficial effects. " 167 
The Commission acknowledges that co-operation may be restrictive as well, 168 and 
TOs and co-operative arrangements are subject to EC competition law. In 
recognising TOs hold either individually or collectively a dominant position there is 
the risk of exploitation of its position and special rights. Similarly there is recognition 
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of the potential dominance of markets where TOs do not have special or exclusive 
rights. Important to the question regarding non-exclusive right-holding TOs with a 
dominant position, The Guidelines stated: 
"Further to the liberalisation of services, undertakings other than the TOs 
may increasingly extend their power to acquire dominant positions in non- 
reserved markets. They may already hold such a position in some service 
markets which had not been reserved. When they take advantage of their 
dominant position to restrict competition and to extend their power. Article 
86 may also apply to them. 169 
The lack of detailed reference by The Guidelines to the network suggests, 1) a 
culture of some state control over the state-wide network. This culture is supported 
by the reluctance of some States to give up their power and financial gain from 
telecommunications as discussed earlier. This reluctance is further supported by 
unprecedented use of Article 90 to liberalise telecommunications. Furthermore, this 
benefits the EC in constructing an EC-wide network. Although a nation-wide 
network is preserved and competition is allowed (by 1998 at the latest for most EC 
states). 170 The potential problem(s) of access to a network where special rights may 
not exist, is not addressed. The United Kingdom is an interesting example of a state 
within the EC where competition is advanced relative to other EC states. The US is 
also interesting with regard to its approach to essential access in 
telecommunications. 
Briefly, the position in the UK has been described as different from the US and the 
EC. An official at British Telecom explained the situation of telecommunications in 
the UK. 
"The position is rather different in the UK at the present time since 
technology has moved ahead and competition has been allowed for the 
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provision of local loop facilities. A number of companies provide local 
telecommunication services. Over 150 companies have been granted licences 
to operate as public operators including AT&T. In the UK, in particular, not 
only is the construction of local loop facilities economically feasible but 
companies other than BT take advantage of the economies of scale and scope 
which follow from combining television and telephony in cable television 
systems.... In addition to wire-line competition, local radio-links may be used 
to provide access in the local loop. Finally, Mercury is entitled and does 
provide its own networks and service to residential and small business 
customers in the local loop, either in its own right or via 
interconnection. " 171 
By contrast, Cowen points to the US market where in 1988 MCI wanted access to 
AT&T's network. In MCI v AT&T 172 the Court found AT&T's refusal to connect 
MCI to local distribution facilities to be unlawful on the basis of the 'essential facility' 
principle. It was found that it was not economically feasible for MCI to duplicate the 
local distribution facilities. Furthermore, regulatory approval would also be 
unobtainable. 173 
Cowen argued: 
"[I)f a concept of essential facility were adopted in the UK or in a market 
where alternatives exist or feasibly could exist, it would call into question the 
economic rationale for de-regulation of that part of the market. To put it 
another way, if access to the local loop could be the essential facility, 
ultimately there would inevitably be a natural monopoly into which no 
economically rational entity would enter. Conversely, if competitive entry 
into the local loop has occurred, good prima facie evidence exists that there 
is no such thing as an essential facility vis-ä-vis the local loop. 074 
Although this opinion is theoretically sound, questions of practicality and reality 
263 
remain. Such questions also exist despite the earlier cited argument of technological 
developments and the number on paper of at least 150 companies licensed to operate 
as public operators in the UK. These theoretically provide for persuasive arguments 
for developments towards a competitive market, but what exists in practice can be 
sufficiently different from the impression on paper. First of all the incumbent in the 
UK, BT, continues to dominate 95% of the residential market. 175 Secondly, the 150 
companies are not sufficiently and noticeably evident in the marketplace to 
demonstrate a 'competitive marketplace' in economic theory terms. Thirdly, to access 
some rivals (such as Mercury), it has been the case in many parts of the UK that the 
user or consumer still had to have access to BT's network. 17' Fourthly, is it realistic 
to expect 150 rival networks and such a choice of companies for consumers? What 
has happened thusfar are two practices: 1) a local franchise for telecom firms or 
alliances; "' 2) alliances among a few firms to establish a company (e. g. Bell 
Cablemedia). Much of the actual market involvement is illustrated in an OFTEL 
publication. Regarding area, size of company and specialisation, OFTEL stated: 
"The area in which a telecoms company provides service will vary between 
companies. Some companies operate nationally and internationally, while 
others in specific areas within the UK. " .... 
"The telecoms companies... vary widely in size, from those who have several 
million customers and telephone lines, to those. .. with several thousand 
customers and telephone lines. " .... 
"The types of customer served by telecoms companies will differ. Some will 
target and serve mainly single line customers, often residential, while others 
will choose to serve mainly multiple line customers who will usually be 
businesses. Others may serve both types of customers. 078 
This example of the UK is beneficial as a model for the EC in so far as the questions 
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raised. After 1998 when competition is officially due to be in existence across most 
of the EC, are the number of firms operating misleading? At a minimum, the EC 
market will have ten - one for every state that has not derogated. However, the 
question then is; how many operate in other member-states? The UK already has 
served as an example. Should the question then be extended to how many serve 
areas within the Member State in order to assess the true nature of the competitive 
market? 
The Telecommunications (Antitrust) Guidelines defines a geographical market as the 
area; "... where undertakings enter into competition with each other" and "where the 
objective conditions of competition applying to the product or service in question are 
similar for all traders. " 179 At present national markets are still distinct geographical 
markets for related services and products. 180 The actual number of competitors 
serving areas within the Members States should be considered as the actual 
determinant of choice for the consumer. Then the definition of the consumer needs 
to be broken down into residential and business. This is not to suggest that this is not 
done, but such explanations may then be used in returning to the question of 
essential access/facility. The results may also question the Idealist perception of the 
marketplace. A closer examination of the geographical market (perhaps in relation to 
the product) may lead to a more accurate policing of the competitive system for the 
consumer. Nevertheless, it may also shape the definition of a dominant company. 
This determines essential access; "the principle that a dominant company has... a duty 
to supply, if a refusal will cause a significant effect on competition. "18! 
However: 
"EC case law does not suggest that a refusal to supply by a dominant 
enterprise is always regarded as having an effect on competition. Such a 
strict view would be incorrect. ... However, if the consequence of a refusal 
by 
a dominant enterprise to supply is that all or most of its competitors are 
excluded from the market, only strong business reasons can justify the 
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refusal.... The difficult and developing principle of essential facilities concerns 
companies that have a dominant position in one market, usually an upstream 
market, and that also provide goods or services in a downstream 
market. " 182 
Cowen stated: 
"From the Commission's guidelines on the application of competition rules to 
the telecommunications sector, it appears that the Commission may wish to 
take narrow market definitions in order to apply Article 86 to the 
telecommunications industry. ""' 
With reference to International Business Machines Corp. v Commission184 the 
Commission stated: 
"Producers of equipment or supplier of services are dependent on proprietary 
standards to ensure the interconnectivity of their computer resources. An 
undertaking which owns a dominant network architecture may abuse its 
dominant position by refusing to provide the necessary information for the 
interconnection of other architecture resources to its architecture 
products. " 181 
The important point about dominant network architecture is its lack of a definition 
by the Commission. Cowen interpreted the Commission's approach as one which is 
likely to take a narrow and restrictive understanding of the term. 186 John Temple 
Lang regarded essential facility as a concept that is more important to EC law than 
US law. 187 He stated: 
"Essential facility cases involve basic principles such as the obligation to 
contract in some circumstances and the obligation not to discriminate. ""' 
Other reasons for its importance (especially since the EC is a less integrated 
economy than the US) include: 1) more dominant positions are said to exist in 
'substantial' parts of the European Community than in the United States; 2) state- 
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owned firms in the EC are more-likely to discriminate and be protectionist; 3) 
traditional absence of competition laws until more recently in EC states; 4) and the 
liberalisation of important sectors. 18' 
However, as Temple Lang stated, essential access/facilities is an important analytical 
tool and effectively an extension to the use of Article 90 (EEC). 190 It is a mechanism 
with which to impose competition on traditional industries, and one with which to 
liberalise telecommunications. On the basis of TOs given special or exclusive rights, 
the EC it would seem has effectively legislated an essential facility code specifically 
in the Telecommunications Guidelines. With regard to the rise of private networks 
formed through strategic alliances, the question of essential access and Article 90 
remain of interest. The use of Article 86 to prevent the abuse of a dominant position 
will certainly also be important. '" 
The economic-efficiency school of thought (e. g. the Chicago School theory in the 
United States) on occasion appears one-sided: That is to suggest that where the 
market-place is theoretically competitive, the consumer is the ultimate beneficiary of 
the resulting efficiency. This may be suited to a marketplace of choice, but a question 
that should be asked is, how much actual choice do consumers have regarding 
telecommunications. On the one hand there is the issue of the actual number of 
players in the market. On the other hand there is the concern about the actual 
accessibility of that number of firms in order that competition is more than simply 
seen to exist. Yet, further questions may be raised specifically regarding the 
consumer's actual role in the competitive system. A basic economic competition 
theory states, the consumer has choice. In telecommunications, while choice may 
become more prevalent than before, is the active involvement of the consumer 
limited once a choice has been made? 
Paradoxically the maintenance of a competitive market may depend upon regulatory 
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intervention since such a market may tend naturally to monopoly. Traditionally in 
many systems such as in North America and Europe, the consumer pays not only for 
use but for connection. This latter payment may involve initial connection fee upon 
subscribing to the telecom firm, and also a monthly (or quarterly) line-rental fee. This 
ties the consumer to the telecom firm. Indeed, where another telecom firm exists in 
the area, the consumer may change firms, but this involves disconnecting with the 
first firm, paying a new connection fee and a new subscription fee with the new firm. 
How often is a consumer likely to change? Different needs of different market places 
could begin to show flaws if a standard theory is broadly applied. Compared with 
goods and services, it is less active than for example entering a shop and changing 
brands of a type of cereal, baked-beans, soft-drink and so on because of price, taste, 
incentive or other reason. The switching of telecom firms is costly, bureaucratic and 
inconvenient. On the other hand, the inconvenience may be overcome with time as 
number-portability becomes more common. However, as the concept of the 
necessity of a monopolistic telecommunications operator for the purpose of universal 
service provision becomes discredited this 'tying' of the customer perhaps could be 
questioned. 
5.4.3 Predation 
Predation in competition (antitrust) law may be understood in two ways. The first is 
generally the act that one undertaking pursues in eliminating a rival undertaking. 
More specifically competition law (i. e. EC law) prohibits a dominant undertaking 
eliminating a rival to strengthen its own position: It is the abuse of the position of 
dominance that is the concern (see Article 86). This abuse leads to the second means 
of understanding predation. This understanding is based on economics through 
pricing - hence the term Predatory Pricing'. Basically this means using pricing tactics 
to eliminate a competitor. In order to do so without suffering substantial and/or 
long-term damage, the predator would have to hold a dominant position over the 
other. Sharpe stated: 
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"It has never been an objective of the UK, US or EEC anti-trust policy to 
condemn monopoly per se or necessarily to prevent the creation of 
monopoly.... ""' 
However: 
"The underlying concept of predation is that there are limitations to the 
manner in which competition should be conducted. Certain types of 
behaviour will almost universally be condemned ... even if only occasionally 
called upon to play it. The action if one rival serves to increase the costs of 
another rival without any corresponding overall gain in efficiency. " 193 
The problem has been in defining the criminal act. As Sharpe further explained: 
"[C]onduct which falls short of the obviously criminal or which does not fit 
into the conventional tort pigeon-hole is notoriously difficult to evaluate and 
English judges at least have strongly resisted taking responsibility for 
establishing limits on competitive behaviour.... The EEC law is only slowly 
embracing predation within the terms of Article 86. "194 
The American antitrust debate has been more involving than the other two systems 
cited, but the debate is also hampered by divisions in opinion about predation. "' 
One of the influential writers, Posner, did not dwell on the significance of predatory 
power in his often cited work Economic Analysis of Law. Instead it was effectively 
dismissed. Posner wrote: 
"Confirmed instances of predatory price discrimination were rare even before 
the practice was clearly illegal. The reason is that the practice is very costly 
to the predator. He incurs a present and substantial loss for gains that are not 
only deferred, but that may be temporary since once the existing competitors 
are driven out of the market and a monopoly price is established new 
competitors will be attracted to the market by that price; the tactic may have 
to be repeated. Ordinarily it is cheaper to buy off a competitor than to 
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destroy him by selling below cost. i1196 
An EC legal case suggests that predatory price does exist. Although Posner's 
economic viability argument is not overtly questioned, the suggestion that such an 
act is not intentional indicates an argument to the contrary of Posner's opinion. In 
Elopak Italia Srl v Tetra Pak (No. 2) the European Commission studied the Italian 
food and drinks carton market and concluded the existence of predatory pricing. The 
Commission found it; 
"... difficult to conceive how behaviour so opposed to the logic of economic 
profitability on the part of an extremely efficient multinational company can 
possibly be the result of a simple management error. i197 
However the policy to date for the EC suggests such behaviour falls foul of Article 
86 and dominant positions, instead of any other specific approach to predatory 
pricing. While this case is a step in further recognising and accepting the existence of 
such a problem, it is AKZO Chemis BV v Commission1" which first began a 
developed consideration of predatory pricing under EC law. In this case the firm 
AKZO was accused of violating Article 86 through abusive behaviour towards a 
smaller competitor. The Commission considered three questions with regard to the 
abuse of a dominant position. The first was to determine if AKZO held a dominant 
position under Article 86. Secondly, did AKZO's behaviour constitute an abuse of 
this position. Thirdly, was there an effect on trade between Member States. AKZO 
had been accused of threatening its smaller rival ECS of aggressive action unless 
ECS withdrew from a particular market. After ECS ignored the threats AKZO 
targeted ECS's customers in other shared markets and offered them prices which 
were both below previous prices and average total cost. This was accomplished 
through cross-subsidisation. Through the Hoffman-La Roche199 test the Commission 
found the first and third questions in the affirmative. The second question was 
considered in greater detail. It considered the position of unfair prices. By virtue of 
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Article 86, the ECJ stated a firm that strengthens its dominant position, "... by issuing 
methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the basis 
of quality" is prohibited behaviour. 200 Therefore: 
"From that point of view... not all competition by means of price can be 
regarded as legitimate. 11201 
The ECJ's explanation of such a pricing position was an important examination of 
predatory-pricing. The ECJ stated: 
"Prices below average variable costs (that is to say, those which vary 
depending on the quantities produced) by means of which a dominant 
undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating 
competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking 
advantage of its monopolistic position, since each sale generates a loss, 
namely total amount of the fixed costs (that is to say, those which remain 
constant regardless of the quantities produced) and, at least, part of the 
variable costs relating to the unit produced. 002 
"Moreover, prices below average total costs, that is to say, fixed costs plus 
variable costs but above average variable costs, must be regarded as abusive 
if they are determined as part of a plan for eliminating a competitor. Such 
prices can drive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient 
as the dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial 
resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged against 
them. "203 
This is the ECYs two-tiered test to determine the existence of predatory pricing. If 
the first test of price below average variable cost failed then the second test of price 
above average variable cost but lower than the sum of average total cost is used. If 
found to be so, it is regarded as abusive behaviour. However the latter is only 
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abusive if the intention to eliminate competitors is demonstrated. This would 
normally be accomplished through evidence in company documents, as was the case 
in AKZO's memos. It was also proved through other practical evidence of AKZO's 
behaviour such as its approaches and offers to ECS's customers. 204 
While there may be a strong argument against the existence of predatory pricing or 
simply that such acts are rare, it may also be claimed as Craig and De Burca stated: 
"The economic reality is much less certain. In order for predation to be a 
successful and rational strategy the future flows of profits has to exceed the 
present losses incurred as a result of the drop in price. This is not 
"Z theoretically impossible.... Os 
Craig and De Burca also stated predation "is... a war of attrition, with the outcome to 
be determined by the combatants' relative losses and reserves.... "206 
On the one hand future entrants could be deterred, while on the other they may be 
attracted to enter the market because of such profits the predator has achieved. But 
there is a risk that such an economic argument as Posner proposed, is too wide, too 
broad-sweeping and a generalisation which is not always applicable to all markets or 
industries, all of the time. Soames and Ryan made an important observation. 
"Although predatory pricing is notoriously difficult to define satisfactorily, it 
appears to be a very real threat to the process of liberalising the Community's 
air transportation market. Indeed, the risk of dominant airlines considering 
that predatory pricing is a rational strategy to adopt has escalated greatly in 
recent years due to the increase in competition in the provision of air 
transportation services on Community routes resulting from the liberalisation 
process.... The threat is aggravated by the fact that the Community's 
jurisprudence on the subject is still in the formative stage, and has not yet, in 
the field of transportation, been the subject of any decided cases on the part 
of the Commission. and has been considered in only a few cases in other areas 
272 
of economic activity. 007 
Soames and Ryan's comment is applicable to the telecommunications industry as 
well. Similarly a statement for the EC Commission's Directorate General for 
Competition (DGIV) referring to the airline industry is also suitable for use in 
discussion about telecoms liberalisation and competition. It stated: 
"Consideration of predatory behaviour needs to take account of the 
regulatory framework of the industry under consideration, and the structure 
of the industry. In an industry where entry is strictly regulated by government 
agencies, and where as a consequence existing firms face protection from 
new entrants, there is no need for predatory actions. As regulations in such 
industries are liberated, and entry becomes easier, so the scope for predatory 
action may increase: this is course of particular relevance now that European 
aviation is progressively being liberalised. i208 
Substitute 'aviation' for telecommunications and the quotation becomes applicable to 
a similar problem in another industry. Where there was once a state-owned or 
protected telecom firm, this firm is now under threat by new entrants (at least after 
1998 for most EC states, with some exceptions such as Spain where liberalisation 
has been allowed to be delayed until after the turn of the century). Even in the more 
liberalised states, including those outside the EC, the larger firms such as the UK's 
BT or America's AT&T are under threat by the increasing number of entrants into 
'their' markets. BT faces competition from more than just Cable & Wireless 
(formerly Mercury), as with many other firms (e. g. EC incumbent operators) after 
1998. AT&T is under threat by, among others, the local Bell telephone companies, 
Sprint and also MCI (which had allied itself with the UK [i. e. EC] firm BT but has 
since become closer to WorldCom), as they are now allowed to enter the long- 
distance market (see Telecommunications Act 1996, FCC). A distinction though 
must be recognised between 'predatory pricing' and 'competitive pricing'. The US 
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Supreme Court stated: 
"Cutting prices in order to increase business is the very essence of 
competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases... are especially costly 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. 
We must be concerned lest a rule of precedent that authorises a search for a 
particular type of undesirable pricing behaviour end up by discouraging 
legitimate price competition. "209 
A search then for actual predation risks being "an elusive one". 210 Yet, historically 
speaking, predatory behaviour in telecommunications is not new. The Southern Bell 
Telephone Company used such tactics between 1894-1912211 However the 
telecommunications market, like aviation, is one which may warrant special and 
closer attention than (for wont of a better term), the common, general competitive 
system or marketplace. One criticism of the American Chicago School-influenced 
approach stated: 
"The Courts have relied too heavily on the idea that predation is rare and 
even more rarely successful. This judgement is supported by neither theory 
nor fact. Rather it is supported by some rather ad hoc theorising and a 
misreading of a number of important cases and instances of strategic 
behaviour. The courts' reluctance to find predation is understandable. It is 
difficult, many would say impossible, to distinguish predation from 
competition. "212 
Zerbe and Mumford state the route to take with regard to predatory pricing is to 
strike a right balance. They explained it is a question of getting the balance right, and 
this is largely an empirical and factual question. "Empirical questions require 
empirical answers and, despite the case law on the subject, there is as yet insufficient 
empirical analysis to determine the right balance. i213 
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There is the potential for further opportunity for the Commission and the ECJ to 
consider and possibly further develop a suitable approach to predation in 
telecommunications. This may not be easy as one study focusing on the American 
local cable market suggested. Hazlett found that it is still uncertain as to what 
antitrust remedy for predatory pricing should be. 214 The proximity of predatory 
pricing and competitive conduct is, it seems, too close for significant distinctions. He 
stated: 
"It is a transient and most strategic dosage, in fact, of ultracompetitive 
behaviour. Pricing below marginal cost or raising rivals' costs in transparently 
ineffective ways (such as creating marketing confusions, delaying pole 
access, or paying sales premia for competitive area subscribers) are tell-tale 
clues of anti-competitive conduct, but remain difficult for courts to pinpoint 
and remedy. 015 
However, Hazlett did find that some markets prone to predation are not typical. This 
is especially the case where there is a market in which it Js the competitor who 
chooses the customer and not the customer choosing the competitor. 21' This is 
evident in the EC's AKZO case. Pertinent in particular to telecommunications is 
Hazlett's following observation: 
"[F]irms are geographically constrained to invest in sunk capital one potential 
consumer at a time. Furthermore, they must give advance notice to 
established market rivals as to when and where they will first emerge on the 
competitive frontier. And municipal franchises form entry barriers which 
gives incumbents confidence that short-run investments in predatory 
deterrence may well be recouped over a monopolistic long-run. There are 
plenty of opportunities for incumbents to engage in gamesmanship that will 
increase entrants' costs for more, proportionally and absolutely than their 
own. 017 
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In pursuit of anti-competitive predation -that which is destructive to the competitive 
process as a whole as opposed to conduct which is competitive- the ECJ or any 
other competition authority also needs to be wary of being used by one firm as a 
weapon against another. There is a risk that the legal process and regulators could be 
used to subvert competition. 218 
Kahai, Kaserman and Mayo observed: 
"Clearly, the ability of firms to employ the regulatory process to achieve 
strategic anticompetitive ends rests heavily on the inability of regulatory 
officials... to accurately assess both the legitimacy of both proponents' claims 
"2t9 and the competitive consequences of their own actions. 
Such problems continue to be with the traditional antitrust questions, namely; market 
definition, - entry conditions, market power and predation. 
220 From a predatory- 
pricing perspective, it has been stated that the possibility of such a problem depends 
largely upon restrictions (such as regulations) on pricing behaviour and control over 
profit-making. It also depends on some degree of market power, the absence of any 
great barriers to exit, and the existence of great barriers to entry. 
22' At least as 
equally as important though, is the 'fairness' in which predatory pricing behaviour is 
judged by the courts. Failure to do so risks both injustice and also the use and abuse 
of regulators and courts by one firm against a competitor. 
The AKZO case may not have been entirely accurately decided; or at least the 
predatory pricing argument was not as fully explored as it might have been. In 
establishing predatory intent, some observers argue the economic question 
considering AKZO's credible threat is also important. The Commission did not 
consider this222 Such consideration would assist in further establishing a difference 
between predatory pricing on its anti-competitive form and active competitive 
behaviour. Greater investigation into the plaintiffs or victim's cost (e. g. the company 
ECS in the AKZO case) is important in order to better identify predation. 
223 
i 
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Although predation is important for further anti-competitive consideration, there is 
another approach that should reduce its frequency or power. This approach is simply 
preserving free entry to the marketplace; a principle which has been a main objective 
for most antitrust policies. "' The focus of anti-predation should perhaps be targeted 
towards behaviour preventing, obstructing, or delaying entry, and this is of particular 
relevance to the liberalising telecommunications market. 
5.4.4 Tying 
Compared with the EC, the concept of tying in the US has diminished in 
importance, "' probably due to the rise until lately of the Chicago School and 
economic-efficiency theory. By contrast to the trend overseas, there is great concern 
about tying and other refusals to supply. 226 It was not until the 1985 case Hilti Gv 
Commission227 that the Commission condemned tying under Article 86.28 In this 
case Hilti had a patented nail cartridge and customers were to use its own nails for 
the cartridge. It was determined that this exploited customers and harmed 
competition. It was also an abuse of a dominant position. In IBM v Commission'29 
the computer firm practised memory bundling' and software bundling, and in effect 
was tying. It refused to supply software for use with non-IBM computers. It 
practised promoting new products before information about them was available. This 
created an artificial advantage for IBM and prevented competitors from modifying 
their products for IBM compatibility. Similar arguments from Hilti were used in 
Elopak Italia Srl v Tetra Pak (Tetra Pak II)230 Although in this case the products 
were a drinks machine and drinks cartons forming an integrated system. The 
principle was the same as in Hilti. The competitors downstream were intended to be 
excluded. The consumable market was separate, but in effect both consumers and 
competitors were being involved and excluded from the market. The practice of 
tying is condemned under Article 86(d) in EC law. 231 
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5.5 Alternative Providers and Alternative Markets 
5.5.1 Satellite Communications 
The satellite sector within telecommunications was described as relatively small, "but 
one with enormous potential for growth. ""' This opinion and interpretation was re- 
enforced by one journalist who stated: 
"For an industry with only one functioning company, the global satellite 
telecommunications business has some pretty fierce competition. Dozens of 
companies are spending billions of dollars to launch hundreds of satellites in 
an often confusing race to provide telecommunications services to people all 
around the world. 033 
The market potential according to one industry spokesman is understood through 
phone line availability and population comparisons. The managing director of 
Odyssey Telecommunications International Inc., claimed there are (globally) only 
200 million phone lines compared with a population of 5 billion. In financial terms, 
the market by the year 2004 is expected to be worth $12 billion, with customers 
ranging from remote parts of the world to wealthy people and corporations linking 
their offices around the globe and also fast Internet services. 234 
The EC's approach to this sector originated in a Green Paper in 1990.235 The 
deadline for an EC internal market was 1992. This in itself is interesting since 
satellites cannot physically be within the EC. Although technically amusing, this 
could be an interesting debate concerning international competition law. The 
objectives of this Green Paper (1990) are: 
1. the full liberalisation of the earth segment, including reception and transmission 
and reception-only terminals; 
2. free and non-discriminatory access to space segment capacity on an equitable 
basis; commercial freedom for space-segment providers; 
3. harmonisation measures for EC-wide services including mutual licence 
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recognition, type-approval procedures, frequency conditions, and co-operation 
for services with non-EC states. 236 
In keeping with EC principles, this Green Paper (1990) also states any additional 
regulatory measures should not introduce restrictions beyond specific satellite 
conditions, licensing schemes founded on objective facts proportionate to the 
objectives sought, they are transparent and non-discriminatory. Also, and in keeping 
with previous Directives and policy documents, this Green Paper (1990) seeks the 
separation of operational and regulatory functions concerning access and control of 
(in this specific example) the space segment. 237. Stehmann explained that the 
Commission through the Green Paper (1990) on satellite communications, 
"... hoped that Eutelsat will operate at arm's length from national operators. 
In order to avoid any distortion of competition the best solution is seen to be 
ensuring direct access by users to space capacity. Providers should market 
their capacity directly. ""' 
To achieve the latter, Stehmann suggested: 
"The distribution of capacity could then be by competitive bidding by all 
service providers instead of an arbitrary allocation through national 
operators. "239 
Whereas Eutelsat previously provided space capacity to the European Broadcasting 
Union, thus demonstrating direct leasing is possible, Eutelsat could develop a greater 
commercial approach by marketing space segment directly to service providers. 240 
The legislation that followed the Green Paper (1990) for satellites are generally 
similar to those which followed the 1987 Green Paper previously discussed. The 
legislation covered services and equipment (including Directive 93/97/EC), but 
importantly Directive 94/46/EC brings into context the relationship between satellite 
communications and (wired) telecommunications. This Directive amends 
88/301/EEC and 90/388/EEC. Directive 94/46/EC noted that some EC states had 
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already opened up some satellite communications services to competition, and 
licensing schemes were in operation. Nevertheless, it was noted within 94/46/EC: 
"[T]he granting of licence in some member States still does not follow 
objective, proportional and non-discriminatory criteria or, in the case of 
operators competing within the telecommunications organisations, is subject 
to technical restrictions such as a ban on connecting their equipment to the 
switched network operated by the telecommunications organisations. Other 
Member States have maintained the exclusive rights granted to the national 
public undertakings. X24' 
The Directive's purpose is to bring satellite earth stations within the established 
telecommunications legislation. Stehmann stated: 
"The satellite policy of the Commission appears to be a logical continuation 
of the approach applied to the terrestrial network. Liberalisation is 
concentrated on those parts which are essential for the provision of all non- 
voice services for which competition is envisaged. "242 
As Stehmann notes, the equal-access rules are to ensure Eutelsat signatories do not 
abuse their monopoly over the network when in competition with other service 
providers. 243 
"In this context the liberalisation of the earth segment cannot be regarded as 
a first step towards the and of the network monopoly. It is rather meant to be 
a necessary but exceptional device to promote the provision of non-voice 
services. However, it is a good example of the technology-driven retreat of 
network monopolies. "244 
The provision for exclusive rights concerning public voice-telephony will no doubt 
expire with the end of the same rights for (wired) telecommunications, if in keeping 
with unifying terrestrial-oriented and satellite-oriented legislation. 
245 The importance 
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of satellites is three-fold. Firstly, it is a potential competitor to the existing network 
and infrastructure. Secondly, it is an alternative for the mobile/cellular 
telecommunications land-based network. Thirdly, it is a complementary network to 
the terrestrial fixed-wire and/or mobile networks. This technology and its usage is in 
place and functioning, but it is the liberalisation and competition within the satellite 
communications industry which is of importance. Simultaneously, it is the 
competition between satellite, fixed wire and mobile networks which is also 
important. One question is, will the three networks actually become formidable 
competitors or largely complementary? The answer may He in breaking down the 
consumer market, distinguishing not only between commercial and private users, and 
travelling (i. e. globally or widely mobile) individuals and isolated populations and 
'static', non-isolated populations. 
Even so, how much choice will isolated populations have? These are rhetorical 
questions under the present context and brief, but none-the-less important factors for 
consideration. However, if there is competition within each (satellite, mobile, fix- 
wire) then the question becomes less important, except to say that competition 
between them will (according to economic theory) be favourable to the consumer. 
The foreseeable importance of satellite competition is with the anticipated growth of 
the satellite-phone market (or satellite personal communications services) and the 
convergence of communications and information services (TV, entertainment, data 
and the Internet), particularly as a global service. 
The EC has already begun to consider the satellite-phone market with the release of 
a Council Resolution at the end of 1993. Entitled: On the Introduction of Satellite 
Personal Communications in the Community (93/C 339/01), the resolution adds to 
the telecommunications policy developments from the 1987 Green Paper, the 1990 
Green Paper and the Directives pertaining to satellite equipment (93/97/EEC and 
91/263/EEC). The Resolution added to an earlier Communication by recognising: 
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"... the need for appropriate regulatory conditions allowing the development 
of new markets for satellite communications services and the need to 
encourage a competitive European space industry and promote its interests at 
[an] international level. 046 
That said, the Resolution expands on the new market and the international level of 
the market through recognising: 
"... the planned introduction of satellite personal communications networks 
and services on a global scale will play a role in the development of 
telecommunications services in the Community in general and in that of 
satellite and mobile services in particular, as well as in the development of the 
Community's space and telecommunications equipment and services 
industries 
.... 
i247 
The Resolution invites the development of policies pertaining to the development 
and trade in this sector, but also for the EC to collaborate in constructing 
competitive space and telecom-related industries to effectively participate in the 
global market. It also calls for international monitoring and co-operation with 
regulating bodies concerning standardisation, licences and frequencies, The Council 
Resolution stresses: 
"... the importance of developing a Community policy with regard to satellite 
personal communications that will build on existing policies regarding 
telecommunications, in particular satellite communications, and on future 
policy on mobile communications based on the Green Paper on the subject 
and if necessary, on regional development and trade policies in 
"248 general... 
As it has been shown, the policy of the EC appears to be one of evolution with 
sectors (such as the above one on satellites) adopting policies and Directives based 
on the 1987 Green Paper. At the (deemed) appropriate time these are amended to 
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adapt to the original equipment and service Directives (88/301/EEC and 
90/388/EEC). This approach is supported above. It is natural to adopt or combine 
satellite communications policies with those concerning mobile communications, 
forming an approach for satellite personal communications services. 
5.5.2 Mobile and Wireless Communications 
The changes in market structures, industry players and even legislation are 
remoulding the traditional communication structure, combining or (even more 
appropriately) blurring industry and market divisions. These developments in the 
(tele-)communications industry and their influence on a competitive (telecoms) 
market have been outlined throughout this study. The developments have also been 
witnessed at regular occurrences during the preparation and course of this 
examination. Garrison and Taylor wrote: 
"The parallel convergence of telecommunications and computing resulting 
from technological innovation compounds ... [the]... challenge to. traditional 
regulation. , 
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Among these innovations are the wireless communications systems. The growth of 
the industry (and multimedia services) has been described as; "... a central force in 
shaping the development of the EC communications and information 
infrastructure. "2'0 The EC Commission has also produced a Green Paper on a 
common approach to mobile and personal communications251 (hereafter Mobile 
Green Paper), and a Green Paper on telecommunications infrastructure (including 
mobile and television networks). 
In the Mobile Green Paper, the Commission estimated there would be 40 million 
users in the EC of mobile communications by the year 2000 and 80 million by 
2010.252 It is estimated that there will be 450 million users by 2010 globally. 253 In 
1993 there were 30 million mobile phone users globally; 13 million in the United 
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States and approximately half of that in the EC. 254 As such, it is not surprising to 
come across opinions like the one of Butler and DeSilva: 
"Mobile radio services represent one of the most dynamic, fastest growing 
and important segments of the telecommunications industry.... " 255 
It is also unsurprising to find statements as: 
"[W]hatever the result, it is evident that mobile services will play an 
increasingly important role in the new national information 
infrastructure. " 256 
Why is this industry or market within the broader framework so important? There 
are at least two reasons. One is it is an alternative to the traditional local loop. 
Secondly, the convergence of technology and its development beyond the initial 
stage of convergence suggest an interesting and plausible shape of the future of 
communications. However, a word of caution is needed. Excitement and enthusiasm 
in industries can mislead or distort present and future reality. Telecommunications is 
certainly no exception to the intoxication of hope. One of the things which risks 
being over-looked in the market-players' attraction to product and market growth, 
and the potential wealth, is the fragmentation of markets by the systems used. 
Stehmann provides an example of this problem: 
"In the past, mobile telephony has been major example of the high costs 
created by the fragmentation of national markets. Having installed different 
and incompatible systems in individual member states, car telephones become 
useless once they pass a national border. Different standards and technical 
specifications prevented equipment manufacturers from reaping economies of 
scale which kept the costs of mobile telephony high. " 257 
As Stehmann observed: 
"As a result, this sector offered fertile ground for the promotion of co- 
operation and market integration. " 
258 
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Yet, the mobile communications sector, despite its technological innovations, is 
perhaps less exciting than it can seem at least at the legislative level. It contains 
problems shared with the traditional wire-based telecommunications system for EC 
authorities. Unsurprisingly, the Mobile Green Paper carries shared principle and 
objectives found in the 1987 Green Paper and subsequent documents. Also 
unsurprisingly Directives 88/301/EEC and 90/388/EEC (et al) form the foundation 
and legislative links towards a common EC telecommunication infrastructure. This 
does not altogether rule out the market differences. As with satellite communications 
there are licensing and technology-differences, such as frequency issues and 
standards. 259 
The important elements are the liberalisation sections in opening up an EC-wide 
competitive market. For example, the provision of mobile terminal and network 
equipment has been open since 1988. The manufacture and supply of terminal 
equipment for the mobile sector is included in 88/301/EEC at 6(6). The abolition of 
exclusive or special rights has not (yet) applied to mobile communications . 
2'0 The 
barriers the Mobile Green Paper states needing to be over-come include: 
1. the existence of exclusive or special rights which prevent overall market access; 
technology licensing causing EC fragmentations; 
2. national-licences which delay EC-wide implementation; 
3. fragmentation of development and service provisions which obstructs a global 
approach to personal communications services; 
4. tariffs and pricing structures; 
5. infrastructure usage restrictions; 
6. a lack of a timetable for radio frequency allocations of new technology; 
7. and barriers for EC manufacturing and operators access to non-EC states. 
Furthermore, the EC's response to American initiatives for satellite-based personal 
communications was unfavourable. 261 
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The solution suggested in the Mobile Green Paper was to extend EC principles and 
laws pertaining to the telecommunications industry to include the mobile sector, as it 
has with satellite communications (see above). There are other interesting elements 
of mobile telecommunications beyond the problems and topics which transcend 
telecommunications more generally, for example dominance and legal concerns 
which were examined earlier. These elements include the mobility - aspect especially 
in so far as its intangible link through satellites and secondly, the value-added 
services. In this case, though not necessarily exclusive to this example, is the added 
value of a mobile information-society. 
This information society covers voice, data, the Internet (and quite possibly 
'multimedia'). One vision of the future is as follows: 
"Handheld and even 'wearable' communicators (combining the portability of a 
mobile phone with the power of modern computers) will have sophisticated 
communications facilities for video, Internet/Intranet access and remote 
database interrogation, as well as fax, email and normal voice 
communications. 1262 
This capability, added to the basic concept of a mobile telephone but with the 
sophistication of being a global (satellite-based) personal communications system, 
makes for an interesting discussion. Omitting the colourful 'value-added services' 
cited above, one observer described the modem and truly mobile telephone concept 
in the following manner: 
"Imagine a pocket-sized mobile telephone that could be used anywhere in the 
world. On home territory it would communicate via the local cellular 
network; elsewhere it would automatically route calls via a constellation of 
satellites. No need for radio based-stations; no need, perhaps, for the wired 
networks through which even cellular calls are rooted for part of their 
journey. Telecoms and space-technology companies are imagining as hard as 
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they can. To date, at least seven global 'satellite-phone' projects (plus a 
handful of regional satellite-based networks) are wending their way towards 
the market... " 263 
Despite such developments and delivery of communications to the extent of the 
mutli-communications equipment cited in the previous quotation, access to the 
network whether its wire, radio-relay or satellite remains important for the success 
of the competitive system. The Commission stated: 
"Any policy with regard to satellite-based personal communications systems 
must take into account the interests of users (these systems may offer a 
valuable addition to terrestrial based services), the interests of the 
manufacturing industry, and of service providers (satellite and other). In this 
context the Commission has raised a number of issues in the satellite PCN 
area relating to: regulation, competition policy, standardisation and 
intellectual property rights, economic and industrial considerations, 
multilateral framework and geo-political relations, and third generation 
mobile communications policy. " 164 
A concern of the Commission which is a reflection of the changing nature of 
telecommunications overall is its global nature, and in particular the global or even 
foreign-ness of the companies operating communications and networks. The 
Commission also stated: 
"Policy in this area cannot limit itself to regulatory questions within the 
European Union, but must address the wider trade issues and issues related 
to the competitiveness of European industry. " 265 
In this regard the Commission is especially concerned that most (not all) satellite 
proposals and most satellite operators are American; 266 or more importantly non-EC. 
This concern draws out the overall telecommunications discussion: the globalisation 
of the industry, and the potential conflict between the traditional state (jurisdiction, 
287 
sovereignty, and enforcement of [competition] law) and the potential direction of 
companies into a more international arena in which states could have little or no 
control. The issue of jurisdiction and the matter of globalisation is worthy of greater 
analysis, and as such follows in Chapter Six. 
Having suggested the existence or development of a global economic playground, 
the competition concerns nevertheless remain both evident and important in the 
domestic (EC) marketplace. Secondly, the same domestic competition problems 
could extend into a global marketplace. The problems of concentration in the context 
of the changing telecommunications industry were earlier analysed. It would now be 
appropriate to turn the attention to legal problems relating to corporate and 
competitive behaviour which will affect the functioning of competition in modern 
telecommunications. 
5.6 Summary 
Competition in the telecommunications industry is dependent upon the successful 
liberalisation of infrastructure access. Such liberalisation is not restricted to one 
approach. This may range from competitors having access to another's network to 
separating the service-provision of the dominant operator from its network- 
provision, forming an independent infrastructure-operator. It is particularly the 
transitional period between the market of monopoly to one of competition which is 
of importance. Its importance is not only in shaping the competitive-system's culture, 
but may also affect the success of the players and long-term survivors of the 
competitive game. There is also the added element of encouraging alternative 
network providers which could come from other industries with previously little or 
no telecommunications interests, such as electricity, rail or canal companies. 
Furthermore, technological innovation provides for alternative networks and 
communications means; namely radio, mobile technology and satellites. However, 
there is the question about how suitable or realistic some alternatives are to 
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traditional fixed-networks; or are they merely compatible communications means. 
One might predict radio services to be an equal competitor to fixed-wire, and/or the 
convergence of radio and fixed providers could emerge as the new status quo. Is the 
role of law to affect this? Some would argue for less intervention and to allow 
natural economic forces and consumer decisions to determine the shape of 
telecommunications. Yet, in a system of competition where the Idealist position on 
competition may be questioned (see previous chapters), the law as established is 
concerned with promoting competition. The American system was founded on 
preventing the abuse of private market power, whereas the EC law was founded to 
encourage and protect the development of a common market. In either case, it is the 
protection of competition that is important, and as such predicting possible future 
competitors is not the role of law; even where technology suggests possible 
alternatives. The law though is also a tool for opening previously closed or restricted 
markets and industries to competition. The different ways in which this was used and 
the philosophy of competition is interesting especially between the US and the EC. 
This interpretation of competition philosophy has led to debates about the position 
of policies that have seemingly become values, such as universal service. These 
debates have been furthered by the concept of the information society. In this regard, 
questions have been raised about redefining universal service and whether it is 
something which should be protected and promoted by governments or left to the 
economic markets. It is neither the number of competitors nor the interesting 
developments (such as the changing types of communications means) that are of 
significance. It is the problems in competition law and the availability of an 
opportunity to correct them through the process of liberalisation that is of much 
greater importance. 
Competition is the current political fashion for operating the telecommunications 
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industry; preferable to monopoly. Can the law adequately prevent monopoly from 
returning? Should the law intervene to protect against the rise of companies 
achieving dominant positions in order to prevent anti-competitive oligopolies? These 
are a couple of questions that can provoke strong opinions about the degree of 
competition and intervention. However, there is the interpretative problem in 
competition law, which suggests there might be a legitimate time when dominance or 
anti-competitive behaviour is either unavoidable or favourable to efficiency and the 
consumer. This then questions the legal regime, as some might in the case of the 
EC's interpretation of law compared with American approaches through rules of 
reason and per se. 
In telecommunications there are conflicts and ambiguities which are not necessarily 
unique to the industry, but might be unusual to most markets. These include the 
infrastructure problem and therefore the need to use competitors' facilities, entry 
barriers, as well as bottlenecks because of an insufficient number of networks. Such 
difficulties create or further other problems including the question of: What is 
essential access and is this necessary?; Who determines access?; Is predatory pricing 
really anti-competitive, or is it all part of the competitive game? Then there is the 
matter of markets; How are these defined? In the end, it is the law that is a means to 
judge the level of acceptance and of effectiveness in overseeing these problems. It is 
also the law which often waits for the action to occur and thus the damage done. In 
some instances, such as in regard to the number of players and trends towards 
oligopolistic, strategic markets, perhaps the law is capable of entering as a 
preventative force rather than as a post-mortem. This is a challenging task, because 
as stated earlier, it is a question for the law to find the right balance between 
empirical and factual questions. These challenges need to be faced and the 
approaches to them re-addressed. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Globalisation: Telecommunications as an Example of International 
Legal Conflict of Competition Laws 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter is an instrument to advance the view that competition policy is no longer 
confined to state jurisdictions, but also increasingly beyond regional jurisdictions 
(e. g. the EC). The position advanced here is that the new telecommunications is 
inherently an industry and market that is of an international type. The purpose of this 
chapter is to raise more questions and challenging issues that require answering and 
addressing in the re-assessment of the fundamental approach to competition policy 
and ultimately the interpretation of competition law. 
The view advanced in this chapter suggests that telecommunications is becoming a 
globalised industryand market. Telecommunications is also a significant 
infrastructure for other services which assists in expanding their markets. It is a 
meta-technology, because it has an important effect on a number and range of other 
industries and markets. In many cases the boundaries of these beneficiary markets 
could be beyond their original national borders. It would be negligent for this theme 
to be overlooked or ignored in re-evaluating competition law and policy in particular 
regard to telecommunications and the Information Society. 
Telecommunications, while having connected much of the world for sometime, has 
its own trans-national structure and interaction. It has as by-products the rapid, 
global communications for other industries (e. g. financial services) and markets 
selling through the Internet. These too present questions and challenges to national 
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regulators. Telecommunications is effectively the modem trade route: the canals and 
railway lines of the Information Society. 
On the one hand, nothing has changed under traditional legal law practice. Anyone 
operating within any country is technically responsible for their own actions under 
that country's laws. However, the position of the national regulator may be 
threatened, even weakened by this process of globalisation. 
There are three approaches governments may take in regard to the new trans- 
national telecommunications industry. One is to do nothing and believe in an insular, 
domestic policy, on the basis that nation-states remain absolutely sovereign. The 
second is to establish bi-/or multi-lateral agreements of co-operation or enforcement 
with other countries. The third is to assist in the development of a separate, neutral 
authority charged with overseeing, adjudicating or regulating matters of a global 
concern. Yet enforcement of law from beyond a state's borders, either by another 
state or by an international organisation is in principle an inherent conflict with the 
sovereignty of nation-states. However, a model of absolute sovereignty has, at least 
since 1945 during the UN era, been increasingly outdated as has the existence of 
international law definition qualifying sovereignty. The EC structure, which is 
arguably a new kind of international organisation, raises even more pointed questions 
of sovereignty as current political debates (e. g. in the UK) demonstrate. It must, 
however, also be said that agreement between states (e. g. US-EC Competition Laws 
Co-Operation Agreement (1991)) do not guarantee co-operation nor effective 
enforcement. Likewise, the right decreed by a state to enforce its own laws beyond 
its own borders (e. g. effects doctrine) conflicts with the principle of national 
sovereignty. It is these conflicts which are fascinating, especially in light of the 
apparent changing commercial nature through telecommunications of the world at 
large. 
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6.2 Globalisation 
Some might argue that globalisation is not a new concept or activity. The creation 
of multinational corporations and international businesses or business links between 
states is historically not new. International trade extends as far back, if not further, to 
the ancient civilisations of Greece, Rome, the Ottoman Empire and East Asia. 
Multinational corporations can be found in the times of the development of Belgian, 
Dutch, English, French and Spanish empires with the royal grants of monopolies for 
trade in furs and precious metals. But there was still a strong bond between the state 
and the form of corporation involved. 
Globalisation may also be a term that has not adequately been defined. It is a term 
which has recently become a `catch phrase'. Globalisation can suggest that national 
borders are insignificant, markets are borderless, ' and/or that firms do not have a 
nationality or home. It is also a term which has been used to describe a dynamic 
process rather than one which is static. A separation of the bond between the state 
and corporation is perhaps the focal point which generated interest in multinational 
corporations in the 1970s. The power and effect of these organisations was 
recognised, for example, through the oil crisis, financial crisis and even markets such 
as coffee. Countries which were not previously recognised as influential states 
became powers in their own way (such as the Middle East oil producing countries). 
This emergence of both the multinational company in conjunction with globalisation 
began a fundamental change in the political-economies of the world. 
"International business has forged a network of global linkages around the 
world that binds us all - countries, institutions, and individuals - much closer 
than ever before. Those linkages tie together trade, financial markets, 
technology, and living standards in an unprecedented way. " 1 
This separates the royally-decreed 'multinational companies' and the international 
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trade of past history from contemporary international business. The evolution of 
trade theory shows progression of thought from Adam Smith's opinion that each 
country should specialise in products which it can create most efficiently, to more 
recently Michael Porter's Competitive Advantage of Nations. In the latter a state's 
competitiveness depends on its ability to innovate. This is benefited by strong 
domestic competition and demanding (domestic) consumers. 2 
Nevertheless, the growth of modern international trade, multinational corporations 
and closer relations of states through a form of economic 'cause and effect' 
strengthened the necessity for international trade laws and organisations. 
International co-operation may be further intensified through the growth of 
industries such as telecommunications and the resulting capabilities these may. 
provide. For example, developments in telecommunications assist in the speed and 
types of financial transactions made in speculative trade. Yet, despite this apparent 
transition to another stage in international trade theory which suggests a further 
distancing of corporate power from traditional state-political dominance, the subject 
is perhaps not quite so transparent and definitive. Instead this furthering of 
globalisation can at times be ambiguous and a grey area threatening many 
theoretical-certainties, or emphasising other forms of political tension. In explaining 
globalisation, Humbert stated: 
"Globalisation is the name given for a lack of a theoretical concept matching 
more closely observed phenomena. Although we are far from a world 
integrated economy, which would rationally characterise the competition of a 
wide globalisation process, we can point out that the evolution of important 
economic variables, which are necessarily localised, depends on economic 
forces that are mainly driven by non-local factors. " 3 
Perhaps globalisation is a product of the meeting of the previous two systems of 
national and international economies. Humbert lists four phenomena regarding the 
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economic evolution of globalisation. First, this term and process has originated from 
the main industrialised states, just as did internationalisation. Secondly, the 
"adequacy between a nation-state economic sovereignty domain and its markets is 
under pressure". Thirdly, "by traditional analysis industry was not given a real 
international dimension. " The fourth phenomenon is the development of 
communication infrastructures (et al) which in effect shrinks the world towards a 
seemingly 'global village'. 4 The direct and integrated involvement of 
telecommunications not only separates itself from most other industries as one in its 
own distinctive right, but is also both an important cause and problem to the status 
quo. 
The consequence is the emphasising of the faults in international regulation of 
competition. It also creates tension and conflict as different state-industrial policies 
and competition laws are forced to meet. This industry is not the only one to cause 
inter-state disputes, but as a communication infrastructure telecommunications is 
more forcible in the bonding of states. The subject of inter-state conflict has in part 
begun to be resolved. The internationalisation of trade has encouraged various forms 
of co-operation and economic unification of states. The North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) is one example and the EC (now the European Union) is another but 
more integrated 'area. Nevertheless, the problems and conflicts for states caused by 
globalisation remain. Individual states and unified bodies (e. g. the EC) are affected. 
So depending upon the issue at hand the conflicts may be understood as being 
between individual states, or between trading blocs. In the end it may be simply a 
reduction in the number of political players, but it does not significantly lessen the 
challenges. 
International trade agreements and organisations exist such as the ITU (International 
Telecommunications Union) and WTO (World Trade Organisation) which may 
develop into positive forums and judicial bodies for relevant international trade 
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problems, in particular as courts for an international competition law. As of 1997, 
there is an international agreement on telecommunications services through the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (CATS). However, while it remains to be 
seen how effective this will be, there is nevertheless a developing need for public 
international law and bodies such as the WTO for effective international competition 
law enforcement. ' 
There are two forms of international regulation: the co-operative approach between 
states; and the transnational approach which is a legal umbrella over states. 
In 1991 the EC and the United States established the Competition Laws Co- 
Operation Agreement (1991). 6 The EC and US publicly acknowledge the need for 
international agreements. In this particular Agreement it was stated: 
"Recognising - that the world's economies are becoming increasingly 
interrelated, and in particular that this is true of the economies of the 
European Communities and the United States of America; 
Noting that - the Commission of the European Communities and the 
Government of the United Stares share the view that the sound and effective 
enforcement of competition law is a matter of importance to the efficient 
operation of their respective markets and to trade between them; 
the sound and effective enforcement of the Parties' competition laws would 
be advanced by co-operation and, in appropriate cases co-ordination between 
them in the application of those laws; 
Noting further that - from time to time differences may arise between the 
Parties concerning the application of their competition laws to conduct or 
transactions that implicate significant interests of both Parties .... " 
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"... [the] agreement is to promote co-operation and co-ordination and lessen 
the possibility or impact of differences between the Parties in the application 
of their competition laws. " 8 
The stated meanings and implications are important acknowledgements of a 
changing economic and commercial world, but this is merely an agreement and not 
enforceable. Nevertheless it is a step forward. Sir Leon Brittan explained: 
"Facing up to the challenges of our interdependent world, and recognising 
that both countries share a commitment to protect competition in their 
markets, the aim is to provide for rapid consultation procedures and dispute 
avoidance mechanisms in competition matters. " 9 
A significant problem with unenforceable Agreements as opposed to binding Treaties 
can be found in this statement. This is the protection of competition in the parties' 
markets. The problem more specifically is the interpretation of competition, the 
policies and theories of competition and enforcement of the system can differ 
sufficiently so as to conflict with the other state's philosophy. While recognising 
potential difference of opinion in the Agreement as cited above, practice may make 
the Agreement appear to be theory. 
It is worth noting again the purpose behind EC laws (supported by Articles 85 and 
86) is to create economic integration of EC states. American law by contrast has 
historically been concerned about private power. 1° Secondly, American enforcement 
has been more influenced of late by Chicago School theorists opposing intervention 
in the marketplace, unlike the approach EC authorities have taken. Each approach 
may not only be founded on philosophical visions and interpretations of the 
organisation of domestic economic freedoms, but as a matter of national co- 
ordination, policy and power as a whole. Fidler explained; 
"[C]ompetition law directly touches on issues relating to a State's economic 
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well-being and power, which are already matters pertinent to the national 
interest. US, British and European authorities have at different times shown 
concern at the way in which competition law affects the economic power and 
competitiveness of their respective economic players. Part of the success of 
Chicago School antitrust thinking during the Reagan administration could be 
found in the message that traditional anti-trust thinking weakened the ability 
of US companies to compete effectively with foreign challengers. Section 84 
of the British Fair Trade Act 1973 specifically lists as one key factor in 
evaluating the 'public national interest' how British companies are faring in 
the international market place. Part of the motivation for some of the 
European Commission's decisions in the early 1980s on joint venture 
agreements relates to fears that European industry was falling behind 
American and Japanese competitors. " " 
Thus foreign policy and trade policy may affect competition law adjudication. 
Conflict arises in two areas. One is the extraterritorial application of law to 
international mergers. The second is the extraterritorial application of law whereby a 
firm in one state commits outside of another state an act which would be illegal in 
that state, but the act affects that state in some manner. The offended state in its 
efforts to enforce its laws against the company located in another state calls into 
question matters of jurisdiction; A question of asserting one's law into the sovereign 
territory of another. 
6.3 Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction of states are traditionally founded on the notions of sovereignty and 
territory. " In terms of globalisation conflicts can arise when one state wishes to 
impose its rule of law within another. For example a situation may arise in which a 
company's behaviour affects the market of a state in which the company is not 
directly present. The "harmed state" may want to take action against the foreign 
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company such as through antitrust laws. A foreign state seeking to impose its 
competition laws on another state or the further development of transnational laws 
risks the sovereign integrity of states. Without straying into the realms of 
international law, some basic definitions need elaboration in. These are sovereignty, 
territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. 
Sovereignty, according to learned scholars and caselaw has been defined as follows. 
"Sovereignty in relation to states signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the 
exclusion of any other state, the functions of the state" 13 
Territory is a basic necessity for sovereignty: without which there is little to claim for 
title. Without territory, the legal entity cannot be a state. "The essence of territorial 
sovereignty is contained in the notion of title. The term relates to both the factual 
and legal conditions under which territory is deemed to belong to one particular 
authority or another. "14 
Jurisdiction has been stated to be "... the power of the state to affect people, property 
and circumstances and reflects the basic principles of state sovereignty, equality of 
states and non-interference in domestic affairs. Jurisdiction is vital and indeed the 
central feature of state sovereignty, for it is an exercise of authority which may alter 
or create or terminate legal relationships and obligations. "" 
This intervention into another state is known as the effects doctrine. This is brought 
under the territorial principle and termed the 'objective territoriality principle'. 16 
Whereas a state is deemed to hold jurisdiction over all persons, property and 
activities within its territory, the extension of competition (namely antitrust) laws 
into the territory of another creates ambiguity in relation to sovereignty and 
territory. " As extension of competition laws and their enforcement into other 
sovereignties may be interpreted with some hostility, in breach of the principles of 
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sovereignty and territory defined above, it is also the case that the state could 
exercise its power abroad where criminal acts are committed beyond its jurisdiction 
by its own nationals and other nationals against it. This (the universality principle) 
may be an extreme example, but the point is made. '8 Perhaps the difficulty, the 
problem, the ambiguity of the situation is the distinction between enforcing a crime 
of humanity and behaviour which is less personal and more business-oriented. A 
principle of protection becomes confused with economic principles and policies. 
Humanity may be understood to be elevated to higher principles than something 
which is of a political-economic policy or culture. In the case of the latter, offence 
may be taken by states where others seek to apply their own policies or laws in 
others', thereby threatening or offending the respect of sovereignty. Shaw explained: 
"Claims have arisen in the context of economic issues whereby some states, 
particularly the United States, seek to apply their laws outside their territory 
in a manner which may precipitate conflicts with other states. Where the 
claims are founded upon the territorial and nationality theories of jurisdiction, 
problems do not often arise, but claims made upon the basis of the so-called 
'effects' doctrine have provoked considerable controversy. This goes beyond 
the objective territorial principle to a situation where the state assumes 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the behaviour of a party is producing 'effects' 
within its territory. i19 
Although with modifications over time, the United States has "energetically" 
maintained an effects doctrine. 20 Regardless of the history of the application of the 
doctrine by the US 21 its application and appropriateness nonetheless continues to 
become increasingly important. Brown stated: 
"During the course of the twentieth century, territorial limits on national 
jurisdiction gradually eroded. Revolutionary transformations in international 
commerce, technology and business organisation produced regulatory needs 
that were incompatible with strict territoriality principles. State practice 
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increasingly included extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction, relying 
particularly on the effects doctrine and nationality principle. " 22 
Two examples of 'effect' acts may be used for some direction as to contemporary 
problems and for application to the telecommunications industry: The Woodpulp 
case and the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger. 
6.3.1 Woodpulp 23 
The decision of the ECJ and the basis of the Commission's argument in Woodpulp 
may be traced back to the Dyestuffs case. 24 Although in this case the term and 
definition of economic entity was important, it was also the "unity of the 
undertaking"25 which was an important doctrine. On this doctrine may be based 
jurisdiction, establishing what in effect is the relevant point of contact. Prior to the 
Woodpulp case, this doctrine allowed for the EC authorities to avoid explicitly 
defining their jurisdiction as regards to cross-border business issues. 26 In the 
Decision the Commission stated: 
"In this case all the addresses of this Decision were during the period of the 
infringement exporting directly to or doing business within the Community. 
Some of them have branches, subsidiaries, agents or other establishments 
within the Community. The concentration on price, and the clauses 
prohibiting export or resale all concerned shipments made directly to buyers 
in the EEC or sales made in the EEC to buyers there.... " 27 
Importantly: 
"The effect of the agreements and practices on prices announced and. /or 
charged to customers and on resale... within the EEC was therefore not only 
substantial but intended and was the primary and direct result of the 
agreements and practices. " 28 
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This clearly established the EC's reliance on the effects doctrine. In referring to the 
company (the parent of the EC subsidiary) outside the EC it was previously stated: 
"The applicant whose registered office is outside the Community, argues that 
the Commission is not empowered to impose fines on it by reason merely of 
the effects produced in the Common Market by actions which it is alleged to 
have taken outside the Community. Since a concerted practice is involved, it 
is first necessary to ascertain whether the conduct of the applicant has had 
effects within the Common market. It appears from what has already been 
said that the increases at issue were put into effect within the Common 
Market and concerned competition between competitors operating 
within it. " 29 
By arguing that the undertakings were established outside the EC, the applicants 
claimed the Commission's decision breached public international law on the basis 
that: 
"... the application of the competition rules in this case was founded 
exclusively on the economic repercussions within the Common Market of 
conduct restricting competition which was adopted outside the 
Community. " 30 
The. ECJ however, noted: 
"By making use of its power to control its subsidiaries established in the 
Community, the applicant was able to ensure that its decision was 
implemented on that market. " 31 
Thus the problems are: 1) decisions (and actions) by firms outside the EC affecting 
the EC, and 2) using influence over subsidiaries to breach EC law. In either (or both) 
instance(s), the use of law is based on the effects doctrine. The question which rises 
may usefully divide the issue into two, and this may be beneficial in regarding the 
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discrepancy over judicial sovereignty. Under international law there is prescriptive 
jurisdiction which concerns nationality, protection (security) and territory. 32 This 
allows for one state to enforce law in another on these principles. However, these 
are not economic principles per se. They are more to do with security, political 
(military) acts against the state and perhaps extended to criminal acts (taking into 
consideration extradition treaties). In effect and generally speaking, these are 
defensive measures to protect the political sovereignty of states. In the instance of 
Woodpulp, there is the problem of an offensive or more intrusive approach which 
points more towards exploiting policies and law rather than defending the market 
within the confines of the EC. Ferry stated in regards to this issue of'imperialism': 
"The direct enforcement of decisions under the Community's investigatory 
powers raises this question in one form. The indirect enforcement of such 
decisions against a subsidiary in the EEC to obtain disclosure of information 
held outside the EEC by a foreign parent, raises it in another form. " 33 
Thus, while a subsidiary may be within the jurisdiction of the Commission and the 
ECJ if located within an EC Member State, the behaviour of firms outside the EC 
including parent firms are in practice beyond the EC authorities' jurisdiction. As 
stated in the XIVth Report on Competition Policy: 
"The Aluminium and Woodpulp cases illustrate the Commission's assumption 
over non-EEC undertakings when the activities of those undertakings have a 
direct and appreciable effect on competition and trade within the EEC. This 
reflects the policy, which is essential in the view of modem world trade, that 
all undertakings doing business within the EEC must respect the rule of 
competition in the same way, regardless of their place of establishment 
('effects doctrine')". 34 
Although recognising the dilemma and conflict of contemporary global economics, 
the approach may be conflict-prone. The EC's approach to the problem of non-EC 
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firms and the effects from without the EC has been criticised. Rather than using an 
effects doctrine, the British Government suggested using what it labelled the 
territorial principle. The UK argued the effects doctrine assumed extra-territorial 
jurisdiction over conduct which occurred wholly from outside, in the case of this 
study, the EC. The justification for this jurisdiction was based on the economic 
effects which the foreign action had within the EC. This reiterates what has already 
been described, but in contrast through the territorial principle to maintain the 
traditional public international (law) respect for sovereignty and territory approach. 
Jurisdiction under the territorial principle, should according to the British 
Government in 1989 instead be founded on the "prohibited acts done or 
implemented within the Community". The acts of agents and subsidiaries "which are 
carried out in accordance with the directions of the foreign undertaking may be 
properly regarded as the acts of the undertaking. " 3s 
Jurisdiction, (according to the said White Paper), 36 under these circumstances is then 
not extraterritorial, but consistent with the territorial principle. 37 It may be 
important though, for the foreign undertakings to have a presence either by agents or 
selling through offices within the EC for proper application of the territorial 
principle. 38 This approach was not accepted by the EC, but rather it was immaterial 
if any presence through subsidiaries, agents or branches existed within the EC. 39 
Competition policy difficulties in the form of 'imperialism' and the problem of 
globalisation to states is most evident in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger. 
6.3.2 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
In Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, this is an agreement about the effects on the 
international aviation market. It is also an example of where the EC-US Competition 
Law Agreement4° should and could have been put into productive use. It is also an 
example of territory jurisdiction conflict, the problem of economic/commercial use 
of the universal principle behind the effects doctrine and the problems outlined in the 
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last quotation by Brown cited above. The problem centres around the oligopolistic 
airline manufacturing market and in particular between two 'flagship' manufactures, 
one American and the other European (EC). The ruling made by the American 
competition authorities, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), accepted that: 
"On its face, the proposed merger appears to raise serious antitrust 
concerns. , 41 
The basis for the FTC's acceptance held: 
1) McDonnell Douglas "... can no longer exert a competitive influence in the 
worldwide market for commercial aircraft. " 42 
2) "There is no economically plausible strategy that McDonnell Douglas 
could follow, either as a stand-alone concern or as part of another concern, 
that would change that grim prospect. " 43 
In this interpretation of the firm's position, the FTC allowed for the merger with 
Boeing with the argument that Boeing and Airbus already dominated most of the 
commercial airline market. The FTC decided that the merger would not substantially 
lessen competition. 4 Some dissension within the FTC questioned the reasons 
supporting the decision. One dissenter was of the opinion that McDonnell Douglas 
has been successful in market pressure despite its comparatively smaller size 
as 
While the firm may need more customers it does not make it uncompetitive for 
future sales, it was stated. 6 The merger however, would make Boeing the world's 
largest aerospace company. 47 
There is more than this though. Not only may the number of manufacturers be small, 
or at least the gap between the leaders and the lesser players be sufficiently 
substantial, there is the post-initial purchase of the aircraft business to consider. 
Contracts for exclusive supplier of aircraft, 48 servicing and supply of spare parts49 are 
also potential competition problem areas. The EC Commission claimed the merger 
would result in Boeing controlling 84% of the global in-service business. 
50 The 
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merger raises concerns about the future competitiveness of Airbus by the company 
and EC authorities. s' The point which is reportedly the one of greatest concern to 
EC authorities is the exclusive supply deals with airlines such as American, Delta and 
Continental Airlines. 52 
These supply deals originally could have lasted as long as 20 years which therefore 
would exclude competition from rivals such as Airbus (among others). 53 Others 
argue that the deals are insignificant as others such as British Airways, who are loyal 
customers to Boeing, could be expected to continue to do so. 54 From the position of 
competition theory, such customers still have the choice to switch to a competitor.. 
Exclusive supply deals by their contractual nature are considerably more binding and 
tie the customer to the company. This does not guarantee that customers will use 
competitors. The president of Continental Airlines for example, stated its relationship 
ss with Boeing would not change regardless of the Commission's decision. 
One suggested approach to solving the dispute was the proposal of a third party 
licensed for servicing and supply of spare parts. This, according to the Commission, 
would reduce the over-dependency of aircraft firms (namely McDonnell aircraft 
operating firms) on Boeing. " Continental Airline's president dismissed the proposal 
to end the exclusive agreements, claiming the Commission was "naive" and such a 
request was "made out of not understanding the business". 57 This opinion from a 
customer is of general interest, but on the whole the Commission has an obligation 
to protect the competitive system (in the EC) and should, in theory, be less 
concerned with the affect on the offending company or the choice of a customer to 
continue with the company. Competition is the ability for choice. However in this 
merger case, but not exclusively with this case, there is the involvement of politics. 
In this instance the evidence of sides taken, EC with Airbus and the US (FTC) with 
Boeing, the pure protection of competitive systems becomes tainted and/or 
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distorted. Perhaps most evident in the taking of sides was the threat of retaliation 
and a trade war started by the US if the EC did not agree to the merger. 58 While it 
may be argued that the authorities involved were acting in favour of their 'national 
firms/industries', there was the issue of jurisdiction. 
The merger is between two American firms, and the formal exclusive-supply 
agreements thusfar are with American airline firms. Furthermore, Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas have few assets in the EC. 59 Yet with concern over potential 
discrimination against Airbus, such as through supply arrangements, the EC's 
competition concerns have been sought to be extraterritorially enforced. This is 
argued on the basis of the takeover being a global issue. bo 
"The Commission argues that the takeover is a global issue giving Boeing 
three quarters of a market worth trillions of dollars over the next quarter of a 
century.... Since Boeing is a global power that does much of its business in 
Europe, the Commission argues that it has jurisdiction, just as US antitrust 
authorities can issue rulings governing European companies that do business 
in the United States. " 61 
This argument is the 'effects doctrine'. Where disagreements between antitrust 
authorities conflict and arguments become reduced to political conflict and 
obstacles, 62 the void of an effective global competition authority becomes evident. 
This problem is furthered where agreements between states such as the EC-US 
Agreement fail to resolve disputes. This is underlined in the following citation: 
"If Brussels lacks confidence in the FTC, it is hard to imagine effective 
transatlantic co-operation. For the EU to insist on dictating changes in the 
US market looks like an attempt to impose its laws unilaterally on other 
countries. That undercuts EU criticism of extra-territorial US policies; it 
might also provoke Washington to interfere in future European competition 
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cases over which the EU claims jurisdiction. " 63 
The problem is not always simple interference because of a disagreement of rulings. 
There is also the problem of a failure to respond adequately to a shared concern. The 
FTC and the EC Commission were both concerned with the sole-supplier 
arrangement, but the FTC did not challenge this with Boeing. 64 It would be logical 
to expect the EC to request the US to investigate these concerns under the EC-US 
Agreement. 65 This Boeing-McDonnell Douglas incident is an example of the 
problem which can be created whereby states' competition interpretations and also 
their political agendas can be damaging to all concerned. This merger is also 
revealing in the double standards which governments at times take. On the face of 
antitrust interpretation this case may be seen on the one hand as a conflict between 
capitalism and, interventionist ideologies. The overt action of the EC may be 
regarded as the interventionist, protecting European interests in Airbus. Whereas the 
American approach would seem to support market forces. Such an interpretation, 
broadly speaking, would be in line with the Chicago School's antitrust philosophy of 
allowing the marketplace to determine the fate of companies. 
"[T]he merger is only another ripple in the tidal wave of consolidation and 
globalisation sweeping the markets. The higher forces of capitalism are at 
work.... " 66 
On the other hand, and as noted, intervention by the American government through 
its protectionist position against EC discomfort about the merger contradicts this 
purely antitrust interpretation. This may be seen in an apparent industrial policy of 
the American government in encouraging the reduction of market-players. This was 
outlined in the following description: 
The merger is the culmination of a consolidation process in the US 
aerospace industry that is threatening the survival of European manufactures. 
In the space of three years, the top 15 US aerospace companies have been 
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welded into three conglomerates dominating the world market.... To maintain 
competitiveness and to drive down US Government procurement costs, the 
companies were encouraged to merge. The Clinton Administration would 
waive antitrust objections, the bosses were assured. They needed little 
encouragement. A merger frenzy ensued. Time-tables also played a part. 
American manufacturers knew Europe would not be ready to follow their 
lead. Tie-ups across European borders were slowly becoming acceptable. 
Airbus, although stumbling from one banana skin to the next, was becoming 
a threat to Boeing in the early 1990s. " 67 
To avoid such disputes from becoming inter-state or global trade wars and to avoid 
political conflict, as this case threatened to become, a policy of co-operation may be 
best in many circumstances to achieve amicable solutions. The globalisation of some 
industries and markets may lead to political-emotional involvement thus resulting in 
damage to the competitive system. While specifics such as employment-protection68 
may be in the political interest and more-so in some industries (such as aerospace) 
than others, the problems are potentially akin. 
The fundamental issues in Boeing may be found in time in the global 
telecommunications industry. Furthermore, there is the growing problematic issue of 
global market concentration and dominance. On the one hand it is very much a 
market problem. On the other hand, it is an economic form of national dominance 69 
The question which could be given greater consideration and is a factor in the 
phenomenon of globalisation asks whether national support for global companies is 
really in the interest of states or if such policies are dated and misguided? If a 
company truly becomes 'global' rather than simply a multinational, then is it really a 
national company; one with ties and loyalty to its state, or has the state become an 
economic and political pawn for the interests of the (global) company? 
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The void or weakness of an international competition body may only further raise 
conflict between states in so far as one state or trade area extending the scope of its 
competition rules into others' jurisdictions or sovereignties. Similarly, the right of 
one sovereignty to disrupt an economic or commercial activity such as a merger in 
another's jurisdiction raises questions. These questions and problems may become 
more frequent as globalisation develops. The paradox to globalisation is the 
importance of states (as opposed to states' self-choice) opening their domestic 
market, and in telecommunications this is evident. 
6.4 Internationalisation of Competition Policies and Law 
As earlier chapters have indicated basic goals of competition policy may be 
understood to: 
"... ensure the best possible functioning of the market by protecting the 
competition system from distorting practices and restraints be they public or 
private. In theory at least, this ensures the consumer the best choice of goods 
and services at the best possible price, and forces firms to become industrially 
competitive. " 
70 
The growth of industry at an international level particularly during the last two or 
three decades has begun to challenge the traditional notion that competition policy is 
purely a domestic concern, distinct from the separate global marketplace. Regardless 
of national emotions and fears which can arise with the development of international 
business, provoking often extreme responses such as calls for isolationist policies, 
the opening of markets and trade through multinational firms has made it more 
difficult to clearly distinguish domestic from foreign. 71 One consequence has not 
only been free trade agreements and trading blocs or alliances, but an effort by at 
least some governments to extend their influence abroad. This is evident with 'effects 
doctrines', extending the reach of domestic law into other jurisdiction if only for self- 
protection. This policy is also not entirely new. One commentator traced the history 
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of the American judicial behaviour of regulating conduct outside the US back to its 
country's Constitution. 72 
"The power of Congress, under the U. S Constitution, to enact legislation that 
regulates conduct occurring outside of U. S. territory is well-settled. In a 
recent decision, the Supreme Court pronounced the matter no longer open to 
any debate: Both parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the 
authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United 
States. ' This is not a new conclusion; for many decades, in a wide variety of 
contexts, the Court has summarily upheld the extraterritorial application of 
U. S. law against constitutional challenge. 03 
It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court of the US has on occasions permitted a 
number of- American states to extend extraterritorially their local laws. 74 It is 
noteworthy that the American Congress does not constitutionally have the power to 
enforce its laws beyond the US. 75 While the latter can lead to an engaging debate 
about the constitution, judicial rulings and the right for extraterritorial enforcement, 
the practice is not restricted to the United States. As cited, the EC (through 
Woodpulp and its involvement in the Boeing merger for example) also pursues such 
a policy. It is politically a dangerous one, despite its usefulness in protecting the 
domestic system. Extraterritorial enforcement risks the arrogant policy of imposing 
one state's will on another. While recognising policy imposition is a regular 
occurrence, the assumption of the right to make rules for the imposition into other 
states is a violation of the principles of international law regarding sovereignty. 
Problems of political conflict from this behaviour has been raised by the EC. In a 
letter to the Congressional Committee in 1984, the EC stated: 
"US claims to jurisdiction over European subsidies of US companies and 
over goods and technology of US origin located outside the US are contrary 
to the principles of international law and can only lead to clashes of both a 
political and legal nature. These subsidies, goods and technology must be 
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subject to the laws of the country where they are located. " 76 
This concern and approach may be seen in the Woodpulp case. It is also applicable to 
the political dispute over the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas takeover and in the 
example of the BT-MCI merger. As in the instance of Boeing, it is not necessarily the 
purpose of extraterritorial application of competition policy to protect abuse of the 
domestic market (by 'foreigners'). The traditional perception of the judiciary as a 
neutral applicator and enforcer of law is tarnished by the use of law as an offensive 
political weapon. Favouring one's own national companies, especially in ignoring 
anticompetitive behaviour such as dumping abroad or any other effects on another 
state is not uncommon. The acceptance of the Deutsche Telekom-France Telecom 
Atlas alliance (for example) was criticised as creating a 'national champion' 
(especially to challenge foreign [non-EC] giants such as AT&T). In the DeHavilland 
Decision the proposed merger was not however, used by the Commission to 
promote economic power. The European Parliament, France and Italy were critical 
of the Commission for not using such an opportunity to promote `national' (i. e. 
European) interests. " 
The European Parliament, as a result, called for: 
"... a revision of the European Community's competition law to force the 
Commission to consider global competitiveness of EC industry and jobs 
when reviewing such transactions. " 78 
However as Fidler stated: 
"[T]he European Commission realises the importance of EC competition law 
in building a sense of European-ness among the member States and in 
demonstrating to non-EC States and companies that the European 
Community is not a figment of the imagination. " 79 
Furthermore: 
"The concern about domestic autonomy and national competitiveness has 
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also recently appeared in the United States in calls for intelligence efforts 
against foreign economic and corporate espionage in the United States" 80 
The problem may not only be trade and market distortions by firms outside the 
affected (national-) market, but rather in inter-state trade these distortions are 
exacerbated by the absence of a common (international) competition law. Again, 
international agreements do exist, and again the GATS (under WTO) is an example 
of some trade law development. 
The WTO's negotiations on basic telecommunications were completed in February 
1997. The agreement under the GATS covers public and private telecommunications 
services involving end-to-end transmission of customer-supplied information. These 
include voice or data transmission: voice telephony, data, fax, telegraph, telex, 
private leased circuits, fixed and mobile satellite, mobile telephony, mobile data, 
paging and personal communications systems. So-called "value-added" services were 
not formally part of the negotiations, but were already liberalised in 44 schedules 
affecting 55 countries of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The GATS schedules for 
telecommunications are concerned with what aspects of telecommunications are to 
be liberalised and when. The purpose is to encourage and increase market access, 
including establishing new infrastructures, provide services including cross-border 
(e. g. calling cards, resale), and interconnection rights. 
However, the liberalisation is not uniform in either time-span, service-provision and 
investment (e. g. foreign ownership rights). Rather, there were in February 1997,69 
countries committed to opening up various levels of the market. The GATS requires 
countries to allow foreign operators access to build infrastructures and compete in 
the national market. Significantly this is undertaken through the more traditional 
GATT/WTO `Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) process. This affects domestic law as 
countries need to change national legislation to be in keeping with the GATS' 
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general obligations and disciplines (e. g. with regard to transparency). However, it 
remains to be seen how quickly signatories do make the necessary changes and also 
the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism. Significantly, it will be 
interesting to observe how effective this process is not only in liberalising markets, 
but in managing competition obstacles. This process of liberalising markets remains 
to be only one side of the proverbial coin. In removing the political barriers to trade, 
there still remains the need to remove commercially-derived barriers and behavioural 
obstacles. The other side to market liberalisation is in managing and protecting the 
competitive market. As the number of national markets are opened, this becomes 
even more important. 
In this respect, there seemingly remains (at present) a void between states. Reasons 
for this may vary, but probably depend largely on the common commitment in 
preserving the principle sovereignty - at least of one's own territory. International 
theories have attempted to reduce the importance of the state, but they have failed to 
be persuasive or realistic. " Nevertheless, it is important to recognise non-states 
players are important influences and factors in modem politics and state-economics. 
There may be an argument for 'national interest' and a case for supremacy of the 
state over economic players, but the growth of international economics, business, 
and international industries and markets calls for a new or at least additional 
approach. This approach demands some other form of diminished sovereignty or 
binding co-operation in order to resolve disputes of those players and factors in the 
global marketplace. 
Telecommunications seems to be a stronger candidate than many other industries for 
having a position in the global economy. There are, nevertheless, elements of 
telecommunications which may remain appropriately under the national policies such 
as manufacturing or universal service obligation. The basic nature of 
telecommunications, the transmission and reception of signals across the world, by 
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definition encourages its acceptance as a global industry and/or market. 
Globalisation extends any interest of multinational corporations into a new realm, 
further from the traditional philosophy of state sovereignty. It brings the conflict of 
competition policies (or lack of) to new levels, and this is especially noteworthy 
when the firms involved in alliances, joint ventures and mergers create global firms 
(which could be seen as something more unified and separate from multinationals). 
The recognition of "realities of modern world trade" as stated by the EC82 and thus 
the resulting policy approach of assumptions over non-EC undertakings through the 
effects doctrine, stresses the legal problem of contemporary international (economic) 
politics. This problem is further emphasised by, but not exclusively, the issues raised 
in the Boeing merger. Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert of the European 
Commission explained their opinions in support for international rules on 
competition in a Communication to the EC. They stated not only have liberalisation 
and globalisation been the shaping characteristic features of international economics 
of late, but the reduction of import tariffs through the GATT negotiations (from 
about 35% down to below 4%) has led to a massive growth in the amount of those 
conducted. 83 They estimated every 7-8 years the value of the trade has doubled, and 
in actual figures this rose from about $200 billion in the early 1960s to more than 
$5000 billion in 1994.84 Thus, "[n]ational economies are more open to foreign 
competition today than ever before. " 85 
As discussed earlier, the pace of change and increasing types of communication 
technology is furthering the value, volume and amount of international commercial 
and financial exchanges. The globalisation of industries such as telecommunications 
adds further pressure to the status quo of international politics and economics. 
Moreover, telecommunications not only contributes to international trade, but 
potentially becomes an entity in its own right; perhaps under the simple title of 
international communications or a global information infrastructure. It was stated in 
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the Report of the Fifth Regulatory Colloquium of the International 
Telecommunications Union: 
"It has become commonplace to observe that telecommunications has entered 
a period of explosive, global growth. This telecommunications revolution has 
been marked by the unleashing of technological change, competitive forces 
and the privatisation of state monopolies, the creation of consortia of service 
providers which are global in scope, and of wholly new services embodying 
advanced capabilities often targeted to specific needs of business individual 
consumers. " 
86 
This statement supports not only the argument, and moreover the interpretation of 
the telecommunications industry and market put forth towards the beginning of this 
thesis, but it is an important recognition from a governing body -not just from the 
industry's players. Through this recognition by a governing body emerges the 
argument about the global nature of the revolutionised industry, and the importance 
for regulatory and government changes in response to the new situation. In the 
Report it was stated: 
"Technological and market forces are changing the telecommunications 
industry from a state industry with special status (and often under state 
ownership) to one in the mainstream of trade. The globalisation of national 
economies, the trend towards 'information economies' and open access, the 
greater the interest of the state in telecommunications as a key factor in 
national development, the significant decreases in costs in the sector which 
have facilitated entry, the fact that telecommunications is an essential 
infrastructure to facilitate trade in goods and services now being covered 
within the trade framework, such as financial services, and the creation of 
global telecommunications companies and consortia, all have contributed to 
bringing about this change. Telecommunications is now seen as the modern 
trade route. 87 
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This recognition of change is widely accepted, on the basis that 69 states in February 
1997 submitted offers for future WTO/ITU negotiations on basic 
telecommunications. This was an increase from only 48 governments involved with 
submissions in 1996. Secondly it acknowledges the increasingly international nature 
of this sector even as the negotiations were held wide under the auspices of the 
WTO. 88 However, the number of states and the increase of participants in trade 
negotiations does not necessarily acknowledge the true acceptance by governments 
of change. 89 A loose parallel may be drawn between the public acceptance by EC 
member states towards liberalising telecommunications during the 1980s and the 
actual change and protests as noted earlier. This problem at an international level 
was observed by the ITU. 
"The efforts to place telecommunications in a trade setting, if they continue 
to be successfully pursued, will certainly add to the momentum of the 
telecommunications revolution, with major benefits for all countries. Whether 
there is an orderly transition from today's partly monopolistic and nationally 
regulated bilateral trading system in telecommunications to one which trade 
barriers are largely discarded and such established free trade principles as 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment within a multilateral framework are 
applied will depend in part on establishing a strong dialogue between trade 
experts and those in the field of telecommunications. " 90 
Political movement towards this trade approach occurred as recently as the 1994 
Marrakech Agreement, whereby the GATT became the WTO. Telecommunications 
received specific attention under the formation of the GATS. However with 126 
states as members of the WTO (up from the GATT's number of 92 in 1986), there 
are potentially 126 different sets of competition rules for global firms and industries 
such as telecommunications to meet. While variations in competition laws may be 
important to meet certain needs of industrial states, numerous competition 
interpretations may no longer be appropriate with the globalisation of some 
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industries (of which telecommunications -the new trade route- may be one). Whereas 
there was a call for seamless systems and 'one-stop-shopping' for global 
communications, it could be reasonable to consider one-stop-shopping for certain 
needs or industries in regard to competition policies and laws. To a point this has 
begun to be recognised. Under the old telecommunications system, the inter-state 
connections were ruled under the ITU. In the modern, liberalised system, the 
changing goals of the ITU become more comparable to the WTO objectives and 
policy interpretations. The ITU91 acknowledged this, stating: 
"There is a growing convergence of goals of the ITU and WTO - to increase 
the value and utility of telecommunications to society as a whole, and to 
foster telecommunications regulatory reform so that countries may fully 
benefit from modern technologies and develop their national economies. 
However, not all ITU members are members of the WTO, and even for the 
..... countries which are members of both, there 
is a surprising lack of 
information and understanding among the telecommunications community 
about what the WTO is, what it does, and what impact it is likely to have on 
their telecommunications regulatory regimes. Perhaps even more importantly 
in that context, are the potential impacts on each nation state's broader 
public interest goals - general economic growth and job creation, the 
opportunity to fully participate in the growing global trading system, and 
social benefits of opportunities..... " 92 
This statement raises important concerns about the disparity of policy and law 
among states. In one respect these are due to a potential lack of full comprehension 
about the changes occurring. Under the newer trade system (WTO [with the GATS] 
and ITU), there is the pursuit of opening state monopolistic sectors and establishing 
"... general 'obligations and disciplines' that are binding on World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) member governments, and ... committing WTO members. " 
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Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert favour, from an EC position, international 
rules for the following reason: 
"European firms 
... 
face a competitive disadvantage if they have to compete 
on world markets with foreign producers operating from home markets that 
are subject to less vigorous competition policies. Multilateral rules would 
promote more equal conditions of competition worldwide. " 9' 
From a less national, state or trade-area centred position as such, international rules 
in competition are important because: 1) conflicts of law and jurisdiction between 
states can be avoided, and 2) a gradual convergence of competition laws can be 
encouraged. The first is important (in continuation with the line of argument in this 
chapter), "... to minimise the jurisdictional conflicts and resulting trade conflicts that 
can arise, not only from the application of competition law to anti-competitive 
practices conceived abroad, but implemented within one's jurisdiction. "95 The 
second, convergence, reduces the potential for conflict, promotes legal certainty for 
business, avoids expense and duplication of work. 6 Furthermore, not all states have 
a developed competition policy or system. Some states for example, may lack the 
necessary domestic competition rules to enforce anti-competitive practices with 
international dimensions. 97 In light of the changes in the telecommunications 
industry, namely the corporate structure through alliances, Brittan and Van Miert 
make a particularly noteworthy observation about global business changes: 
"The 1980s and 1990s have seen a significant increase in international 
mergers, strategic alliances, joint ventures, licensing agreements etc. These 
arrangements may face examination by different authorities at the same time 
with potential for a conflict in the law or remedy applied to the same case. In 
an extreme example, divergences in the laws applicable to the same set of 
facts may result in conflicting conclusions as to the legality of the behaviour 
under review. However, even where there is a common view as to the anti- 
competitive nature of the conduct, the remedies imposed in each jurisdiction 
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may be incompatible. "98 
In keeping with this train of thought about a wider common international 
competition law, as opposed to the more telecommunications-specific common 
competition law, what framework could be considered? Brittan and Van Miert are of 
the opinion that an International Competition Authority can not with its own powers 
of investigation and enforcement be created in the medium term. Instead, it is 
practical to build on existing institutions. Within the WTO for example, common 
principles could be established with the view to promote gradual convergence, equal 
conditions of competition globally, establish co-operation between domestic 
authorities, and dispute settlement. 99 
However, domestic competition structures would have to be developed (at least 
among the under-developed) and secondly conflict could exist in the basic necessity 
of finding common principles. The philosophies behind competition law, policies and 
their enforcement vary from an interventionist to a libertarian position. Perhaps after 
a century of antitrust and having completed a cycle of opposing approaches to policy 
and judicial interpretations, lessons may be applied in creating a set of common 
principles. Secondly, competition law and policy may be suited under industry- 
specific analysis such as telecommunications. 
Some of the basic and fundamental difficulties in working towards a global 
competition principle, policy and law have been stated, such as differences in 
policies, inadequate enforcement or simply the limited or non-existence of such 
regulations. Perhaps in the instance of the latter, this is the easiest to resolve as there 
are no preconceived opinions or traditions involved; unless something fundamental 
about the political system (such as the former Eastern European communist system) 
opposes the basic economic principles behind competition practices. In devising a 
global competition system of rules, it would not be value-free. It could not be 
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neutral. No concept of market freedom can be value-free. 100 This approach of 
suggesting economics is a science and applying the law scientifically does not make a 
neutralisation of ideology. Yet, like the European Community (namely the 
Commission), the WTO and other such organisations should be ideologically neutral. 
They may be party-politically neutral, but the principles are unavoidably ideology- 
based. 'o' 
So even though liberalisation and competition may be spreading to become widely 
accepted for many states, within this broad set of principles the opposing approaches 
may politically obstruct progress towards a global competition regime. Furthermore 
and importantly: 
"[I]nternational order lacks a supranational authority to which to refer the 
conflicts that might arise among its participants. " 102 
De Leon stated: 
"The need to reconsider international regulation over economic transactions 
inevitably uncovers significant problems stemming from the particular nature 
and importance attached by policy makers to these regulations. These ideas 
entail entrenched principles about state intervention and individual freedom, 
and are therefore doomed to conflict. Additionally, the very nature of the 
phenomenon creates further challenges to the task of harmonising these 
views. The international economic order emerges from the consensus of its 
participants. This is frequently ignored by policy makers who assume that 
public policy goals may be set and reached independently from the will of 
those affected by these rules. " '03 
For example, in approaching the very issue of international regulations, the tactic 
taken by governments will most inevitably be 'state-centric'. Economic and political 
powers such as the United States will, naturally, consider it in their interest to 
influence international law formation and interpretation to parallel the American style 
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and philosophy. Simultaneously and not exclusively, the European Community 
would want their influence to be predominant. In their Communication Brittan and 
Van Miert stated: 
"A basic assumption of this Communication is that a framework of 
competition rules, negotiated in the WTO, would be compatible with EC 
competition law, in particular the provisions of the EC Treaty. The WTO 
instrument would, as is traditional in GATT/WTO apply to governments and 
not be self-executing or have direct effect. It would also be much more 
general than the relevant provisions under EC law, and the emphasis would 
in the first stages be on procedural obligations. " Boa 
In telecommunications, an area whereby both a global and a state-centric approach is 
evident and a potential conflict, this policy debate is important. The Fifth Regulatory 
Colloquium Report outlined four "distinct, but related reasons" for 
telecommunications as an important trade issue of global concern. The Report 
(ITU)'s reasoning claimed telecommunications was an important infrastructure 
(network) for the exchange of goods and services, from financial information, 
professional and even tourism. With the advent of competition the problem of 
market access was raised making trade negotiations about the right to sell services in 
foreign markets important. Thirdly, these negotiations require national telecom 
regimes to be reformed to enable proper domestic and foreign competition and 
access. Fourthly its importance is: 
"Because issues concerning telecommunications relationships between 
countries or between telecommunications operators in different countries that 
have traditionally been handled within the ITU framework, such as issues 
concerning accounting rates and correspondent relations between 
international telecommunications operators, also arise in the context of 
international trade negotiations. " 105 
337 
Under the GATS general obligations are imposed on states namely with regard to 
licensing, transparency and foreign investment limiting. 106 However, it is perhaps 
becoming more important that international agreements such as the GATS go 
beyond traditional inter-state agreements to something resembling and meeting 
convergence in so far as the changes in telecommunications are concerned. 
Convergence has two separate subjects in this instance; telecommunications and the 
state. Yet, these two are connected. Convergence in regard to states could mean a 
convergence of laws such as trade or competition-specific. Initially this notion 
challenges, even threatens the sacred sovereignty and independence of states; but this 
may not necessarily be the case. Convergence in regard to telecommunications, as 
stated in Chapter One, is more technological and consequently market-based. In the 
Chairman's Report of the Sixth Regulatory Colloquium of the ITU, it was explained: 
"There are many ways to describe what is meant by convergence in 
communications. Convergence can refer to the provision of new services 
over existing infrastructure, development of new types of infrastructure, and 
the enhancement of existing services and technologies to provide new 
capabilities. Convergence can also be defined as technological, market, or 
legal/regulatory capability to integrate across previously separated 
technologies, markets or politically defined industry structures. Convergence 
also involves an important international component, as many services and 
information sources that were traditionally controlled on a domestic level are 
being provided on a global basis. " 107 
The result of overlapping systems, infrastructure, services and markets and 
industries, according to the ITU, "... is that traditionally defined industry segments 
are less and less distinguishable". 108 Despite these practical changes, regulatory 
bodies are not necessarily as adaptable in meeting the newer market and structure 
forms. 109 This may be due to legislative obstacles or simple lack of appreciation of 
change. Nevertheless, and regardless of the reasons, the issue remains as outlined by 
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the ITU: 
"Despite the blurring of industry segments, many regulators continue to 
licence and regulate discrete services for certain carriers, while equivalent 
functions provided over other types of systems may be less regulated, or not 
licensed at all. This discrimination is not sustainable, as is evidenced by 
growing arbitrage of services.... Sources and alternative means of delivering 
information are becoming increasingly abundant and ubiquitous, while certain 
operations such as traditional press and broadcasting are still subject to close 
content regulation, and others (the Internet, satellite broadcasting) either are 
not or cannot be as easily controlled. Technology, of course, knows no 
regulatory or legal limits... " 110 
Presently with these practical conflicts at basic, national legislative and policy levels 
it is hardly surprising that the global nature of the new (tele-)communications beast 
is unchallenged by the slow, confused and ageing political approaches by states. The 
ITU observed: 
"Competitive principles are coming to dominate the market worldwide, but 
there remains regulatory segmentation and even monopoly control of major 
industry elements on the national level in many countries.... Because other 
trends that are occurring are largely beyond the direct control of 
governments, and market forces are increasingly determining industry 
evolution, it is apparent that the impact of convergence upon regulation will 
be greater than the impact of regulation upon convergence. " 111 
Significant challenges are faced by regulation and policy-planners in regard to 
communication convergence. There may not be a common perspective among states 
on all issues pertaining to convergence. These will be affected by the economics and 
technical advance-position of states, and even different needs influenced by social, 
economic and even geographical criteria. Yet, where there is common ground on 
339 
which to develop global principles, while simultaneously maintaining degrees of 
independence, is in the separation of the technical element of communications from 
the market-economic element. As the ITU noted, there are still important roles for 
governments in convergence. 
"These include management of the radio spectrum, to assure equitable 
allocation of frequencies among competing service, and limit interference; 
promotion of minimal technical standards if needed to ensure universal 
compatibility of systems.... " 112 
Nevertheless, the management of these elements may need some global agreement as 
to standards, frequencies and types of common interconnection capabilities for the 
co-ordination of a Global Information Infrastructure. '13 
The market-economic element is significant in so far as the rise of the global market, 
the global industry, and last but certainly not least the global player (company). It is 
here that different, weak or non-existent competition laws and policies meet and 
conflict. It is here where there is a conflict between state laws; where the conflict 
may due to the inadequacies of effectively meeting the globalisation process of 
markets, thereby risking a void or state of (global) market anarchy. As stated earlier, 
Brittan and Van Miert do not foresee the emergence of an effective international 
competition authority. Instead the laws should emerge through establishing common 
principles. In the meantime some of the principles behind the policies of states are 
either flawed, conflicting or confused about the meaning and mixing of the terms 
competition policy and antitrust policy. De Leon stated: 
"A... misconception by supporters of antitrust policy arises from their 
unfounded assumptions that the policy question is developed and enforced 
follow a'public interest' objective, in principle, the promotion of 
competition. "' 14 
Although his conclusions are particularly critical of those who do not take into 
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account consideration of the economic consequences of antitrust, (just as the 
Chicago school theorists might argue, ) he (perhaps inadvertently) raises an important 
point in making a distinction between antitrust and competition policy. 
De Leon's use of the term antitrust is adopted from the American and OECD 
practice as " 'the body of laws and regulations governing business practices 
(horizontal or vertical agreements between enterprises, abuses of dominant positions, 
monopolisation, mergers and acquisitions)' "1 15 Secondly, the use of competition 
policy is more general as in the European Community tradition. "' The separation of 
these two is significant and may assist the advancement of establishing common 
principles at a global level. However, in establishing the principles, 'antitrust' is an 
element of'competition policy. As De Leon states, the economic arguments in either 
case, but especially 'antitrust', should not be ignored.. However, its use and influence 
should perhaps be regarded with caution, though economic theory's usefulness for 
guidance should be acknowledged. De Leon (et al) argues against policies which are 
considered without regard for the economic theory and implications. He stated: 
"A constructive and more profound perspective must not attempt to isolate 
social reality and market functioning from those sets of rules that enable them 
to function. " 117 
Rather than whole-heartedly adopt or ignore economic theories, consideration of 
antitrust consequences is beneficial at both domestic and international levels. 
However, one also should be careful with dismissing concerns about restrictive trade 
and business practices; for contrary to the cited words of P. Godek by De Leon, "$ 
anxiety about imagined ills of capitalism may in fact be healthy if the related 
principles of freedom are to be ensured and other economic theories are not entirely 
reliable. " 9 Economic rhetoric is as much apart of public policy as is any other 
political theory rhetoric. Competition policy is the sum of trade and legal rights or 
restrictions for business practice. Antitrust is as it was intended; against trusts. 
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Antitrust is a political not an economic policy. Economic theory provides methods 
for which antitrust and competition policy consequences may be argued, judged or 
only predicted. If a common policy is against the domination of a private (economic) 
power or trust and in favour of public government, then this is a common principle 
on which to start the globalisation of competition policy, learning from (but not 
necessarily exclusively) the American trend and from common market lessons of the 
EC. Telecommunications is an industry-specific example with which to develop the 
necessary principles, practices for a global economy, and learn from the lessons, 
successes and failures of experienced competition (antitrust) regulators. 
6.5 Summary 
While "[t]he internationalisation of services is at the very core of the process of 
economic globalisation'120, telecommunications is the principal infrastructure for 
delivering these services. This infrastructure is important, and the control 
(commercial or political) over the infrastructure-market determines its effectiveness, 
efficiency and costs, affecting these features in the service-market. It is worth 
repeating a couple of fundamental questions which the modern communications- 
centric world faces: Is national support for global companies really in the interest of 
states or are such policies dated and misguided? If a company truly becomes 'global' 
rather than simply a multinational, then is it really a national company; one with ties 
and loyalty to its state, or has the state become an economic and political pawn for 
the interests of the (global) company? The answers then determine the legal policy of 
states and of world trade organisations. Yet a failure to give serious consideration to 
these matters may risk furthering the void or weakness of international competition 
management. In turn this may add further conflict between states in so far as one 
state or trade area extends the scope of its competition rules into others' jurisdictions 
or sovereignties. 
If the commercial structure of states is changing from manufacturing industrial-based 
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to information(-communications)-based, and if the structure of the 
telecommunications industry is altering to such an extent that it is becoming a global 
industry, as opposed to a multinational one, could this modem Information Society 
have consequences to the political structure which has been the status quo for at 
least the past century? That is to suggest, if such changes are occurring (which affect 
potentially all states), is the presumption of state-supremacy at risk of being 
questioned? It is possible that both are happening; neither the structure of state-ism 
significantly changes, nor does globalisation seriously threaten the state's power. 
Nevertheless, even if devolution spreads worldwide, there would still be the 
recognition that, as Brittan stated, an interdependent world has been developing; 
hence the independence of states also demands co-operation. In some instances, co- 
operation may extend to surrendering some of the state's traditional, absolute power, 
because its absolute power has been challenged, and indeed weakened by industries 
which are truly global. 
To maintain order and control, some form of effective mechanism may be required 
such as a world competition authority. To achieve this, there might be required some 
common principles about competition. Advances towards such a framework is 
evident through agreements and treaties such as the GATS. A modem ITU provides 
an example for an industry and market-specific authority. As noted above with the 
views of Karel Van Miert and Sir Leon Brittan, the WTO could be an appropriate 
organisation with which to develop international competition laws 
The conflict to overcome for an effective authority remains centred on sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. The capability of the new telecommunications industry, its changing 
structure and importantly, its intangible, yet valuable information-product gives rise 
to a greater potential than most other industries for a re-examination and 
modernisation of these political values. A re-examination is not simply to change the 
system for the sake of it, but because modern technology (e. g. telecommunications) 
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and commercial society challenges the present acclaimed supremacy structure of the 
state; founded and developed under different circumstances at a different time. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has sought to facilitate a re-assessment of contemporary competition law 
(antitrust) and policy. The need for such an analysis stems from a century of antitrust 
law during which problems have persisted despite the range of philosophical 
approaches that have been deployed in its development. Furthermore, these 
persistent problems are not only demonstrable through the example of the liberalising 
telecommunications market, but this market is also an example in which assumptions 
attributed to perfect markets manifestly fail to meet the ideals. Telecommunications 
is also an appropriate market - example because firstly, it is an established industry 
undergoing the process of deregulation and therefore serves well as a case study for. 
a competition - system review. Secondly, it is an important market because of its 
significance as the infrastructural foundation of modern commercial society. 
Through the progression of this thesis towards a re-assessment of competition law 
and policy, some of the fundamental and the continuing problems have been brought 
to the forefront. The thesis was constructed in stages, beginning with the setting out 
of the telecommunications environment (both the market and the policies) at the time 
the thesis was undertaken. The philosophical foundation of competition policies was 
discussed, followed by analysis of specific areas in both telecommunications (e. g. 
universal service and interconnection) and the market (e. g. strategic alliances and 
mergers). There remains, for example, the broad problem of market dominance and 
its threat to a properly functioning competitive market. Indeed, the very nature of 
telecommunications currently presents some challenges to the basic model and ideals 
of the fully competitive marketplace. Finally, the issue of telecommunications beyond 
national jurisdictions and the developing context of "globalisation" was introduced 
to further the re-assessment, showing that competition policy and law can no longer 
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realistically be confined within state boundaries. In all of these respects the 
telecommunications sector affords an excellent illustrative example. 
The study is primarily advanced in the context of the law of the European 
Community, although there are common problems shared with other jurisdictions in 
relation to the telecommunications market. There may here be seen interesting and 
good examples of both common conflicts in competition policy and problems facing 
the telecommunications market as it is liberalised into a truly competitive form. 
Telecommunications is also a fundamentally important market, because it is 
increasingly the basic infrastructure of contemporary commercial society. 
The basis of this thesis is the questioning of the underlying philosophy which 
underpins the foundation of the law and policy of competition. It is now an 
appropriate time to reflect on competition policy, because, after a century of 
existence, not only do a number of problems remain, but the changing nature of the 
industry provides a suitable opportunity to seek solutions to these problems. 
Furthermore, the expectation that the contemporary commercial world is beginning a 
revolutionary form of change into an "Information Society", the significance of this 
industry, its impact and increasingly global nature of it make the present a time of 
importance and influence. 
There are a number of theories and influences which have been deployed in the 
search for the ideal and perfect means of regulating competition; be it by 
government intervention or'the natural law of economics'. In many instances, shared 
legal questions were answered differently by the US and EC authorities. The answers 
were (and are) affected by different policies and aims, such as the goal of integration 
which is fundamental to EC law. Different philosophies have resulted in different 
answers. The EC, for example, has a reputation for being more interventionist than 
the US. The American experience is beneficial to the development of competition 
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laws such as the EC's, because it has the experience of extreme philosophies 
(intervention versus non-intervention) influencing its antitrust enforcement culture. 
However, the experiences from other authorities like the EC, may provide valuable 
lessons towards forming new approaches to competition problems. 
The changes in national marketplaces suggest the likelihood of a new commercial 
society. Telecommunications is the infrastructure of developed societies, in a manner 
parallel to the role of railroad in the Industrial Society. This confers upon the 
industry and market a fundamental national importance. But this does not necessarily 
mean there should be greater national intervention. Rather, it is the peculiarities of 
this market and its ambiguities in a competitive environment which make 
telecommunications an interesting study. Reference has been made to the American 
experience of competition in telecommunications in the late 19th and early 20th 
century as an example of competition problems. The rise and domination of private 
power, as was the case in the early experience of the US, over such an important 
social and commercial infrastructure would seem to contradict the principles of 
competition as well as some political. philosophies of Western states. The 
significance of such power is enhanced by the extension of modem 
telecommunications' infrastructure beyond state borders to a global level. Its 
importance as the infrastructural basis of the domestic economy add to or highlight 
the importance of domination problems within the market. There are also issues of 
interest and importance arising from the cross-border effects and the globalisation 
prospects of both the industry and individual companies. Even so, it must be 
emphasised that the telecommunications industry does not in itself represent a unique 
example, it is rather a type-example which carries messages for a much wider range 
of modern commerce. 
A further point of interest is that the telecommunications industry and marketplace is 
a well established commercial sector in which the introduction of competition offers 
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a new and highly significant challenge. There is the concern throughout this thesis 
that competition, if not managed so that it is continuous, will appear to function as 
ideal competition only for a short period. Thereafter, the names may change, the 
players may change, and the ways and even methods of conducting traditional 
exchanges of goods and services may change, but the problems faced in a 
competitive system may not undergo real change. 
Preventing the rise of trusts, or private domination of industries and the marketplace, 
may have been the origins of US antitrust law and to a degree similarly played a role 
in the EC's own legal origins, but old problems remain. They remain because of 
changes in interpretation and lapses in thinking as to what degree of domination is 
acceptable and what is not. In its history antitrust interpretation has ranged from a 
political or policy approach to an attempt to apply "scientific" principles through 
economic theory. Yet, it is perhaps understanding that the difficulty in applying 
scientific principles to law and in expecting scientific facts and/or 'truths' to regulate 
society remain a social and commercial constant. 
The appeal of the application of scientific principles to law, which lies in the 
perceived predictability of the results, was raised as an issue in this study. This 
appeal is understandable because every case can be made to fit neatly into the same 
perceived model. Such a method is initially attractive because it affords ready 
answers, and it is also an approach which can, misleadingly, be interpreted as a 
neutral tool for common use. The problem is that the appeal of clear answers risks 
blinding one to more complex realities. This offers a dangerously over-simplified 
ideal. It has been argued that this ideal is more misleading than helpful. In contrast to 
the laws of physics which supposedly offer predictable certainty, the involvement of 
the human player in the marketplace precludes any such certitude. This human 
interaction dilutes arguments concerning laws of economics because the presumption 
of perfect knowledge is called into question. The advocation of the alleged laws of 
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natural economics becomes more ideological than science. This risks reducing its 
credibility as a beneficial tool and the arguments become self-defeating. 
Progress towards a legal system which uses economic theories in a more appropriate 
manner may be possible by acknowledging the inherent faults within a system of 
"scientific" principles. This would be to use the theories as tools for the anticipation 
of possible or probable costs of laws and judicial decisions. Then the result may be 
judged to be acceptable or not. For example, if society values a competitive system, 
then some intervention, despite doctrinaire opposition in some quarters may be 
necessary, The problem however, which further illustrates the difficulty of the human 
participant in creating the ideal predictable results, lies in choosing which of the 
many and opposing economic theories to use as the tool. This should be further 
developed in the re-assessment of competition policy for which this thesis calls. 
In so far as modem telecommunications is concerned, the new capabilities and 
possibilities and opportunities will no doubt attract many firms to the market, but at 
the same time the objective of "competition" for companies is to win. For society, 
the objective is different. The liberalisation of telecommunications is on the basis that 
the market can achieve a more efficient and effective communications service than 
the. public sector. Values such as "universal service" have emerged and become 
"rights". Achieving and retaining universal service is one area in which the 
competitive market could be distorted by necessity or as a result of rights and 
privileges granted in order to render this principle effective. The need for 
interconnection, and particularly in the early years of liberalisation the infrastructure 
deficit, emphasises the importance of co-operation and access to rivals facilities. 
These factors, especially the latter contribute to some contradictions inherent in 
telecommunications and problems for an idealistic competitive system. It also risks 
encouraging anti-competitive behaviour and adds support to the arguments of 
interventionists. However, co-operation has also been seen as a necessity in meeting 
356 
the demands of consumers, especially large businesses which internationally conduct 
trade. While this is not anti-competitive per se, it does raise some interesting matters 
about strategic alliances. 
Strategic alliances have raised a number of interesting problems and concerns for 
debate. These continue the argument about intervention and non-intervention in the 
market by competition authorities, and scepticism about applying the idealist model 
of competition enforcement, as in the views espoused by "the Chicago School" 
philosophy. This subject is of particular interest at a time of telecommunications 
market liberalisation. It opens up a range of concerns among which include joint 
ventures and mergers. Questions arise from these matters about the relationship 
between companies, their effects on competition and the application of law. 
Questions also are raised about political intervention in allowing or disallowing 
alliances, including important issues arising in and in the interface with foreign 
jurisdictions. 
A complex problem in competition assessment is that of oligopolies. Oligopolies are 
a problem, because such a market situation is vague compared with definitive 
positions such as a monopoly. It is a complex situation of imperfect competition with 
opportunity for barriers to entry for potential competitors to be erected, intentionally 
or unintentionally, and also for collusion between the existing players. The threat is a 
concentrative marketplace. Oligopolies raise a number of important questions that 
are necessarily addressed in the re-assessment for which this thesis calls. In regard to 
telecommunications sector, the transitional period (from the old monopolistic regime 
towards a competitive system) presents the opportunity to avert the negative 
consequences of an oligopolistic and concentrative marketplace. There is thus at 
present an opportunity to avoid long-term damage to the competitive market or the 
future need for intervention. Telecommunications is an example in which there is 
likely to arise oligopolistic issues in various sections of the market such as 
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infrastructure. Among these concerning factors are questions about the nature and 
expense of the product or service: Is the market one which requires a large company, 
and can only support a few such companies? Furthermore, in maintaining a 
competitive system, some additional analysis is recommended in oligopolistic 
structures. Other questions that need addressing include: Does the competitive 
behaviour of the companies affect the marketplace, changing it from a competitive 
one to an oligopolistic one? If so, is this avoidable? Oligopolies require re- 
examination, particularly to ensure legal instruments are available to better oversee 
competition. 
The basic principles of competition and the governance of the system is further 
challenged by the recognised problem that telecommunications is an ambiguous case. 
At times anti-competitive behaviour (e. g. co-operation or foreclosure) might be 
acceptable or necessary in order to achieve, for example, nation-wide or international 
connections. As a result, it may be beneficial for some mergers and for some joint 
ventures to occur which might ordinarily go against judicial philosophy. The problem 
is in forming some consistency and predictability. It also causes tensions between 
corporate behaviour and industrial and market structure. The question is: where to 
go from here to find a sound approach for competition law which meets the needs of 
contemporary society, 'rather than pursuing a fashionable ideology. 
Telecommunications is a study of ambiguities. Conflicts within the system of 
competition will continue, including the contradictory principle of a necessity for 
some form of co-operation. However, it is possible that the industry's structure is 
evolving into something entirely new with unforeseen problems, perhaps resulting 
from responses to older ones. It is also challenging the state-centric legal structure 
through its globalisation, both as an industry and with its service-capabilities. 
EC law is an example of a normative structure unifying competition law between 
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states, however it lacks the predictability demanded by lawyers and industry alike. It 
may be that, as an example of inter-state law, the lesson to be learnt by the EC is that 
some legal matter are best left to the individual countries. Nonetheless, in the 
instance of an industry and/or marketplace which extends beyond the confines of 
individual states, EC law clearly has the potential to be one the more progressive 
examples of developing trans-national facilitation and regulation. The problem 
however, is the mandate of the EC system, (especially after the Maastrict Treaty) to 
move towards increasing political unification between the Member States and the 
divergent understandings and acceptance of this between them. The EC's weak 
record in predictability encourages some attraction to the American method of neo- 
classical economics as a means to establish a common principle among states for a 
more global competition system. Yet this approach also has inherent weaknesses 
which generates serious risks in jumping to seemingly "obvious" conclusions. The 
potential of such a global system is also weakened by the continuing effects of the 
inward-looking nature of the state system. Yet, if national identities attached to 
telecommunications companies were removed and a wider interest in world 
competition were adopted the competitive behaviour of these companies might 
become more manageable in domestic markets. 
A concern which emerges from studying telecommunications is that the benefits of 
the competitive telecom marketplace will largely be corporate businesses, because 
they use more communications services and contribute more revenue to the telecom 
firms than the domestic persons. Telecommunications seems to be an all- 
encompassing term, whose usage is lacking in distinction between two very separate 
markets and the recipient of the benefits of the new telecommunications era. Indeed 
specific reference to the corporate or the domestic markets is made. from time to 
time, but over all the perception is of one market. This may create confusion in the 
analysis of competition, and clarification could assist antitrust interpretation. 
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There is now the opportunity for a practical re-examination of competition theories 
and laws in the light of past experiences and a century of variable experience, largely 
deriving from the United States. The opportunity is present also in light of 
'globalisation' whereby a void in the global market, weak or non-existent policies and 
laws in many states suggest discussion and action is necessary. Furthermore, through 
examining an industry such as telecommunications which is both competitive and co- 
operative, and which is also under-going significant transformations, it is an 
opportunity to re-evaluate and make the necessary corrections to competition law. 
This thesis has examined competition law in light of the changes to the 
telecommunications industry. Weaknesses in the law, ranging from areas of under- 
development to philosophical faults have been promoted, ultimately demonstrating 
that, in contrast to the opinion of some, the antitrust debate is far from over; history 
has not ended. As such, much analysis and debate can emerge from this examination 
towards improving competition law and developing it in the next century. 
The regulation and maintenance of competition in a marketplace which is undergoing 
radical changes and, to some degree, moving beyond the structural presumptions 
upon which former and existing patterns of regulation were based, inevitably raises 
serious questions. Analysis of the direction and implications is needed, and a 
response to these questions is essential. This thesis seeks to examine these issues and 
in doing so underlines the fundamental dichotomy between a competitive ideal and a 
strategic market reality. The satisfactory resolution of this issue, in the maintenance 
of the advantage of a competitive ethic in ways compatible with the real 
marketplace, is vital for an efficient and effective telecommunications sector in the 
Twenty-first century. It may, by analogy, have also a much broader importance for 
other marketplaces and industrial sectors. 
The return of competition and liberalisation in telecommunications and its 
development across the globe has greater significance for the industry. One 
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significance is the increase in the number of potential (national-) markets telecom 
firms could enter, yet at the same time there is an increase in the number of 
consumer and product markets. Another significance is the importance of the 
industry as a whole to society entering the 21st century. These changes and the surge 
in importance of telecommunications is, like the railways were in the nineteenth 
century for manufacturing in large countries, in the provision of a global 
infrastructure for economic prosperity based on the commercial exchange. of 
information. 
On both sides of the. Atlantic principles such as Universal Service have been 
questioned as to their relevance and contemporary significance. Are such principles 
of value, and are they best served by the marketplace rather than by governments? 
Do such principles have any value or should they be modified and updated? 
Furthermore, how far do governments become involved in connecting the 
populations to communications? These policy questions directly affect competition in 
telecommunications. On the one hand, will the marketplace ensure universal 
connection and service, or will those who are least profitable suffer disadvantages? 
Leaving aside the differences between vast city populations and remote island hill 
farms, will businesses benefit significantly more than the domestic consumer? If on 
the other hand the government intervenes and imposes obligations on a telecoms 
firm to provide service to the less profitable population, will this place the company 
at an unfair disadvantage relative to other telecom firms? In short, the future of 
competition regulation in the telecommunications sector must somehow square a 
circle between the imperatives of competitive commerce and the linked, but not 
wholly concordant necessities of service provision. 
The importance of these questions, especially in this analysis, is the demonstration of 
the difficulty and the inherent conflicts telecommunications has in relation to pure 
competition theory. These questions also incorporate an overlap of competition 
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(antitrust) principles and social principles, which in the EC can at times be seen 
between DGIV (Competition Directorate in the EC Commission) and DGXIII 
(Telecommunications Directorate). In regard to principles of competition, the 
expense and technical nature of the industry may pose start-up challenges for firms 
seeking to compete with the established, incumbent telecommunications operator. 
This leads to such questions as: who has access to the infrastructure, how is it paid 
for, and finally who has the right to access (or be denied access)? Yet, from a 
position of social principle, some conflict with competition principles (such as 
intervention for equal access) could be resolved through technological advances. 
In telecommunications the convergence of technologies and the emergence of new 
market opportunities has generated a rapid process of development which does not 
admit a leisurely development of appropriate legal responses. This thesis does not 
seek to advance any "perfect" model for telecommunications, or general, 
competition regulation. Its purpose has rather been to examine the issues which must 
be taken into account in the useful development of legal norms for the positive 
growth of an industry which is not only important in itself, but essential to the broad 
base of modem commerce. In a rapidly evolving commercial sector it would be 
foolish to set in stone a "solution" to questions which are themselves in the course of 
emergence. It can, however, fairly be said that the evolution of regulatory law in 
parallel with commercial development must remain tied to the basic social concerns 
which afford the justification for such regulation in the first place. The ultimate 
production of adequate regulatory restrictions rests upon a clear understanding of 
the needs which are to be addressed. It is to this vital preliminary endeavour that this 
thesis has been instrumental for the facilitation of positive and productive dialogue in 
its chosen area of study. 
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